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Foreword 
"The energy future of the European Community 
will rely on the development of an energy policy 
that emphasises a free internal market, 
encourages technological advance and supports 
sustainable economic growth with concern for the 
environment. " 
This was the framework that emerged from two 
days of discussions at "Energy for a New 
Century - The European Perspective", a two-
day conference organised by the European 
Commission in Brussels, 3-4 May, 1990. 
I am grateful to the distinguished speakers and 
guests for making available their experience 
and for the informative debate on these 
important energy issues. 
Clearly we share a common concern with our 
global partners in looking at how best energy 
can contribute to economic growth and 
prosperity and how we can better manage the 
environmental consequences of energy 
production and use through the improved 
application of technology. 
This special edition of "Energy in Europe" provides the opportunity of sharing with a wider 
audience: 
- the report of the "Groupe des Sages" who at our request identified those issues and areas of 
energy policy in need of greatest attention; 
- the energy analysis "Major Themes in Energy Revisited"; and 
- the conference proceedings. 
The results of the conference form an invaluable input to the Commission's programme for 
energy policy. 
Antonio Cardoso e Cunha 
Member of the Commision 

Introduction 
In 1987 the Directorate-General for energy began the process of establishing the conditions for 
integrating energy in the framework of the Single European Market. The following year, the 
Council of Ministers approved the Commission's programme for the Internal Energy Market, 
fixing the priorities for its achievement. Today there is consensus (among Member States and 
industry) that a new and more common approach to energy is urgently required. 
In parallel to this and placing the Internal Market in a wider context, we have been examining 
the factors which could influence the Community's energy future. Among the many influences 
at work on both the demand for and supply of energy, a number were identified as "Major 
Themes" which can determine the direction of future policy. These reflect the important 
political, economic, industrial, environmental and energy developments at the world level. The 
Community's energy objectives for 1995 alone are not sufficient to drive the Community's 
energy economy towards a new integrated single market. Other actions are necessary 
commensurate with the challenges of these global issues. 
We believe that a comprehensive and well-structured debate on world and Community energy 
perspectives for a new century was essential. This debate began with the publication in 
September 1989 of the interim report "Major Themes in Energy". 
The report sought to facilitate a dialogue between often opposing interests. The extensive 
exchange of views which followed its publication was essential to deepen and expand the 
analysis. The final version, "Major Themes in Energy - Revisited", incorporates comments and 
suggestions received. 
I am grateful to Kevin Leydon who directed this project and to all the members of his team who 
drafted both reports and ensured the coordination of an extensive exchange of views. 
We had the good fortune and the honour to receive the criticism and suggestions of six eminent 
personalities who accepted our invitation to form a "Groupe des Sages" to comment on the 
"Major Themes in Energy". Their report together with the "Major Themes in Energy -
Revisited" report will be the cornerstone of the continuation of our work. 
I am therefore grateful to Professor Umberto Colombo, Dr. Martin Gallego, Dr. Heinz Horn, 
the Rt. Hon. David Howell, Professor Jacques Lesourne and to Mr. Peter Winsemius for their 
valuable cooperation. 
Commissioner Antonio Cardoso e Cunha initiated the discussion when addressing the World 
Energy Conference last September in Montreal. His comments and his ideas, together with his 
dynamic endorsement of this initiative added political value and a stimulus to the efforts of my 
colleagues. I am grateful to the Commissioner for his guidance and support. 
Following the conference "Energy for a new century: The European Perspective" the first stage 
of this work has been accomplished. The major and challenging task of redefining the future 
direction of the Community's energy policy begins. The Directorate-General for Energy is 
committed to this most important second stage. We believe firmly that a common approach to 
European energy policy is of capital importance for our economy and a natural coroUaTyl^ f an 
Integrated European Market. 
C.S. Maniatopoulos 
Director-General 

Energy for a new century: 
The European Perspective 
Report of the "Groupe des Sages" 
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In a wide ranging and comprehensive review such as is presented in this report, not every member of the group would 
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Energy in Europe 
Foreword 
"Can we continue to develop the world's energy supplies, on a secure and economic basis, sufficient 
to maintain economic growth whilst at the same time ensuring that the global environment is 
protected and indeed improved ?" 
Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha, 
Montreal, September 1989. 
The question is straightforward. Finding the answer is one of mankind's most complex and vital 
tasks. It has assumed a new sense of urgency for the European Community because of the 
dramatic changes which now face us. 
These changes include the completion of the internal European market, the unprecedented 
developments within the countries of Eastern Europe and increasing concern for the 
environment, in particular global warming. The significance of these changes should not be 
underestimated. They will influence major decisions in all sectors over the next decade and 
beyond. 
For the energy sector, in particular, the challenges are immense. This was lucidly illustrated in 
the report "Major Themes in Energy" produced by the Commission's Directorate-General for 
Energy (DG XVII) and first presented at the World Energy Conference at Montreal in 
September 1989. In that study alternative future scenarios were presented as a means of 
stimulating discussion on the major themes and challenges facing the energy sector. 
In this report, we take a step forward. At the request of the Commission, we have attempted to 
draw out the key messages from the "Major Themes" report. In particular, we have sought to 
identify those issues and areas of energy policy in need of greatest attention. 
The first part of our report focuses on the scenarios developed by DG XVII. We present our 
understanding of the key features of each of the scenarios and also provide some general 
comments on aspects of the scenarios which could be further developed. In the second and 
third parts, we consider the main challenges which now face us. These challenges derive not 
only from the "Major Themes" report but also incorporate our own views of more recent 
developments, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. In the final part, we present some 
concluding remarks on the way forward. 
Our report provides no easy answers, because there are none. But we will have succeeded in 
our task if this document provokes thought, discussion and debate both at the Conference and 
within our society in general. 
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Introduction 
A decade has passed since the last energy crisis. However, energy issues are moving to the top 
of the political agenda once again. We believe that energy will be a priority issue in the 1990s 
because of its importance for economic development and because of increasing environmental 
concerns associated with its production and consumption. Even if resource scarcity is of less 
concern than in the past, the possibility of another major price shock cannot be ignored. 
We are, therefore, more than ever convinced that an energy policy is required. But, there are 
no easy solutions. An energy policy which encompasses all of the key objectives (strong 
economic growth, a clean environment, moderately priced and secure energy supplies) may not 
be readily compatible with current trends and values. An effective strategy to achieve 
sustainable development should recognize two fundamentals : 
1) The linkage between economic growth and energy demand needs to be reduced; 
2) Acceptable trade-offs have to be made, on an international scale, between energy and 
other concerns, particularly the environment. 
The first step must be to establish a consensus on the nature and magnitude of the problems to 
be faced. This will require a dialogue amongst the key players : energy companies, consumers, 
policy makers and other leading opinion formers. Only in this way, can conflicting objectives be 
recognized and resolved. 
In our view, an important initiative in this direction was taken when the Commission's 
Directorate-General for Energy (DG XVII) published its report "Major Themes in Energy" at 
the 1989 World Energy Conference. 
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Prospects : The "Major Themes" Report 
In this first part of our report we focus on the scenarios developed by DG XVII. 
There are at least three areas of novelty for which the "Major Themes" report should be 
commended : 
1) The key role of energy demand policies is highlighted; 
2) Recognition is given to the importance of environmental concerns in shaping energy 
policy; 
3) The importance of technology in helping to improve energy efficiency and 
4) Power generation and, especially, transport are identified as the critical sectors where 
solutions need to be focused. 
An important strength of the "Major Themes" report is the systematic use of models. The three 
scenarios hightlighted in the Report do not pretend to be predictive, but the use of models has 
ensured the self-
consistency of the assumptions used in the three cases. The following is our understanding of 
the key features of each scenario, together with our general comments on their findings and on 
how they could be further developed. 
Scenario 1 
DG XVII's Scenario 1 could best be described as a "business as usual" scenario. It does take 
account of the move towards integration of the European market, but no other major new 
policy initiatives are incorporated. Furthermore, the key scenario parameters, such as economic 
growth and oil prices, take values which broadly represent the "conventional wisdom" currently 
prevailing in the energy world. Although some of the assumptions could be debated, our 
judgement is that the resulting changes are unlikely to be sufficiently large to modify the 
general conclusions. 
Scenario 1 points to some potential problem areas, such as the growing need for upgrading 
facilities in the oil refining industry. On the whole, however, the conclusions seem to be 
reassuring from the energy point of view. 
In particular, saving major political upheavals, there is little reason under these assumptions to 
expect a new oil price shock or supply shortages. Although European dependency on oil and 
energy imports remains high, it does not reach unmanageable levels. No physical constraints 
on the availability of resources are anticipated until at least 2010. 
The concept of security will, in our view, continue to apply mainly to oil imports. Coal should 
present few problems due to the variety and nature of the suppliers to the world market. Some 
difficulties associated with gas imports could possibly arise if production capacity and 
transportation infrastructure do not keep pace with demand. 
Pollutants associated with acid rain (sulphur dioxide (S02) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx)) are 
expected to be under control as a consequence of Community legislation. S02 emissions would 
faD drastically after 2000, mainly in trie power sector. NOx emissions would decline more 
slowly as reductions per unit of output, particularly in the power and transport sectors, were 
offset by increased economic activity. Vigilance would certainly be needed to ensure that the 
planned reductions were achieved in practice. 
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However, there could still be environmental problems. Carbon dioxide (C02) emissions would 
increase (from 2700 million tonnes (Mt) in 1987 to 3400 Mt by 2010) in Scenario 1. The 
Toronto agreement, which proposed a 20 percent reduction by 2005, would not be achieved. 
Scenario 2 
History has demonstrated that the "conventional wisdom" is rarely correct. Usually unforeseen 
changes take place. Although such events cannot be predicted, the sensitivity to changes in key 
assumptions can be examined to test the robustness of a scenario. 
Such an exercice has been carried out in constructing Scenario 2. Economic growth in the EC 
was increased from 2.7 percent per annum to 3.5 percent per annum between 1990 and 2000, 
reflecting the impact of a more favourable international situation, combined with greater 
benefits derived from the completion of the internal market in Europe. 
This Scenario demonstrates that higher economic growth, without appropriate energy policy 
measures, will lead to increasing tensions. 
In international energy markets, the possibility of new price shocks and tight supplies would 
become more likely. Polluting emissions would also be nigher than Scenario 1 as a result of 
rapidly growing energy demand. The consequences of these problems in the longer term are 
significant. The higher rate of economic growth is judged to be unsustainable. 
Although variations in this analysis are possible, we believe that Scenario 2 clearly 
demonstrates, within a consistent framework, that unless effective energy policy measures are 
taken, the benefits of higher economic growth may be difficult to maintain. 
Scenario 3 
In designing Scenario 3, the aim was to reconcile the competing objectives of sustaining high 
economic growth (with resources available at acceptable price levels) and protecting the 
environment. 
This could be achieved principally by a rapid increase in energy efficiency after the turn of the 
century accompanied by a significant increase in nuclear power and gas-fired units substituting 
part of coal-fired plants. 
The technologies required to produce this large efficiency improvement are already available 
to-day and it would clearly be economically justified to promote their use. Indeed, a rapid 
penetration of technology would be consistent with and would itself promote higher economic 
growth. 
One important criticism of Scenario 3 could be the projected rapid increase in nuclear energy 
supply, from 180 Mtoe in 1995 to 340 Mtoe by 2010. This would appear to be very high given 
the climate of opinion which exists currently in most European countries. Conversely, the 
European indigenous coal industry experiences a rapid decline from 150 Mtoe in 1995 to 60 
Mtoe in 2010. This would have major economic and social implications for the regions 
concerned, which could justify further analysis.There is no doubt that the technological 
potential exists for Scenario 3 to be a plausible representation of the future. However, this 
poses the fundamental question : how in practice can such a rapid uptake of technology be 
achieved ? 
But, technological developments alone cannot be sufficient to satisfy the objectives. It is 
important to recognize that energy efficiency is not synonymous with energy conservation. 
Consumer behaviour however would likely absorb some of the efficiency gains in the form of 
increased services or comfort levels. Also, improvements in overall energy efficiency tend to be 
accompanied by an increase in the penetration of electricity. 
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It is therefore necessary to bring about important structural changes in the behaviour of 
consumers and society in general. For example, in the critical transport sector a significant 
intermodal shift is required from road to rail for both passengers and freight. Such deep 
structural changes may require very large investments, the return on which is only achieved 
over the longer term. This could have a modifying effect on the level of sustained economic 
growth in Scenario 3. 
The Scenario 3 approach implies a strong political will. In fact, the solutions outlined in "Major 
Themes" are mostly normative and, in many situations, normative approaches may be very 
difficult to implement. For example, how can such large shifts in passenger traffic from road to 
rail be achieved ? The feasibility of Scenario 3 needs to be further explored. In particular, it 
will be necessary to examine ways in which such a policy could be implemented. 
Furthermore, the policy solutions need not only be normative ones. It would be important to 
consider other approaches, such as fiscal instruments. For example, incentive-disincentive 
mechanisms based on revenue- neutral taxation changes are one class of approach now 
attracting increasing interest. Such mechanisms which make use of market signals could 
usefully complement regulations and standards as ways of promoting greater efficiency and 
technological change. Clearly there are important issues requiring an overall and European 
approach. 
General comments 
Overall, the scenarios usefully demonstrate how higher economic growth could result in energy 
related tensions emerging. They also show how it might be possible to avoid these tensions and 
satisfy the objectives of sustainable economic growth, moderately priced and secure energy 
supplies, and a clean environment. 
There are three aspects of the scenarios which could be further developed : 
All three scenarios are "smooth scenarios". It would be useful to incorporate some shocks or 
unexpected events, such as : 
.a nuclear moratorium which could follow a major reactor accident; 
.an oil price shock due to unexpected political developments in the Middle East; 
.recent events in Eastern Europe are a good example of unexpected "discontinuties", as 
is the uncertain situation in Soviet energy exports 
Whatever their probability, such events could have a large impact on both the European and 
indeed world energy scene. 
The scenarios form a consistent framework to 2010. Policy makers need to recognize the 
importance of the development of energy futures beyond this time horizon. This is particularly 
relevant with respect to the availibility of energy resources and environmental concerns. 
We recommend that these aspects be further explored in variants on scenario three and 
possibly with the expansion of the analysis to incorporate a new scenario 4 based on a 
combination of low economic growth and strong decrease in energy demand plus increased 
energy prices to consumers. 
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There is little explicit discussion of changing structures and systems within the Community in 
the scenarios. 
How will the gas and electricity grids in Europe evolve ? 
How will utilities change ? 
Which new players will enter the market ? 
Will companies need to operate on a European scale to be competitive ? 
These questions are important to address, given progress towards the internal market. 
The evolving political structures in Europe, the internal market, Eastern Europe and 
environmental concerns require consistent policies and strategies for 2010. These raise key 
challenges for both the Community and indeed the world. 
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Challenges : The Emerging Issues 
In this second part to our report we consider the main challenges which now face us. This 
analysis derives not only from the "Major Themes" report but also incorporates our views of 
more recent developments, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. 
There are major historic changes influencing the Community both within its territory and in its 
external relations which present unique challenges to European political structures. 
Because energy plays an important role in our economic and social life and in our geopolitical 
relations, this historic process requires a positive contribution from this sector. The elements of 
an energy policy will need to be defined in a Community framework. The genesis of such a 
policy is emerging. Its constituents will include the internal energy market, environment, 
development in Eastern Europe, technological progress and geopolitical relationships. 
Internal Energy Market 
Steps are underway to complete the internal energy market. Current progress in this area 
focusses on increasing competition leading to lower costs and prices; greater integration and 
hence optimisation of energy networks, pricing and investment transparency. But to what extent 
energy network optimisation through integration opposes the partial liberalisation and market 
desintegration, which accompanies the "common carrier approach ?" 
These specific actions are completed by proposals for public procurement, freeing capital 
movements, tax and technical harmonisation and with energy objectives such as conservation, 
resource sharing and diversification of fuel sources. 
Completion of the internal energy market is likely to lead to a greater cohesion in the planning 
of gas and electricity supplies, and greater integration of electricity and gas grids. If such 
achievements are realised, a reappraisal of the existing structures and operations of gas and 
electricity utilities will be needed. 
The developement of the internal energy market provides the opportunity to reinforce cohesion 
between different regions of the Community. Decreasing inter-regional differences will be 
especially important for peripheral countries. And progress on the integration of energy 
infrastructures and the encouragement of investments in new, and refurbished, facilities will 
need to be encouraged within the internal market framework. 
The realisation of an internal energy market introduces a new reality in the construction of a 
community energy policy. 
Environment 
Concerns are growing as public awareness of environmental problems increase. Energy 
production, transport, transformation and use are important contributors to polluting 
emissions. These impact on landscape, waste disposal (nuclear and non-nuclear), water and 
atmospheric pollution. 
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Examples of such impacts are : sea and coastal areas being polluted by mismanagement of oil 
production and transport facilities; the damage to forests due in general to acid rain deposition; 
effects on landscape and natural fauna from big hydropower projects; the whole debate around 
nuclear waste disposal. In summary, the fear of all these impacts associated with those resulting 
from major accidents and risks inherent to the energy sector have led public opinion to resist 
major new projects in the area of energy production and transformation. 
But as environmental concerns grow generally, we are likely to see regional differences, both 
globally and within the Community, raising conflicts of interest among States as regards the 
responses advocated and adopted. To put it simply, the wealthier a country, the greater is likely 
to be its willingness to devote significant resources to environmental improvement. 
Community-wide measures aimed at reducing S02 and NOx emissions (acid rain related) have 
already been adopted. However, we have not yet seen the full implementation of currently 
available technologies to reduce these emissions. The question is to what extent and at what 
cost the Community will pursue improvements in this area. 
As regards nuclear waste disposal, which is a very long term issue, the question is if we have 
already availability and control of a sound technology. The answer is essential in terms of 
public assurance. 
For the global warming issue, there is still no scientific consensus on both the magnitude and 
implications of the problem. However, if action is required, Community policy is only a small 
part of the answer with a very limited effect if consistent policies are not adopted in all other 
regions of the world. The energy sector is not the only contributor to this phenomenon. C02 
emissions are responsible for only about 55 % of total "greenhouse" gases, and part of these 
gases do not result from energy sector activities. 
Scenario 3 describes an attempt to reduce air polluting emissions particularly C02. However, 
C02 reductions at the end of the period may prove to be insufficient if there is consensus that 
the worst expectations regarding global warming are confirmed. 
Eastern Europe 
The extraordinary changes currently underway in Eastern Europe and the USSR will have a 
profound impact on the European Community. It is to early to understand the full 
consequences of these changes - they are still unfolding but pending a full analysis some 
preliminary observations seem appropriate. 
Higher economic growth and a different social structure will likely lead to robust energy 
demand growth, at least in the short to medium term. This results from the fact that these 
countries currently have a very high energy intensity. However, as the economics evolve new, 
more efficient energy technologies will be introduced, possibly combined with structural 
changes. 
Due to the possible surge in Soviet and other Eastern European energy demand, we could see a 
reduction of energy trade among all these countries and specially of Soviet energy exports. This 
could not only lead to a tightening of world energy markets, but in particular to pressure on the 
European Community to participate in the supply to some of its Eastern European partners. 
The electricity supply sector is one where this pressure could arise. 
In the nuclear sector, real concerns have been voiced about the safety of some power stations in 
Eastern Europe. Given the widescale implications of a reactor accident similar to that of 
Chernobyl, the Community should make every effort to ensure that safety standards are 
improved rapidly. 
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The extraordinary changes currently underway in Eastern Europe and the USSR will have a 
profound impact on the European Community. It is to early to understand the full 
consequences of these changes - they are still unfolding but pending a full analysis some 
preliminary observations seem appropriate. 
Higher economic growth and a different social structure will likely lead to robust energy 
demand growth, at least in the short to medium term. This results from the fact that these 
countries currently have a very high energy intensity. However, as the economics evolve new, 
more efficient energy technologies will be introduced, possibly combined with structural 
changes. 
Due to the possible surge in Soviet and other Eastern European energy demand, we could see a 
reduction of energy trade among all these countries and specially of Soviet energy exports. This 
could not only lead to a tightening of world energy markets, but in particular to pressure on the 
European Community to participate in the supply to some of its Eastern European partners. 
The electricity supply sector is one where this pressure could arise. 
In the nuclear sector, real concerns have been voiced about the safety of some power stations in 
Eastern Europe. Given the widescale implications of a reactor accident similar to that of 
Chernobyl, the Community should make every effort to ensure that safety standards are 
improved rapidly. 
Developing countries 
Problems surrounding world supply and use of energy are strongly affected by developing 
countries. The growth in energy demand in the Third World, particularly in the high population 
LDC's in Asia and Latin America, will have a major impact on the future world energy and 
environment situation. These countries are currently facing a real energy crisis due to rapid 
population growth, an urgent need to increase per capita energy consumption to improve living 
standards, and a move from non-commercial to commercially traded fuels. Payment for their 
growing energy needs is particularly difficult for those countries with major debt problems. 
The need now is for effective energy planning and transfer of "know how" and technologies, 
aimed both at improving the efficiency with which energy is used in the Third World and 
developing local energy sources. For those countries with low-cost energy supplies, economic 
profitability may induce a transfer from the developed to developing countries. On the 
environmental side, care would need to be exercised to ensure that problems were not simply 
transferred from one, wealthy, region to another, poorer, region. 
Energy technology 
Not all of the energy questions now facing the Community have technological answers. But it is 
to be expected that the implementation and dissemination of new technologies will continue to 
be important and may yet serve to reduce significantly our present concerns regarding the 
environment and energy security. Indeed, it would be difficult to extrapolate Scenario 3 beyond 
2010 without assuming the introduction of new and innovative technologies. 
Renewables, inherently safe reactors, fusion, hydrogen and superconductivity may all play an 
important role in the more distant future, even though their future contribution to the world 
energy market is difficult to assess. However, if the potentially major benefits of such 
technologies are to be exploited in the long term, a strong commitment to research and 
development is necessary. 
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Energy Security 
The specifics of energy security of particular fuels are discussed elsewhere in this report. There 
are some general considerations which are appropriate. The balance in the contribution of 
indigenous production and imports is changing with imports expected to increase in importance 
in Community supply. This applies equally to oü, coal, gas and uranium. Consequently the 
availibility of these supplies at secure and moderate prices remains an important consideration 
for the Community. 
As mentioned earlier, developments in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union could have 
important consequences on the overall energy situation. 
The interaction between consuming and producing regions of the world will increase. An 
illustration is provided by the pressures now building up for the use of natural gas for power 
generation. In the European context this new demand will be met by increased imports. 
Similarly the increased demand in OECD oil requirements (largely due to increased 
transportation), will add to already growing demand for supplies from the oil producing regions. 
Changes in the supply structure and investment programmes of these countries will effect their 
capacity to respond to these demands. 
Coal, which is largely consumed in place of origin, will grow in importance as a world energy 
commodity. 
The analysis in the three scenarios usefuly provides an indication of possible Community 
requirements. Such trends emphasizes the need to develope the external dimension of the 
Community energy policy. 
Energy security will remain a major concern. The issues mentioned reflect the interaction, 
between global developments and changes in the Community with the implementation of the 
internal market and environmental policies. 
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Challenges : Energy Sources 
So far in part two we have looked at the broad challenges facing the energy sector. We continue 
this review by concentrating on the energy sources. 
Oil 
The future of OPEC is critical to developments in the oil market. Arguments for greater 
cohesion between OPEC members may be made but the opposite could also be true. As 
reserves become increasingly concentrated within a few Middle Eastern OPEC members, the 
difficulties affecting political relationships in the region will become of even greater 
importance. In our view, the Community should promote economic and industrial cooperation 
with Gulf oil-producing countries. 
In the longer term, sustained investment in new production capacity in the key producing 
countries will be necessary to maintain stability in the oil market. Such investment may be 
funded internally or, indeed supplemented by Western investment. 
Similarly because production in non OPEC countries is important in maintaining stability in the 
international oil market it is necessary to continue and indeed increase investment in both 
areas under current development and in those areas where exploration is currently less 
intensive. 
Recently US imports have been increasing which may in the medium term put pressure on the 
call on world markets and in particular on OPEC export requirements. 
Coal 
European coal production has been declining for many years. Pressures on the industry will 
persist in the future as production from low-cost regions outside Europe results in a highly coal-
to-coal competitive market. 
Furthermore, most of the coal imports into the Community are from suppliers no less reliable 
than European industry. 
If the European coal industry is to decline, careful planning of the process should be 
undertaken. In particular, new industrial and infrastructure investments in those Community 
regions affected by reduced production should actively be thought. 
Given that, over the next twenty years, nuclear's contribution to European electricity supply will 
be less than many analysts were predicting five or ten years ago, and that oil and gas-fired units 
are not likely to make up for the loss in nuclear capacity, coal burning will likely have to 
continue growing. In this case and if European coal production falls, coal imports are also likely 
to grow. And yet coal represents at the world level one of the largest energy reserves. 
Concerns in some quarters are raised that by reducing indigenous coal production, the 
Communities security position is weakened. Others argue that indigenous production per se 
does not contribute for energy security.Coal will remain an important fuel in power generation. 
In an era of growing environmental concern further R & D developments can improve the 
efficiency and the cleanliness with which coal is used. 
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Gas 
A greater use of gas in the Community is now envisaged, particularly in the power sector. Gas 
offers environmental advantages over coal (virtually no S02 and lower C02 emissions) that 
make it particularly attractive for use in densely populated areas. 
Efficiency of use is high in combined cycle generating plant (even higher in cogeneration 
schemes) and the technology is well suited to the construction of relatively smaller, modular 
units. This, combined with low capital costs per unit of installed capacity, means that combined 
cycle gas fired power stations are likely to feature prominently in the more competitive energy 
scene associated with the internal market. The financial risks associated with such stations will 
be lower and the threat of overcapacity, always present when very large stations are built, will 
be reduced. 
As the contributions from gas supplies from Member States fall, we will see greater dependence 
on supplies from Norway, USSR, Algeria and possibly even West Africa andthe Middle East. It 
seems therefore convenient to consider the development of gas pipelines to all those producing 
areas, within the framework of industrial cooperation between the Community and those 
countries. Gas reserves outside the Community are very large but care will be needed to ensure 
that the greater gas import dependency which now seems almost inevitable does not lead to a 
new energy security threat. 
As gas use expands and in the context of the internal energy market, we will likely see the 
construction of new and the increasing of existing transportation/ distribution infrastructures. 
The need for investment is not négligeable and careful allocation of Community resources is 
necessary within the framework of cohesion policies. 
Nuclear 
The part played by nuclear energy differs widely accross Member States. France and Belgium 
produce some 70 % of electricity from this source - some Member States have refused this 
source as an option. Currently there is declining consensus at both the political and public 
opinion levels about nuclear's role in the future. 
The difficulties associated with the construction of new nuclear capacity are not only due to 
environmental concerns. There is a growing mis-match emerging between the financial 
requirements of utilities, which need the flexibility of short lead times and low unit capital 
costs, and the financial realities and risk concentration of nuclear power. The challenge for 
nuclear engineers is to develop nuclear technologies more in line with these changing needs. 
This raises questions on the evolution of existing nuclear power units, and the type of new 
nuclear technologies likely to emerge. However, none of these are likely to have a major role 
unless they can be made both financially attractive and overcome the widespread opposition to 
nuclear power which still exists in most countries of the Community. 
The problem of the safe disposal of nuclear wastes remains an area of concern. In addition, 
reactor decommissioning, which will become of increasing importance within the Community 
over the next twenty years, will also contribute substantially to the problem of waste disposal. 
Renewables 
Renewable energy has been the basis of man's earliest fuels. Today we are, through technology, 
seeking to make these sources more efficient. Indeed hydro was the initial source of electricity 
generation in many states. Currently this accounts for some 12 % of total Community electricity 
and with further developments in traditional and new small hydro schemes this percentage 
share is likely to be maintained. 
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The contribution of other renewable sources (solar, wind, bio-mass, etc.) in the Community as 
a whole is small, although regionally we may see contributions as high as 10 % of total primary 
energy needs. In fact, in many cases the economics of renewable technologies compete 
favourably with fossil fuel options. They appear particularly attractive in remote areas where 
the energy infrastructure is weak or in areas endowed with particular natural resources. 
For a number of reasons - domestic supplies, environmental concerns, regional development -
renewable energy sources are likely to be required to play an increasing role in the long term. 
However, because there is a need to reduce unit costs to make renewable technologies more 
competitive, they will only fulfill their role if a major research and development commitment is 
made. In fact, there are good prospects of R & D leading to the breakthroughs necessary to 
commercialise particular technologies, for instance in the field of photovoltaics. 
Electricity 
The demand for electricity will continue to grow through the 1990's. Indeed even in the 3rd 
Scenario, which presumes substantial energy savings and lower overall consumption (even for 
transportation), the growth rates for electricity remain positive into the new century. 
The interaction between electricity and economic growth is important. Many of the economic 
sectors - commercial and tertiary - are increasing in importance. The "new industries" linked to 
new technology and information are fuelled essentially by electricity and these are the sectors 
we are turning towards for economic growth. 
This growth in demand has implications for both investments in new generating capacity and 
for how use our networks more efficiently. The investment issue is complicated by the difficult 
choices in fuel options to produce electricity. Yet there is a clear need for maintaining a 
balanced and flexible range of supply choices. The present concern with emission levels will 
require new investments in reducing S02 and NOx (through technical solutions) and C02 
(through fuel substitution). 
Coal will continue to be an important source. Yet this must be matched by the concern with the 
cleanliness and efficiency with which it is burned. Phasing coal out is not an economic option. 
Certainly gas has become an attractive fuel and nuclear is a potential replacement. However, 
given the sheer volumes required and the problems inherent to these two energy sources (see 
respectiwe sectors), it will neither be politically, nor economically feasible to stop using coal for 
power generation. One direction, therefore, is to concentrate on developing more efficient, 
cleaner coal-burning technologies. 
The volumes of generating investment required and the management of these investments 
(with suppliers facing strong growth initially but with this level decreasing in the longer term) 
could, for some Member States, pose considerable difficulties. 
The issues currently debated in the application of the internal energy market take on added 
urgency when set against the longer term electricity outlook. There is an incentive to seek more 
efficient use of networks and to cooperate in meeting new demands (Eastern European needs 
may become of growing importance). 
Similarly how efficiently consumers use electricity is a growing concern shared by customers 
who pay the bill, utilities who must build new capacity (with growing environmental resistence) 
and the public authorities. New ways of tackling the efficient use of electricity are required. 
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The Way Forward 
In this third and final part of our report we present some concluding remarks on the way 
forward. 
DG XVII has initiated an important forum for discussion about the energy agenda for the 
1990s when it published the Discussion Report "Major Themes in Energy". 
By placing energy in the context of economic growth and environment we see clearly the 
strategic role energy plays in these two fundamental policy areas. By seeking to understand the 
role of technology in improving end use and production efficiency we can better appreciate the 
dynamic effects which are influencing the volumes of energy we need. Finally the geopolitics of 
energy are recognised by placing the Community analysis in a global context. 
Using the comprensive framework provided by DG XVH's analysis we have in this report 
identified issues which require resolution when progressing towards a Community Energy 
Policy. Some of these issues are likely to find a broad consensus of support. Greater emphasis 
on R & D and the penetration of the resulting technology in the market will be generally 
welcomed by all partners to the debate. 
Other choices will remain controversial. Fossil fuel burn will be challenged by those whose 
preoccupation is with emission levels. Can we count on cleaner coal burning and can we look to 
improvements in nuclear design, in the way in which waste is dealt with and, in a reduction lead 
times for new reactors ? To meet current public concern these are questions which must be 
faced. 
Energy imports will grow. This is a reality and one which the external dimension of energy must 
take account. 
For environmental issues the attainment of agreed objectives based on scientific evidence could 
involve the setting of targets requiring new economic instruments. 
We are, therefore, more than ever convinced that an energy policy is required. But, there are 
no easy solutions. An energy policy which encompasses all of the key objectives (strong 
economic growth, a clean environment, moderately priced and secure energy supplies) may not 
be readily compatible with current trends and values. We would stress the need for a 
combination of policies which is the only way of making reasonable trade offs between equally 
important and partly incompatible objectives. 
Perhaps it is inevitable that much attention is focused on the environment, given its current 
high profile in scientific, public and political debate. But it is vital that we do not lose sight of 
our other objectives. Energy security may be perceived currently as a low priority issue, but 
should remain a major concern and could be undermind if policies based on environmental 
concerns are pursued with scant regard for growing import dependency. Similarly, the adoption 
of very high cost environmental control strategies in the short term could have a detrimental 
impact on economic growth within the Community. 
Sustained economic growth is imperative if the Community's wider economic and social 
objectives are to be achieved. But this does not mean that the environment needs to be 
sacrificed. Not only can growth be accompanied by improving efficiency of energy use, but the 
greater wealth created would, in the longer term, enable a more extensive range of 
environmental improvements to be achieved. 
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Foreword 
The Commission of the European Communities' Directorate-General for Energy has been 
examining the many factors that could influence the Community's energy future. Of the range 
of influences at work on both the demand for and supply of energy, a number have been 
identified as "Major Themes" which will have an important bearing on energy policy in the early 
1990s. 
A first preview of the long-term study undertaken was published in a discussion paper "Major 
Themes in Energy" in September 1989. Based on the criticism and suggestions received from six 
eminent personalities who accepted the invitation to form a "Groupe des Sages" to comment on 
the report, this earlier work has been revised and further extended to take account of their 
suggestions and those of others which were received in response to the invitation to comment 
on the earlier report. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Challenges and themes 
Over the last twenty years, the world's energy consumers and producers have lived through 
dramatic changes and faced difficult challenges. 
• The cyclical behaviour of economic growth has had a strong influence on energy 
consumption patterns and producer profits; 
• Energy markets have experienced sudden shocks and times of glut providing uncertain 
price signals as input to consumers' and producers' investment decisions; 
• Energy security has moved from near the top of the political agenda in consumer 
countries to a position of lesser importance as policies have been successfully 
implemented; 
• Environmental concerns have been growing throughout the period and have recently 
heightened. 
Change and uncertainty will continue to persist in the future. Yet decisions still have to be 
taken. Although risks cannot be avoided, it may be possible to manage them better. 
Because energy is so firmly embedded in a rapidly evolving economic, social and political 
climate, its development will continue to be influenced by external factors. Furthermore, 
because of its fundamental strategic importance, it can itself affect economic and 
environmental conditions. Due to the complexity of these relationships and the associated 
uncertainty, there is a need for a robust policy framework within which the key issues facing us 
today and in the future may be addressed. 
Responses to the "Major Themes" report and world events since September 1989 have 
confirmed that the challenges facing us today are no less severe than those experienced over 
the last two decades. 
Major Themes in Energy Revisited 
The Major Themes can be reiterated: 
• Energy and economic growth - how will the internal market impact on energy use within 
the Community? 
• Energy and the environment - can increased demand for energy services be reconciled 
with a need to improve the quality of the environment? 
• Energy and security - will increasing import dependency make us once again vulnerable 
to price shocks and supply disruptions? 
Not only are these themes complex within themselves and, furthermore, strongly inter-related, 
but there is also a new dimension. Developments in eastern Europe have been both dramatic 
and rapid. Such fundamental political changes could not have been envisaged even in 
September 1989. The implications of these changes will emerge as the political choices become 
clearer for the east European countries. 
The implications for, and the role of the Community in this process, are also unclear at this 
stage. However, there is little doubt that the effect on the Community's energy future is likely 
to be significant. A preliminary assessment is perhaps useful and is presented in Chapter 4. If 
anything, these latest developments, given the potential implications for growth, the 
environment and energy security, have reinforced the key issues which emerged from the 
"Major Themes" report. 
The "Major Themes" approach and the way forward 
Scenarios are tools which enable uncertainty to be structured in a logically coherent fashion so 
that the complex decisions which face us can be addressed. Given the high degree of 
uncertainty affecting many of the important parameters in world and European energy 
markets, there is a need to identify the most vital factors upon which the scenarios should focus. 
The scenario focus developed in the "Major Themes" report consists of two key elements: 
• The impact of economic growth on energy supply and demand patterns, particularly in 
the context of the internal market; 
• The role of Community energy policy in reconciling economic growth objectives with 
environmental and energy security aims. 
The Report of the "Groupe des Sages" to this Conference takes the first important step forward 
from the "Major Themes" report. The Sages' task was to draw out the key messages and to 
identify those issues and areas of energy policy in need of greatest attention. They also 
recommended that certain aspects of the scenarios presented in "Major Themes" should be 
further explored. 
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They focussed on two factors. First, the conventional wisdom as presented in "Major Themes" 
may no longer represent the consensus view. Second, they recognised that the costs associated 
with meeting strict environmental targets could be very high. In response to these 
recommendations, Scenarios 2 and 3 have been subject to modifications. At the same time a 
new scenario has been created to examine another possible future. 
Scenarios 1 and 2 are characterised by progressive implementation and development of current 
thinking: 
• Scenario 1 is the original "Conventional Wisdom" view which provides an outlook 
consistent with consensus thinking; 
• Scenario 2 tests the robustness of this view under conditions of higher growth with the 
economic system "Driving into Tensions". 
Scenarios 3 and 4, on the other hand, represent energy futures in which energy policy, 
coordinated with other key policy areas, plays a vital role in shaping supply and demand 
patterns within the Community. 
• Scenario 3 explores in more detail than in "Major Themes" the options available to 
achieve sustainable high economic growth, a cleaner environment and secure supplies of 
moderately priced energy; 
• Scenario 4 examines the effect of more moderate economic growth combined with 
higher end user prices but with the same efficiency gains as in Scenario 3. 
A more detailed description of Scenarios 1 and 2 is presented in Chapter Two, while Scenarios 
3 and 4 are explored more thoroughly in Chapter Three. 
In Chapter Four, conclusions derived from this analysis are drawn together and placed in the 
overall framework. Issues within each of the fuel sectors are examined as are issues arising 
from the major energy themes of sustainable growth, a clean environment and moderately 
priced and secure energy supplies. Finally, the Community is considered within the changing 
global situation. Annexes providing supplementary information relating to the four scenarios 
are included at the end of the report. 
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Figure 1.1 shows how three key variables, primary energy demand, oil import dependency, and 
carbon dioxide emissions, evolve in the Community under the four scenarios. Two types of 
world emerge: "A conventional view" and "A change of policy". 
Figure 1.1 
The four scenarios compared 
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This report is not intended to provide "answers". It is hoped that it will provide the focus for 
further discussion between energy producers, consumers and policy makers. Difficult decisions 
still have to be faced. However, through better understanding of these very complex 
interactions with a broad input from all sides, it may be possible to take those decisions with 
greater confidence. 
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Chapter 2 
A conventional view under stress ­ Scenarios 1 and 2 
Introduction 
The amount of energy required within the Community in the future will be determined by the 
size, demographic structure, lifestyle and wealth of the population as well as the industrial 
structure. It will also depend on how efficiently it is produced and converted from one form to 
another, and how efficiently it is used. All of these factors need to be taken into account in 
developing energy scenarios. 
Demographics 
Over the next twenty years a significant increase in the size of the population of the European 
Community is unlikely. The population will grow by perhaps another 5 million people by the 
end of the century and thereafter stabilise. However, because of a falling birthrate and 
increasing life expectancy, the average age of the population will steadily increase. In 2010, as 
Figure 2.1 shows, nearly half of the population will be more than 45 years old. 
Figure 2.1: Demographic Influences 
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The number of households will increase appreciably and more people will own cars. Both 
houses and cars could well be larger , on average, than today. The average person will have 
more money to spend and, probably, more time in which to spend it. 
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Economic growth 
In Scenario 1 the Community economy grows at 2.7 percent p.a. over the period 1990-2010, 
modest compared to growth during the 1960s but equal to that achieved over the period 1968-
88. Creation of the internal market and realisation of its potential benefits occurs gradually, 
contributing to this steady economic performance. On the world scene, while OECD countries 
grow at a similar rate as the Community, USSR and other Eastern European countries, after a 
transition period of slow growth, grow at slightly less than the Community. Developing 
countries experience the strongest growth at 4 percent p.a. resulting in overall long-term growth 
for the world averaging 3 percent p.a. 
In Scenario 2, the completion of the internal market together with improved world trading 
conditions results in stronger economic growth in the Community, an average of 3.5 percent 
p.a. from 1990 to 2000. Overall world growth averages 4 percent p.a. with developing countries 
experiencing 4.5 percent growth over this period. 
Within the Community, energy intensive industries, such as chemicals, steel and building 
materials, continue to grow during the 1990s. The tertiary sector would also continue to 
develop, while in the domestic sector higher disposable incomes are achieved. 
Beyond 2000, the picture changes. Due to higher energy prices, driven by higher energy 
demand levels, the economic situation deteriorates with Community and world growth falling to 
2.5 and 2.8 percent p.a. respectively. More comprehensive descriptions of the scenarios are 
presented in the annex. 
Energy resources 
In the 1970s, "conventional wisdom" suggested imminent depletion of energy resources. Higher 
energy prices and a desire to increase production where possible stimulated exploration and 
improvements in production technologies. As a result, in the 1980s a common perception has 
developed of sufficient resources to cover needs for the foreseeable future. Despite growing 
energy demand, reserves continue to be replaced and upgraded. In the scenarios, there are no 
perceived physical constraints on global energy resources in the period to 2010. 
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International energy markets 
Against this background of adequate energy resources, international energy prices are driven by 
supply and demand fundamentals. 
In the case of oil, the increasing concentration of global reserves in the Gulf region will allow 
OPEC to exercise greater market power over the longer term. In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 
2, the call on OPEC oil and OPEC's role in managing the market are key factors. 
In both scenarios, non-OPEC supply (including Eastern European net exports) is expected to 
plateau at around 30 million barrels per day (mbd). Net exports from USSR and other Eastern 
European countries are projected to decline from their current level of 2 mbd to zero by 2010 
as their own energy requirements grow. Hence, in both scenarios, higher world oil demand 
translates almost directly into additional call on OPEC. 
Faster oil demand growth in Scenario 2 during the 1990s due to higher economic growth exerts 
upward pressure on prices. Oil prices exceed $25 per barrel (in 1987 real terms) in Scenario 2 
by 2000, compared to only $20 per barrel in Scenario 1. Oil prices persist in an upward 
direction, reaching $40 per barrel in Scenario 2 and $30 per barrel in Scenario 1 by 2010. 
In both scenarios, the international coal market is highly competitive. Prices are cost driven. In 
Scenario 1, prices grow slowly to $50 per tonne (in 1987 real terms) by 2000, and to $60 per 
tonne by 2010. In Scenario 2, due to more rapid growth in demand during the 1990s, prices 
reach $65 per tonne by 2000. This growth slows thereafter, with prices increasing more 
modestly to $70 per tonne by 2010. 
Historically, natural gas prices in Europe have been strongly linked to oil prices. In both 
scenarios, this relationship is expected to persist throughout the 1990s with only a slight 
decoupling in Scenario 2. However, with growing gas use in the power sector, prices 
increasingly need to reflect the movements in the price of competitive fuels. Consequently, 
beyond 2000 in both scenarios, gas prices are indexed to coal. 
These oil scenarios are discussed in working paper number 12 "The World Oil Market - a 
scenario approach". 
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The energy outlook 
In Scenario 1, primary energy demand in the Community grows at a rate of 0.9 percent p.a. 
over the period 1990 to 2010. However, this is the result of two distinct trends: the rate of 
growth being faster in the 1990s (1.1 percent p.a) but declining in the later period to 0.7 percent 
p.a. 
Faster overall growth in primary energy demand is experienced in Scenario 2, at a rate of 1.4 
percent p.a. However, the split between the two period is even more accentuated: demand 
grows by 2.1 percent p.a. in the 1990s, but only 0.6 percent p.a. thereafter. 
Figure 2.2 : Primary Energy Demand by Fuel 
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Final energy demand growth (excluding non-energy use) in both scenarios is slower, averaging 
0.6 and 1.1 percent p.a. respectively. This reflects changes in economic structures, technical 
efficiency improvements, and saturation in some markets (e.g. car ownership, household 
appliances). Final consumption will rise from current levels of around 770 Mtoe to 930 Mtoe in 
Scenario 1 and 1020 Mtoe in Scenario 2 by 2010. With GDP growing faster than final energy 
consumption during this period, the ratio between the two, i.e., the "energy intensity", will 
gradually decline in both scenarios from 0.2 to 0.13 toe per 1000 ECU (at 1985 prices), a 
decrease of 35 percent. 
Scenarios 1 and 2. 
Figure 2.3 
Final Energy Demand by Sector Average Annual Growth Rates 
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Table 2.1 shows incremental final energy use in both scenarios over the period 1987 to 2010 
broken down by fuel and by sector. By sector, transport grows most rapidly in both scenarios, 
adding 55 Mtoe and 102 Mtoe of incremental demand over 1987 levels. Industrial energy 
demand growth is more similar between the two scenarios at around 50 Mtoe, while in the 
domestic sector the range covered is from 46 Mtoe to 74 Mtoe. 
Table 2.1: Incremental Final Energy Use 1987-2010. 
Scenario 1 
Industry 
Transport 
Domestic 
Final Consumption 
Solids 
-4 
-8 
-12 
Oil 
-1 
52 
-26 
25 
Gas 
20 
32 
52 
Elect. 
26 
3 
43 
72 
Heat 
4 
2 
6 
Renewab. 
3 
3 
Total 
45 
55 
46 
146 
Scenario 2 
Industry 
Transport 
Domestic 
Final Consumption 
Soiids 
-1 
-8 
-9 
Oil 
-1 
99 
-26 
72 
Gas 
23 
48 
71 
Elect. 
30 
3 
54 
87 
Heat 
4 
3 
7 
Renewab. 
3 
3 
Total 
55 
102 
74 
231 
Looking at consumption by fuel type indicates some important changes. In both scenarios, solid 
fuel loses ground in both industry and domestic/tertiary sectors. Oil is also gradually backed 
out of the domestic/tertiary sector over the period. Both gas and electricity grow strongly, with 
electricity growing the faster of the two. 
The increase in electricity demand and transport fuels accounts for over 80 percent of the 
incremental growth in both scenarios. Electricity is replacing mainly solid fuels in the industrial 
sector, while electricity and gas are replacing solid fuels and oil in the residential and 
commercial sectors. Oil will continue to dominate the transport sector. 
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The transport sector 
An important effect of greater disposable income in the Community is that more cars will 
appear on the roads. Because of increased efficiency of new cars, fuel consumption will grow 
more slowly than the size of the fleet. However, by 2010 over 55 percent of the fuel consumed 
in the transport sector, over one third of total oil consumption, will be accounted for by private 
vehicles. 
Mtoe 
Figure 2.5: Transport Scenarios 1 and 2. 
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In the road freight sector, higher load factors and technical progress to reduce unit 
consumption by between 25 and 30 percent will restrain growth in fuel demand. 
While there could well be a substantial increase in the number of passengers carried by air 
transport, and in the number of kilometres flown, this is expected to be somewhat offset by jet 
fuel savings per passenger. Replacement of the existing fleet by higher capacity, more economic 
aircraft combined with higher occupancy rates, could reduce unit consumption by half over the 
scenario period. 
However, Scenario 2 presents concerns. Oil use in the transport sector increases by 35 percent 
between 1990 and 2010. With little prospect for substitution, emissions of atmospheric 
pollutants, particularly of CO2, will continue to grow. Breaking the link between transport 
requirements and oil consumption remains one of the great energy challenges. 
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Electricity generation 
During the last 15 years, the demand for electricity has grown faster than that for all other fuels. 
It has also grown faster than the rate of economic growth, meaning that electricity intensity has 
increased while other fuel intensities have tended to decrease. 
Figure 2.6: Total Electricity Demand Scenarios 1 and 2 
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In Scenario 1, the demand for electricity grows at 1.9 percent p.a. over the period to 2010, but 
again with more rapid growth (2.3 percent p.a.) in the 1990s compared to 1.6 percent p.a. in the 
following decade. In Scenario 2, overall growth is faster at 2.3 percent p.a. with a similar pattern 
(3.3 and 1.4 percent p.a. in the two periods). In both scenarios, growth is stronger in the 
domestic/tertiary sectors than in industry. 
However, overall in both scenarios, demand growth is less than GDP growth representing a 
change in the historical relationship as efficiency improvements begin to outweigh both 
increasing ownership and substitution effects. 
To meet this growth in demand, electricity production will need to increase by 830 TWh and 
1080 TWh in the two scenarios between 1990 and 2010. While coal and nuclear will continue to 
be the major source of inputs of this production (around 85 percent in 2010), oil burn will 
increase from 36 Mtoe in 1987 to just under 60 Mtoe in 1995, before falling back to around 20 
Mtoe in 2010. This increased oil burn over the medium term reflects the reluctance of utilities 
to invest in new capacity. Gas burn under both scenarios rises from 29 Mtoe to around 50 Mtoe 
between 1987 and 2010 - an increase considerably below its apparent potential. 
The installed capacities in both scenarios are compared in Figure 2.7. In Scenario 1, capacity 
needs increase by 142 GW over the period from 1990 to 2010. This growth is met mainly by coal 
(79 GW), followed by nuclear (45 GW) and then gas (22 GW). In Scenario 2, an additional 188 
GW is required. This increment of 46 GW over and above the needs of Scenario 1 is again met 
predominantly by coal (24 GW) and nuclear (9 GW). The amount of actual new capacity 
required in both scenarios is, of course, even greater again once retirement of existing plant is 
taken into account. 
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Figure 2.7: Electricity Generation Capacities 
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The environmental consequences differ for each of the three key air pollutants ­ sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and carbon dioxide (CO2) ­ in the two scenarios. SO2 
emissions experience a steady reduction as new coal plants equipped with flue gas 
desulphurisation (FGD) are brought on­line, existing plants are retrofitted, and as gas 
substitutes for coal. NOx emissions are little changed as the benefits of installing low NOx 
burners are offset by increasing demand. CO2 emissions in the power sector increase 
significantly: in Scenario 1 by over 40 percent and in Scenario 2 by over 55 percent between 
1990 and 2010. It is in this last respect where greatest concern may exist, and where the most 
fundamental of challenges may lie. 
Figure 2-8: Air Polluting Emissions 
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Major themes 
Energy and growth 
The link between economic growth and energy demand has weakened over time in the 
industrialised world as a result of economic restructuring and technologically driven efficiency 
gains. These processes will continue in the future. However, incremental changes in economic 
activity will still require additional energy; only the amount will be reduced. 
In Scenarios 1 and 2, energy demand grows, with industrial and commercial structures changing 
as a result of the evolving consumption patterns of individuals, households and institutions. 
Scenario 2, in particular, points towards increasing stresses within energy markets as a result of 
rapid economic growth. 
Energy and the environment 
Under both scenarios, CO2 emissions are likely to increase: from 2.8 billion tonnes in 1990 to 
3.2 billion tonnes in 2010 in Scenario 1, and to 3.5 billion tonnes by 2010 in Scenario 2. In the 
latter case, the largest increments take place in the power sector (0.5 billion tonnes) and in the 
transport sector (0.2 billion tonnes). 
Energy security 
The Community's dependency on energy imports will continue to rise in both scenarios. Coal 
imports experience the most dramatic increase from around 30 percent to nearly 70 percent of 
primary requirements. However, because the market is likely to remain competitive this may 
represent a lesser concern provided that a diversity of suppliers is maintained. Oil imports will 
rise from around 70 percent of consumption to 80 percent by 2010. Gas imports rise 
significantly from 38 percent to just under 60 percent. The call on imports overall for the 
Community increases from 47 percent in 1990 to 57 percent by 2010 in both scenarios. 
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Figure 2.9: Call on Imports, a conventional view. 
90 
10 τ I I i ! I I I I I I i Ι Ι Τ Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Γ 
1980 1986 1990 1998 2000 
τ—ι—ι—ι—ι—r 
2006 2010 
Conclusions 
It seems likely that energy demand will continue to grow, driven by economic forces. In 
Scenario 1, this would appear to be containable. World energy markets remain relatively stable, 
thus higher European import dependence does not represent a significant threat. On the 
environment, SO2 emissions are significantly reduced, while NOx emissions also decline. 
However, CO2 emission reductions are not achieved. 
It is in Scenario 2 that the real stresses and tensions emerge. World energy prices rise more 
rapidly, and in the case of oil could be potentially unstable. As a result, higher import 
dependency becomes a serious concern. Emission levels are also higher, particularly of CO2, 
further fuelling the controversy about the polluting nature of energy production and use. 
The consequences of these problems are significant. In the longer run, the higher rate of 
economic growth is judged not to be sustainable. Beyond the end of the century, economic 
growth in Scenario 2 is slower than in Scenario 1. 
Overall, this would seem to demonstrate that there is a need for effective energy policy 
measures in order that the full benefits of greater economic integration can be realised. 
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Chapter 3 
Reducing the tensions - Scenarios 3 and 4 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a "conventional" approach to energy demand and supply was 
developed. Presently the outlook for energy demand in the early 1990s seems set on a path 
closer to that of Scenario 2. We could be "driving into tensions" between the desire for 
economic growth, a cleaner environment, and secure energy supplies at moderate prices. 
Scenarios 3 and 4 look at different ways in which these tensions could be reduced. 
In Scenario 3, stronger economic growth provides the additional impulse to increase investment 
which facilitates the penetration of new and more efficient technology into the market place. 
This dynamic economic process is accompanied by policy initiatives on energy intensity: norms, 
standards and incentives. In this way, consumers can satisfy their needs in an environmentally 
conscious manner. Consumer prices in Scenario 3 follow world market trends. 
Scenario 4 shares the same assumptions as Scenario 3 concerning improvements in energy 
intensity. However, tensions are reduced by means of more moderate economic growth (similar 
to Scenario 1) and by higher end user prices. Further description of the scenario assumptions 
are in the annex. 
The economic and political framework 
The internal market and changes in eastern Europe over the medium term could have an 
important impact on economic growth. This would complement a generally improving world 
economy. In Scenario 3, world growth averages 4% p.a. between 1990 and 2000, and 3.5% from 
then to 2010. The average Community GDP is 3.5% p.a. to 2000 and, because this rate could 
lead to some tensions, there is a slowing down after 2000 to 3% p.a. 
In Scenario 3, energy intensive industry continues to grow as in Scenario 2 up to 1995, but 
stabilises from then until 2010. Other industrial sectors maintain more steady growth 
throughout the entire period. The tertiary sector expands after 1995 compensating for the 
slowing down of heavy industry. In the domestic sector, income grows at 3% on average to 2000, 
declining to 2.5% over the period 2000 to 2010. 
From the early nineties onwards, new technological developments, combined with high capital 
turn-over, lead to greater economic and energy efficiency. Consumer behaviour changes, 
reflecting decisions to reduce emissions (a wish endorsed across the political spectrum). 
Consumer behaviour reflects a more energy and environment conscious society. 
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Given the structure of Scenario 3, with strong economic growth and a clear political consensus, 
progress is achieved in establishing the internal energy market. With tax harmonisation and 
greater integration of gas and electricity networks, prices and costs of different fuels tend to 
converge. After a period of transition, economic growth across Europe would seem to be 
relatively robust. Consequently, in a healthy economic climate, concern with the level of 
emissions could lead, in the early 1990s, to much stricter environmental standards. 
Energy policy implications 
The energy policy implications of the two scenarios are important. The growing tensions 
reflected in Scenario 2 lead to a renewed focus on energy policy. In scenarios 3 and 4, particular 
emphasis is given to: 
• more efficient use of energy through tighter norms and standards; 
• facilitating new technological developments; 
• increased diversification of fuel supplies; 
• stricter environmental standards. 
Furthermore, in Scenario 4 a greater willingness exists to accept the trade-off of more 
moderate economic growth and higher energy prices. The willingness of consumers to accept 
such policies reflects a coherence between the desire to maintain growth but with a cleaner 
environment. The scenario requires this political consensus to enable public authorities to 
legislate accordingly. As in Scenario 3, close coordination between local, national and 
community institutions is implied if a coordinated range of policies covering energy, transport, 
industry and environment are to be implemented. 
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Scenario 3: Principal results 
Since the "Major Themes" report was published, very useful comments and suggestions from the 
Groupe des Sages and others have been received. These have guided our review of Scenario 3. 
In particular, the analysis of the power sector has been developed further. To better illustrate 
the issues involved four sensitivities are presented showing the impact of different fuel choice 
options in the electricity sector. 
Primary energy demand 
The growth path for primary energy demand changes radically over the scenario period. A 
strong rate of growth of 2.6% p.a. occurs until the mid 1990s after which the new policies to 
reduce demand begin to take effect. In the latter period, consumption patterns are reversed 
such that by 2010 the incremental increase over today's demand levels is only 120 Mtoe. 
Figure 3.1: P r imary Energy Demand by Fuel 
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The pattern of fuel use changes with oil's role declining, while the role of gas increases 
significantly. For power generation major uncertainties exist regarding nuclear and coal while 
interest in gas and renewables grows. 
Changes in primary demand reflect fundamental shifts in how final energy is consumed: 
• in transport there is a major shift in demand towards much greater use of public 
transport; 
• in the domestic and tertiary sector a shift away from oil to gas is accompanied by lower 
demand through efficiency improvements; 
• industrial consumption declines due to structural shifts towards lighter industry. 
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Electricity demand continues to rise particularly in the domestic and tertiary sectors. Over the 
long term, electricity demand grows at about 1.7% p.a. However, a higher growth rate of 3.5% 
p.a. is experienced in the initial period to the mid 1990s, followed by a lower rate of less than 
1% p.a. in the subsequent period. 
Figure 3.2: Final Energy Demand by Sector 
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Energy intensity 
Energy intensity, an indicator of the impact of structural, behavioural and efficiency changes, is 
considerably reduced reflecting the changes in final demand. Historically the long-run decline in 
energy intensity was around 1% p.a. from 1960-1988. Since 1979, intensity has decreased by 
over 2% p.a. However, since 1985 this has slowed considerably. 
The rate of decline in Scenario 3 is 2% p.a. for the period 1990-2000 but doubles to an annual 
reduction of 4% in the final decade. Many believe such rates are technically possible and 
politically achievable. Others argue that there is a need for higher prices as examined in 
Scenario 4, if further decreases in energy intensity are to be achieved. 
Figure 3-3: Final Energy Intensity ί scenarios 1,2 and 3 ) 
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Transport 
The transport sector illustrates the policy challenges implied by Scenario 3: 
• cooperation of motor manufacturers in designing and marketing vehicles with lower 
energy consumption; 
• refineries upgrading fuel quality; 
• city authorities implementing improved traffic management schemes and urbanisation 
policies; 
• development of transport pricing policy; 
• significant improvements in public transport. 
Figure 3.4: Transport 
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The key messages are: 
• without such policy measures, transport demand will continue to grow. There is no 
market mechanism (other than congestion) to reconcile the increasing tensions; 
• a number of coordinated policy initiatives across different sectors (industry, transport, 
environment and energy) are required. 
This will not happen of its own accord and will require political commitment. Research and 
development in car design and fuel alternatives (including non­oil options) are required, as well 
as a re­examination of the role of public transport. 
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Electricity generation 
The electricity sector is growing in importance with demand increasing in the 1990s by between 
2-4% p.a. It is a fuel viewed as environmentally benign when it is used - but not when being 
produced. There is growing controversy about the choice of fuels for generation. Each fuel has 
potential problems: 
• nuclear because of fear of accidents plus waste disposal; 
• coal because of polluting emissions; 
• renewables because of a lack of scale, and in some cases because of high costs; 
• oil because of price volatility and security issues. 
Potentially a surge in gas use could occur but this too raises questions about energy security. 
To understand the implications of different fuel options on the structure of the electricity 
supply sector and to highlight other wider implications such as import requirements, and the 
impact on CO2 emissions, four power generation sub-scenarios were developed. 
These sub-scenarios are defined as follows: 
Scenario 3.1 
Scenario 3.2 
Scenario 3.3 
Scenario 3.4 
Nuclear is the main fuel used in new power 
stations;some additional use of solids, gas and 
renewables(traditional plus some new). 
Increase in gas use compensating for nuclear which 
remains static after 2000; solids and renewables 
have a supporting role. 
Nuclear moratorium; gas used as the swing source. 
Reduced role for coal with gas as swing source; some 
additional nuclear; renewables as in 3.3 . 
Additional assumptions for all four sub-scenarios: 
oil capacity is expected to decline after 2000; 
nuclear decommissioning occurs at the end of a technical/economic life of 30 years on 
average; 
coal remains under pressure because of the cost of removing SO2 and NOx and new 
restrictions on CO2 emissions; 
between 4 to 10 GW of "non-traditional" renewables become available; 
all new gas fired plants are based on highly efficient combined cycle designs. 
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These electricity sub­scenarios were chosen to respond to the various arguments presented 
following the "Major Themes" publication. Those who argued that nuclear's role could increase 
(even if less rapidly than in the original Scenario 3) may expect the supply structure in Scenario 
3.1, where 60% of the incremental capacity is met by nuclear. Those who argued for a 
moratorium (or shock) can see the impact by referring to Scenario 3.3. Reducing coal's role 
(Scenario 3.4) increases the call on gas to levels similar to a nuclear moratorium ­ some 
120 GW. 
Figure 3.5= Electricity Generation Capacities 
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The resulting additional generating capacities of these different electricity scenarios are shown 
in Table 3.1. The incremental capacity required is 103 GW, compared to a total capacity 
currentìy of about 430 GW. 
Table 3.1 
Nuclear 
Solids 
Gas 
Renewables 
Others (mostly 
Total 
The structure of incremental net capacities (in GW) 
under the four 
1990 
105 
159 
18 
81 
oil) 70 
70 
power generat 
S3.1 
60 
22 
28 
16 
­23 
103 
ion sub­scenarios 
Increments 
S3.2 
15 
22 
68 
21 
­23 
103 
for 2010 
S3.3 
­44 
22 
123 
27 
­23 
105 
S3.4 
15 
­36 
121 
27 
­23 
104 
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Table 3.2 
POWER GEN. Solids 
Gas 
TOTAL EMISSIONS 
Variations in % of 
base case 
Main findings in 
S3.1 
395.2 
80.6 
2426.2 
2010 (Mtonnes C02) 
C02 variations from SC 3.1 
S3.2 
0 
+ 62.6 
2488.9 
2.6 
S3.3 
0 
+ 147.1 
2573.4 
6.1 
S3.4 
-149.6 
144.6 
2421.3 
-0.2 
CO2 Emissions: Changes in the fuel choices shown impact little on total CO2 levels except in 
the event of a nuclear moratorium where the levels are 6% higher in 2010. 
Energy security: there are important consequences for import requirements, particularly for 
gas. While total net import requirements are lower than those projected in Scenarios 1 and 2 
(796 and 856 Mtoe respectively) the call on gas imports rises from a range of 157 to 173 Mtoe 
(Scenarios 1 and 2) to between 177 to 300 Mtoe depending on the fuel options chosen to meet 
electricity demand. 
Table 3-3 
Net import requirements for coal and gas (Mtoe) in 2010 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
Total Energy 
1987 
0.6 
71.3 
491.1 
S3.1 
115.0 
177.3 
562.1 
S3.2 
115.0 
229.8 
614.6 
S3.3 
115.0 
300.5 
685.3 
S3.4 
51.0 
298.5 
619.3 
The resulting impact on the Community's gas import requirements is an increase from 56% of 
total primary demand to between 58% and 70%. 
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Table 3.4 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
Total Energy 
CaU 
(imports as ' 
1987 S3.1 
26.2 52.3 
36.0 58.4 
46.2 47.7 
Dn imports in 2010 
Jo of total primary demand) 
S3.2 S3.3 S3.4 
52.3 52.3 32.7 
64.5 70.4 70.3 
52.8 59.4 52.5 
Key messages from Scenario 3 
Power generation 
A balance in the fuel mix to generate electricity is required. Over-reliance on a single input 
reduces the system's resilience and flexibility. 
Figure 3.6: Electricity Production by Fuel 
TWh 
2500 
2000-
1S00 
1000 
500-
1990 Sc 3/1 8c 3/2 8c 3/3 8c 3/4 
I 2010 
I Nuclear [ZZI Solid« WÍ& Qae liiiiiJ Other 
Coal will remain an important input over the period and indeed beyond. The challenge is to 
improve, through research and development, the cleanliness and efficiency with which it is 
burnt. 
Nuclear faces the challenges of improving both its public acceptability and its financial 
attractiveness. Reducing or foregoing this option implies increased substitution by either coal 
or gas 
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Currently gas is the favoured option. However, the preference for gas could imply a large 
increase in import requirements beyond that envisaged even one or two years ago. Therefore 
the policy emphasis must rest on the terms, conditions and security of its long­term supply, as 
well as on transportation and market structure. 
The reduction in electricity demand implied in this scenario requires substantial effort in 
marketing "electricity efficiency". 
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
Figure 3.7: Air Polluting Emissions. 
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The resulting emission levels in 2010 (using sub­scenario 3.1 as a basis) are as follows: 
• CO2 emissions are down some 12% on 1990 levels, but do not achieve the Toronto target 
(20% reduction on current levels) nor stabilization by 2000; 
• NOx emissions down by 50% with transport contributing 75% and power generation 20% 
of this reduction. 
• SO2 emissions are down by 60%, with the power generation sector contributing 80% of 
this reduction; 
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Scenario 4: Principal results 
Scenario 4 is presented as a variant of Scenario 3. This new scenario was prepared in response 
to comments received from the "Groupe des Sages" and others. Scenario 4 assumes more 
moderate economic growth, with energy prices to consumers decoupled from world market 
trends. Price levels are determined by government intervention and, in comparison with 
Scenario 3, reflect a once­and­for­all increase in coal of 100%, oil of 40% and gas of 30%. In 
effect, Scenario 4 recognises the need to internalise the costs associated with environmental 
externalities. The methodology used to calculate the impact of these price levels on demand 
together with the full definition of Scenario 4 is contained within the annex. 
Primary energy demand 
Figure 3.8: Demand by Fuel 
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Despite similar GDP growth rates, growth in primary energy demand in Scenario 4 up to the 
mid­1990s differs from Scenario 1 by 3% because of higher consumer energy prices. Primary 
energy demand is 9% lower compared with Scenario 3 because of the combined effect of lower 
GDP growth and higher consumer prices. From the mid­90s onwards, the growth path of 
Scenario 4 is similar to that Scenario 3, but shows an earlier reversal from positive to negative 
annual demand growth rates. 
Fuel patterns 
While the role of gas and electricity increase significantly in both scenarios, oil declines because 
of higher prices in Scenario 4. More significantly the scenarios differ in their need for electricity 
generating capacity. In Scenario 4 total capacity could stabilize beyond 2000, with only 30 GW 
additional capacity in 2010 over 1990. This can be contrasted with Scenario 3 where 103 GW 
incremental capacity is required. 
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Final energy demand 
Incremental developments in final energy demand by fuel and sector are summarized in Table 
3.5. As with Scenario 3 there is: 
• a major intermodal shift in transport demand away from private cars in urban areas; 
• significant substitution of solid fuels and oil by gas and electricity in industry and to an 
even greater extent in the domestic/tertiary sector. 
Table 3.5 
Solids 
OU 
Gas 
Electricity 
Heat 
Renewables 
TOTAL 
1987 demandlevel 
Incremental final energy demand 1987-2010 
Industry 
-23 
-19 
+ 7 
+ 7 
+ 4 
-24 
217 
(Mtoe) 
Transport 
-79 
+ 5 
-74 
199 
Domestic 
+ Tertiarv 
-15 
-52 
+ 13 
+ 18 
+ 2 
+ 5 
-29 
289 
Final 
Energy 
-38 
-150 
+ 20 
+ 30 
+ 6 
+ 5 
-127 
705 
In comparison with Scenario 3, oil demand falls twice as fast while the rate of increase for gas 
and electricity is halved. 
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In contrast to all three other scenarios, energy consumption in Scenario 4 decreases in all 
sectors. 
M i o · 
Figure 3.9: Final Energy Demand by Sector 
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Energy intensity 
In Scenario 4, the ratio of final energy demand to GDP falls by 2.4% per year in the 1990s and 
by almost 5% after 2000 (this compares with 1.9% and 4.6% respectively in Scenario 3). This 
implies an acceleration in efficiency improvements due to higher prices. 
Figure 
•o-
80-
eo-
6 0 -
4 0 -
3.10: 
ndex 1987 - 100 
Final E nergy Intensity 
^ ν * * * ^ ΰ > . 
1 
1886 
>*^v¿ 
Annaal « Chana« 
1 8 7 0 - 1 7 8 7 - 7 0 0 0 l O O O - l t 
•ë i -¿ï •a f •a I • e 4 
ι ι ι Ι ι 
IMO 
Historic 
8c 3 
-ta - Μ -1.« -f.* -1.» -4.« »t.« '4.» 
l i l i l í 
1996 
- " - 8c 1 
- * - So 4 
^5^^ ,^. 
^s^~« 
^ ^ v ^ " - . 
ι Ι ι ι ι ι ί I I I I 
90 
80 
-80 
-60 
-40 
2000 2006 2010 
Sc 2 
- * - 1996 EC objective 
Electricity intensity, which historically has been increasing, declines strongly. By 2010, electricity 
intensity falls below the level achieved in 1960! 
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Transport 
The trends developed in Scenario 3 are further reinforced, with transportation fuel 
consumption declining by over 37% from 1987 to 2010 (2% p.a. overall). After 2000, 
consumption declines by over 5% p.a. in contrast with an increase of 0.3% p.a. in scenario 1. 
Figure 3.11: T r a n s p o r t 
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Electricity generation 
In Scenario 4 electricity demand grows on average by 1% p.a. This is almost half of the rate of 
growth in Scenario 3 and about one third of current growth rate. 
Overall investment needs for new, and replacement generating capacity are lower in Scenario 4. 
Total generating capacity stabilises after 2000. 
Table 3.6 compares net capacities in 2000 and 2010 for Scenarios 3 and 4. 
Table 3.6 
Nuclear 
Thermal 
Renewables 
TOTAL 
Structure of electricity generating 
1990 
105 
247 
81 
433 
S3.1 
120 
293 
92 
505 
2000 
S3.2 
120 
290 
95 
505 
(GW) 
S4 
117 
255 
91 
463 
net capacities 
S3.1 
166 
273 
97 
536 
2010 
S3.2 
120 
313 
103 
536 
S4 
117 
250 
95 
462 
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Key messages from Scenario 4 
Figure 3.12: Air Po l lu t ing Emiss ions 
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Reflecting trends in energy demand, emissions of SO2, NOx and CO2 decline further in 
Scenario 4. By 2010, SO2 and ΝΟχ emissions are 65% and 56% below 1990 levels as compared 
to 60% and 50% in Scenario 3; 
Overall CO2 emissions decline by 19% by 2010, compared with 1987 levels, stabilising by 
around 2000. 
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In comparison with the other scenarios, Scenario 4 exhibits the lowest energy import 
dependency. 
Figure 3.13: Total Call on Import 
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Table 3.7 
Solids 
OU 
Gas 
TOTAL ENERGY 
Share of net imports in 
1987 
26 
71 
36 
46 
(%) 
Sc3.1 
52 
71 
58 
47 
total primary 
2010 
Sc3.2 
52 
71 
65 
53 
demand 
Sç4 
50 
68 
51 
45 
Conclusions 
Scenarios 3 and 4 examined how tensions could be eased by reducing energy consumption. 
Clearly both scenarios present major changes in current economic behaviour and political 
preferences. Scenario 3 emphasises the role of technology, more efficient use of energy and 
willingness to voluntarily change our behavioural patterns. In Scenario 4, higher energy prices 
act as a stimulus to achieve these effects while at the same time growth is moderated. 
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Chapter 4 
Challenges faced by changing futures 
Introduction 
Our starting point has been to accept that uncertainty is inherent in energy futures. We cannot 
predict the future. Perhaps the best that can be expected is: to make the assumptions 
transparent; try to measure the broad consequences of such assumptions; and to understand 
the degree of freedom for manoeuvre such directions would provide. On this basis, it may then 
be possible to develop a broad policy framework within which energy could develop, fostering 
economic, social and environmental welfare. 
Looking back over the last two decades we may wonder if the period 1985-90 was in many ways 
a transitional one. The 1970's and early 1980's were periods of major changes in the 
macroeconomic structure, reflecting the stresses and strains in the production process arising 
from inflation, debt and rising interest rates. This undermined confidence in managing crises as 
they arose. Simultaneously, the geopolitics of the Middle East were introducing complex and 
long-lasting influences. This took place against a background of developing debate between the 
North and South in which the oil issue played a fundamental role. The intellectual climate of 
the times was essentially pessimistic and Malthusian. 
Looking towards the coming decade - how different will this be? Certainly many of the earlier 
concerns will remain - the debt situation could result in an "energy crisis" for many developing 
countries. But if the global financial situation has echoes of past problems the geopolitical 
shape of the world will have altered radically. Superpower tensions have declined but the 
certainty of continuity supposed when security tensions were highest is replaced by growing 
uncertainty about the consequences of changing relationships in eastern Europe. There is no 
reason to believe that we have seen all the changes which are going to happen. Further changes 
- as fundamental and radical as we have seen in eastern Europe over the past few months - may 
be expected as the global geopolitics adapt to what has just happened and to what may still 
happen. 
Simultaneously, social and political values are changing. Demographic factors are being 
influenced by such changes and are, in turn, impacting on how energy is used. The effect of low 
population growth is expected to be compensated by increases in the number of household 
units. The social preferences being shown for conservation and environment are more and 
more reflected in policies and programmes of the mainstream political parties. 
How these new socio-political preferences will be accommodated with the desire for continuing 
improvements in economic welfare is the core of the political debate about energy and 
environment. The environmental dimension of the debate is not confined only to energy related 
problems but is widespread across the range of economic and social activity. 
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The nature of the issues as they affect energy is also multidimensional - siting of plants, urban 
development and transport-related congestion, waste disposal (both nuclear and non-nuclear), 
and emissions of SO2, NOx and CO2. 
The institutional context within which energy policy will be formulated will itself evolve as 
Community structures adapt and develop in response to change. Yet because of its strategic 
role, energy thinking must contribute to such changes. The dire energy condition of some 
eastern European states clearly indicates that if for no other reason than the need to help them, 
energy will be on the pan-European agenda. But the interaction between different parts of 
Europe goes well beyond specific needs for cooperation. Energy technology, trade and demand 
management skills will have a role in designing the future shape and structure of Europe. 
Changes in geopolitics at both a global and regional level, in the political value systems and in 
the evolution of the Community, while outside the realm of energy, will nonetheless influence 
and perhaps determine the framework within which the energy sector operates. 
In this final chapter, we seek to draw together the broad economic messages to facilitate the 
political debate which needs to take place. 
The four scenarios developed identify the range of influences at work which could affect the 
direction of energy demand and supply over the longer term. Scenario 1 reflects the late 1980s 
"conventional wisdom" about key variables. Scenario 2, "driving into tensions", tests the 
robustness of the first scenario and shows that conventional wisdom could underestimate the 
long-term growth in energy demand with a resulting increase in tensions between the objectives 
of robust economic growth, a clean environment and secure and moderately priced energy. 
In Scenario 3, stronger economic growth provides the impetus to facilitate the penetration of 
new and more efficient technology into the market place. This dynamic economic process is 
accompanied by policy initiatives on energy efficiency norms and standards, and incentives to 
use energy more efficiently. In this way, consumers are able to meet their needs in an 
environmentally conscious manner. In Scenario 3, consumer energy prices follow world market 
trends. !_ 
Scenario 4 shares the same assumptions as Scenario 3 concerning improvements in energy 
intensity. However, tensions are reduced by means of more moderate economic growth (similar 
to Scenario 1) and by higher end user prices. 
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These four scenarios provide two contrasting paths along which our energy futures may 
develop. 
Figure 4.1: Primary Energy Demand 
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Our analysis offers some indications of the consequences, both in terms of the efforts required 
and the possible results of choosing one or other of these broad directions. The analysis 
presented does not seek to predict a final outcome, but rather to contribute to the debate which 
will determine the direction in which we will head. 
This chapter consists of a discussion of the implications of the Community's possible energy 
futures for each of the key fuel sectors. Overall economic conclusions are drawn with regard to 
the major energy themes of growth, environment and energy security. And finally, these themes 
are placed in a global setting but in particular with regard to recent developments in eastern 
Europe. 
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Fuel sectors 
In the preceding chapters, the four scenarios were developed for each of the principal energy-
using sectors. The results for specific fuel sectors were highlighted within each individual 
scenario. Here we take a broad view of possible implications for each fuel sector - looking at 
pricing, indigenous production, import requirements and market potential. 
Oil 
Figure 4.2 
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Looking at the world market: 
• The key uncertainty is the degree to which OPEC will succeed in managing the market; 
• Non-OPEC production levels are unlikely to increase significantly from current levels. 
Growth in world oil demand will therefore result in a higher call on OPEC; 
• In the scenarios developed, the call on OPEC converges into two ranges: 
between 30-35 mbd under Scenarios 1 and 2 
between 20-25 mbd under Scenarios 3 and 4; 
• Three broad price levels in 2010 emerge (expressed in 1987 $US per barrel): 
- around $40 - Scenario 2 
- between $25-30 - Scenario 1 
- around $20 - Scenarios 3 and 4 
A separate shock scenario was developed as a variant on Scenario 2, where prices 
increased to $40 in the late 1990s. 
Further discussion of the world oil market can be found in Working Paper No 12. 
On the supply side: 
• Community oil production is expected to decline. This fall may be more rapid in the 
1990s, but slowing thereafter; 
• Producers profits are clearly sensitive to the oil price but significant savings in 
production costs could allow for acceptable returns to be made at prices as low as 
$15/bbl; 
• Downstream prospects appear less certain. Assessing the requirement for additional 
investment in refining capacity will be difficult; 
• There is a real possibility of strong growth in oil demand in the short term, followed by 
a downturn should policies to reduce transport demand or emissions of carbon dioxide 
be put in place. 
Oil will continue to play an important role over the period to 2010. From a current 
consumption level of 513 Mtoe (10.3 mbd), demand by 2010 could range from 290 to 540 Mtoe 
depending upon the scenarios. 
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On the demand side: 
Longer term trends in transportation fuels pose the greatest uncertainty depending on 
whether we are in a "conventional" or "conservation" world; 
Residual fuel oil demand is also uncertain. In the short term, power utilities may 
increase the utilisation of existing plant. Longer term, as the plant is replaced and as oil 
increases in price, a decline in demand is likely; 
Overall, the structure of the demand barrel is likely to continue to shift in favour of 
lighter products reflecting stronger transportation demand growth; 
Tax harmonisation (see Working Paper) will add to uncertainty on the structure of oil 
demand due to changing relative prices in different countries; 
Consumers who have invested in fuel switching capability will be better placed to 
withstand oil price volatility and uncertainties. 
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Gas 
Figure 4.4 
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Strong growth in Community gas demand is likely; 
Imports will be the main source of additional supply; 
If Community gas producers' sales volumes remain fairly constant as assumed in this 
analysis, their market share will fall from 64% in 1987 to between 40 and 45% by 2010. 
However, this assumption could prove to be conservative; 
Prices will be driven by conflicting forces: 
upward pressure from increased demand reflecting the environmental benefits 
of gas 
downward pressure from competition amongst major producers such as USSR, 
Norway and Algeria and possibly increased competition between European gas 
utilities; 
In the early years over-supply is likely to produce downwards pressure on prices. 
However, as demand increases, the market will tighten, with upward pressure on prices; 
If greater access to networks is realised, producers may seek to move downstream, 
particularly to sell directly to electric utilities; 
Uncertainty in future demand is largely determined by uncertainty in gas use in the 
power sector (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
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Coal 
Domestic Coal Production Figure 4.5 Net Imports of Coal 
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Demand for coal depends largely on its use in power generation; 
The range of possible coal burn depends on environmental emission standards and the 
relative cost of using the different fuels; 
Considerable progress is possible in reducing SO2 and NOx emissions but CO2 presents 
a clear challenge. If concern about this pollutant increases then there will be additional 
pressure placed upon other less or non­polluting substitutes; 
The analysis in Chapter 4 indicates that a serious reduction in coal's contribution is 
likely to require very substantial growth in either nuclear or gas to compensate; 
There is a need to improve the efficiency and cleanliness with which coal is burnt ­ an 
R&D challenge; 
The market for indigenous coal production depends on: 
total coal demand 
interfuel competition 
world coal prices 
the weight given to security considerations 
commercial integration downstream, particularly with the electricity sector 
state aid policies 
changes in the structure of the market ­ move from long­term to short/spot 
markets. 
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Electricity 
Figure 4.6 
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The rate and pattern of electricity demand growth is a key uncertainty: 
Average growth rates could range between 1.7% p.a. and 3% p.a. In turn, additional 
capacity requirements could differ by as much as almost 170 GW; 
The pattern of electricity demand growth could vary considerably. Policies which 
achieve reductions in electricity intensity could substantially lower growth rates in the 
future; 
Electricity's share of total final energy demand is likely to increase, gaining from solid 
fuels in the industrial sector and oil in the residential and tertiary sectors; 
Interest may develop in finding ways to stimulate greater end use efficiency to improve 
flexibility in meeting increasing demand; 
Governments may encourage utilities to develop additional services promoting 
electricity efficiency. 
Utilities face possible over-capacity and low returns on investment if growth rates are 
substantially reduced after a period of buoyant growth; 
Investment will also be influenced by: 
Moves towards integration of the electricity market; 
The priority given to environmental issues such as waste, siting and, in particular, air 
pollution; 
The need for greater response-time flexibility in managing uncertain demand growth; 
The need to maintain a balanced, flexible supply system; 
Limits in fuel option choices - nuclear's public acceptability and its attractiveness in cost 
and financial terms; 
The potential for increased use of renewables. 
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Major themes in energy 
The four scenarios were developed to provide insight into the dynamics of the relationship 
between energy and economic growth, environment, and energy security and fundamentally to 
address the question: 
"Are robust economic growth, a clean environment and moderately priced and 
secure energy supplies compatible objectives?" 
Clearly there are tensions, but are these sufficient to block progress? While economic analysis 
may contribute to the debate the final direction will be based on political decisions. 
Energy and economic growth 
A number of important issues emerge. 
The twelve member states are not all at the same stage of economic development. Indicators 
such as GDP per capita reveal a significant spread across the Community. Expected rates of 
economic growth are such that some of the differences are likely to increase rather than 
diminish. This presents the Community with an exacting challenge. 
Wealthy countries are more able to make the tradeoff between economic growth and other 
factors, such as environmental improvement. Tensions may emerge if richer Member States 
attempt to influence the Community's agenda in ways which other member countries feel are 
detrimental to their own growth prospects. This tension is also reflected on the world stage 
between different regions. 
Completion of the internal market offers large potential benefits through increases in economic 
welfare. As eastern Europe moves on from its current economic problems, the impetus may 
grow for trading on a pan-European basis. Growth in economic activity will support greater 
cohesion within the Community and with eastern Europe. 
Better energy management emerges as the first priority in reconciling the tensions between 
energy growth, environment and security. Improved energy efficiency, linked to structural 
changes and lower energy intensity, is projected to some extent in all four scenarios: 
• In Scenarios 1 and 2, improvements in energy efficiency are achieved through market 
forces, as high demand leads to higher prices; 
• In Scenario 3, greater competition, economic efficiency and capital stock turnover lead 
to the uptake of more efficient technologies; 
• In Scenario 4, growth and higher energy prices for consumers stimulate greater energy 
efficiency. More moderate economic growth reduces demand pressures. 
In Scenarios 3 and 4, the rate of reduction in energy intensity between 4.5 and 5% p.a. is 
outside our historical experience. Market forces alone are unlikely to achieve these gains. 
Policy initiatives are required. 
Working Papers 5 and 6 provide further information on the efficiency potentials for both 
energy use and production. 
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Energy and environment 
Within the European Community concern for the environment is growing and is already having 
a major impact on policy decisions in many areas. The scope of this concern is broad and 
includes air pollution, water quality, waste disposal, the use of toxic substances in 
manufacturing, urban congestion, land use and siting issues. Few would argue that this 
heightened environmental awareness will diminish in future. 
The 1980s saw the emergence of the latest, and some would argue, the world's most difficult 
environmental challenge - that of global warming. Much uncertainty surrounds the greenhouse 
effect. For example, we do not fully understand the role of each of the many so-called 
greenhouse gases, the interaction between those gases and the extent to which other gases are 
involved. But we do know that the most important gas, accounting for an estimated 50 per cent 
contribution to global warming, is carbon dioxide. A consensus amongst scientists is now 
emerging of a linkage between the increase in carbon dioxide levels and average global 
temperatures. The problem is not totally related to energy - increasing deforestation would also 
appear to be an important factor. 
There are three ways of reducing gaseous emissions associated with energy use: 
• Prevent the emission of polluting gases by some technical removal process; 
a Use energy sources which are non-polluting; 
a Consume less energy. 
But each has problems associated with it. 
Technical removal processes: 
a Using flue gas desulphurisation equipment reduces efficiency leading to greater carbon 
dioxide production per unit of electricity produced. It also creates new waste products 
with potentially damaging effects. 
a No technical fix is available now, or in the foreseeable future, for removing carbon 
dioxide from fossil fuel following combustion. 
Using energy sources which are non-polluting: 
a Nuclear power does not produce gaseous emissions but has its own environmental 
problems - disposal of nuclear waste, decommissioning of old reactors, and the potential 
accident threat. 
a Renewable energies have associated problems. Good examples are the visual intrusion 
and considerable land requirement associated with wind turbines and the ecological 
damage to estuarine habitats associated with major tidal power schemes. 
a Gas is an environmentally attractive fuel but the carbon dioxide emitted when it is 
burned is not negligible, albeit it is only 60% of that produced from an equivalent 
amount of coal. 
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Consumption of less energy is likely to be an environmentally attractive option. But achieving 
the substantial energy reductions which may be necessary to minimise the threat of global 
warming without sacrificing other objectives, both at the Community and world level, presents a 
difficult challenge. 
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Global problems require global solutions. The Community acting alone would have relatively 
little impact. To overcome this problem, a coordinated approach will be required with the 
OECD, USSR and other Eastern European countries, and the developing countries, each 
making their contribution. 
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The Commission's programme on climate warming is being completed. R&D analysis on the 
means and costs of dealing with the CO2 problem is in progress. This and other work will 
contribute to the ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process. 
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Moderately priced energy 
If energy demand continues to grow, then upward pressure on prices is likely. Hence, policy 
measures designed to reduce energy demand growth would be consistent with the objective of 
achieving moderately priced energy. 
Energy demand depends on a number of key factors: 
a The energy intensive nature of a country's economic structure; 
• The penetration of energy using appliances and processes within the economy; 
• The utilisation of such equipment and appliances; 
a The efficiency of the energy using capital stock. 
It can be argued, at the simplest level, that improving energy efficiency will lead to downward 
pressure on demand. Such improvements are likely to be most pronounced when economic 
growth is strong. However, there are countervailing forces: 
a Gains due to energy efficiency improvements may be offset by higher utilisation rates; 
a In the domestic sector, the benefits of better insulation may be taken in the form of 
improved comfort levels; 
a In the industrial sector, technological developments which bring about efficiency 
improvements may also lead to a wider range of applications of such technology, 
offsetting potential savings. 
Even with significant improvements in energy efficiency, the upward spiral of energy demand 
may well continue. This is the type of future presented in Scenarios 1 and 2. 
To break this spiral, it will be necessary for energy consumers of all classes to change their 
behaviour so that the full benefits of energy efficiency are translated into lower energy 
consumption. To achieve this goal, stringent efficiency standards and norms will be required, 
and fiscal measures may also play a role. These are the types of future presented in Scenarios 3 
and 4. 
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Figure 4.9: Energy Demand Spi ra l 
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Secure energy supplies 
There are three main strategic routes by which energy security could be improved: 
• Increasing the supply of indigenous fuel sources; 
• Improving diversity of both fuels used and fuel suppliers; 
• Reducing energy demand. 
All have contributed to the decrease in the energy security threat faced by the Community over 
the period since the early 1970s. However, it needs to be recognised that much of the slow­
down in energy demand growth was due to economic recession, as well as specific energy-
focussed strategies. 
As energy demand is again growing at a more rapid rate, energy security concerns may re-
emerge in the period to 2010. In particular: 
a Due to greater concern for the environment, significantly increased gas imports to the 
Community may present a security concern. However, this threat could be minimised by 
maintaining a diverse portfolio of supplies; 
a Given the massive concentration of oil reserves in OPEC countries, concerns may grow 
again as OPEC's market share increases. OPEC's own pricing and production policies 
will be crucial in this respect; 
a There is uncertainty about the volumes of imported coal which may be required 
depending on whether the direction followed is closer to "conventional" or 
"conservation" paths; 
a Nuclear has played a key role in improving the Community's energy security position. 
However, nuclear's contribution in the future is now anticipated to be lower than was 
previously considered. The risk of accident and supply disruptions which could follow 
such an event bring their own security concerns. 
Figure 4.10: Call on Imports 
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Import requirements for each fuel were considered in the scenarios. The world oil market 
analysis examined the consequences of a sharp increase in prices, while a sharp reduction in 
nuclear generated electricity was considered in one of the Scenario 3 sub-scenarios. Without 
doubt, energy security will remain a key policy concern during the 1990s. 
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The Community in a global setting 
World energy outlook 
Conventional views about global energy demand suggest long term growth rates of between 2% 
and 2.5% p.a. Uncertainties would seem to exist about this range of growth rates as there were 
when the "conventional wisdom" scenario for the Community was tested. Such an exercise 
might indeed yield results similar to Scenario 2 - that globally the energy sector is "driving into 
tensions". Our world energy analysis is limited to a matching "conventional wisdom" approach. 
But some recent published work lends credence to the view that world demand is likely to grow 
at a faster rate than previously anticipated. 
In particular, in both eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Basin there appears to be 
considerable latent pressure for higher rates of growth in energy use. Under favourable 
economic conditions, this could manifest itself during the 1990's. As their economies develop, 
energy consumption patterns in eastern Europe could follow those of western Europe during 
the late 1950's. Similar pressures are evident in the Pacific Basin where a number of countries 
are recording energy growth rates similar to those experienced in Europe in the 1960's. Finally, 
we cannot ignore the traditional developing countries which will also require increases in 
energy to match their economic ambitions. 
/ 
(See Working Paper 14 for more detail on the world energy situation). 
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Eastern Europe 
Current developments in the political and economic structures of eastern European countries 
and in the Soviet Union will have major implications for the Community. Today we cannot be 
other than uncertain as to what the energy implications will be for these countries. But looking 
at how these countries' energy situation has developed (subject to data limitations) it is possible 
to obtain some key indications of the types of problems which are likely to arise in eastern 
Europe (which includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia). 
These countries consumed about 500 Mtoe of primary energy in 1987. 
a Their consumption per capita is higher than in EUR-12; 
a Indigenous production, mainly in the form of solids, accounts for about 75% of total 
consumption; 
a In 1988, 650 Mtoe of brown coal and lignite were produced, about 45% of total world 
production. 
Net imports of energy represent about 130 Mtoe (25% of primary consumption). 
a These imports come mainly from the Soviet Union, and account for about half of Soviet 
net exports of energy; 
a Due to declining indigenous production and rising energy consumption, net imports are 
likely to increase in future; 
a Difficulties in the Soviet Union could lead to uncertainties about their export capacity, 
requiring eastern European countries to participate in international energy markets. 
Although there are difficulties in measurement, it would appear that energy intensity in eastern 
Europe is roughly double that of the Community. 
a Final energy demand is dominated by the industrial sector, which is highly energy-
intensive in structure; 
a Restructuring of the industrial sector towards less energy-intensive products would also 
have a significant effect on energy intensity; 
• Intensity could be reduced if market pricing were introduced in place of central 
allocation; 
a On the other hand, transport energy demand is extremely low. As incomes rise, the 
demand for private cars is likely to rise very rapidly, impacting on oil imports and the 
refining sector. 
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In 1987, gross electricity generation was around 570 TWh, about 35% of EUR-12. 
a Losses and own use by the energy sector accounted for 24% of this, compared to only 
16% in EUR-12; 
a Industry again dominates, accounting for 60% of final electricity demand; 
a Consumption in the domestic/tertiary sectors is at a very low level. Latent demand is no 
doubt considerably higher. 
Electricity supply is under stress due to demand growth. Currently in excess of 30 TWh need to 
be imported from the USSR. 
a Nuclear (capacity about 10 GW in 129 GW total) generation has been growing at a rate 
of 15% p.a.; 
a Plants under construction could more than double the installed capacity by 1995; 
a Longer term, financial and environmental constraints are likely to become increasingly 
important. 
; 
Environmental problems are significant. 
a SO2 emissions are very high by any standards; 
a CO2 emissions per capita are significantly above EUR-12 levels because of the 
extensive use of solid fuels; 
a Safety standards in some nuclear plant are at unacceptably low levels. 
In conclusion, the energy situation in eastern Europe is extremely difficult from many 
perspectives. Given the political and economic uncertainties in these countries at this moment 
it is very difficult to consider how it might evolve over the short, medium or longer term. (More 
details on the eastern European energy situation is given in Working Paper 13 on the subject). 
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Mediterranean Basin 
In the Mediterranean Basin, rapid population growth, particularly in the non­European areas, 
will lead to more rapid energy demand growth in the future. 
Electricity demand is likely to grow most rapidly with perhaps 300 to 350 GW of additional 
capacity required by 2010. These capacity requirements imply very high investment programs. 
Given this rate of growth, tensions may emerge with regard to land use between energy 
production, agriculture and tourist activities. 
The challenge facing these countries is to reduce this latent demand growth through improved 
energy efficiency, while at the same time improving their economic welfare. 
Figure 4.12: Energy and t he M e d i t e r r a n e a n 
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Conclusions 
We have focussed on a number of key objectives which energy policy could seek to promote: 
robust economic growth, a clean environment, moderately priced energy and secure energy 
supplies. In the past these objectives have rarely been in balance. For the future, the challenge 
is to make acceptable tradeoffs between key objectives in order to develop an energy strategy 
for sustainable development. 
At this stage we cannot say whether we are entering a growth-led or environmental-led future. 
However, the choice is to some degree in our own hands. The political decisions which will 
direct us down one path or the other now need to be taken. This report has sought to provide a 
better understanding of the likely consequences of such decisions with the hope of facilitating a 
more focussed debate on the choices with which we are faced. 
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Conference Programme 
Wednesday, 2 May, 1990 
Afternoon Opening of registration and distribution of the meeting's documents 
Thursday, 3 May, 1990 
09.15 Inaugural Session - Global Consensus for Global Problems 
Chairman: Mr. Cardoso e Cunha, Member of the Commission 
Inaugurating the conference Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha will 
address the political issues for energy in the coming decade. 
Distinguished guest speakers include: 
Political ChaUenge: 
The Rt. Hon. W. Henson Moore, Deputy Secretary of Energy (United 
States) 
Mr. B. Tackaev, Vice Minuter, Government of the USSR 
Mr. Antonio La Pergola, Chairman of the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology of the European Parliament 
Mr. Robert Molloy, President in Office of the E. C. Council of Ministers 
(Energy) 
11.00 Coffee Break 
11.30 Energy Policy Challenges 
Chairman: Mr. C. S. Maniatopoulos, Director-General of the Directorate 
General XVII 
Mrs. Helga Steeg, Executive Director, International Energy Agency 
Dr. Subroto, Secretary General, OPEC 
Dr. Abdullah El-Kuwaiz, Assistant Secretary General of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
Prof essor Jacques Lesourne, President, Conservatoire National des Arts et 
Metiers (Paris), presenting on behalf of the "Groupe des Sages" the report 
on the "Major Themes in Energy" 
12.45 Lunch 
Guest Speaker: Mr. Umberto Agnelli, President of Fiat Auto 
The Industrial Dimension 
15.00 Session 1 - Energy and Economic Growth 
Co-chairmen: Professor Jacques Lesourne & Dr. Heinz Horn, Chairman of 
Ruhrkohle 
Issues: What changes could occur in the relationship between economic growth 
and energy demand in the future? 
Members of the Panel: 
Mr. Gordon Adam, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Energy 
Research and Technology of the European Parliament 
Mr. Philippe Bodson, Outgoing President of FEB 
Mr. Pierre Desprairies, President of CIFOPE, Paris 
Dr. Klaus Liesen, Chairman of Ruhrgas, Germany 
Mr. Robert Malpas, Chairman of Powergen, UK 
Mr. Michel Pecqueur, Vice-President, ERAP, France 
Mr. Henny de Kuiter, Managing Director Royal Dutch-Shell 
Mr. Masan Yamamoto, Director General, Agency of Natural Resources & 
Energy, MITI (Japan) 
16.15 
16.45 
18.30 
Coffee Break 
Discussion 
End of Session 
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Friday, 4 May, 1990 
09.30 Session 2 - Technology, Efficiency and Environment 
Co-Chairman: Professor Umberto Colombo, President of the ENEA, Rome & 
Dr. Pieter Winsemius, Director, McKinsey and Company, Amsterdam 
Issues: What environmental agenda is emerging? 
How can technology improve energy efficiency and help solve 
environmental problems? 
Members of the Panel: 
Mr. V. Bushuev, Energy Committee of the Supreme Soviet 
Mr. John Eas t on, Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs, ' 
Department of Energy, United States 
Mr. Robert B. Horton, Chairman, British Petroleum 
Dr. Klaus Knizia, Chairman of VEW (Vereinigte Elektrizitäts Werke 
Westfalen) 
Mr. Paul Lannoye, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology of the European Parliament 
Mr. Aldo Romoli, Président du Comité Economique et Social, Section de 
l'Energie 
Dr. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Director, Institute for European Environmental 
Policy, Bonn 
11.00 Coffee Break 
11.15 Discussion 
12.30 Lunch 
14.00 Session 3 - The Geopolitics and Supply of Energy 
Co-chairmen: The Rt. Hon. D. Howell, M.P., UTK & Dr. M. Gallego, President, 
Hidroastur, Madrid 
Issues: The developments in world energy and the issues confronting energy 
suppliers 
Members of the Panel: 
Mr. Antonius H P. Grotens, President, Gasunie, The Netherlands 
Mr. RolfLinkohr, MEP 
Mr. A. Macarov, Academy of Science, USSR 
Mr. Alessandro Ortis, Vice-President, ENEL, Rome 
Mr. William C. Ramsay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy 
Resources and Food, Department of State, United States 
Mr. Garcia Sanchez-Sierra, Secretary General, Latin America Energy 
Organization, Equador 
Mrs. Helga Steeí Executive Director, International Energy Agency 
Mr. Kumhiko Uematsu, Director General, Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD 
15.30 Coffee Break 
15.45 Discussion 
17.30 Concluding remarks by Mr. C. S. Maniatopoulos, Director-General of the 
Directorate General XVII, and end of the Conference 
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INAUGURAL SESSION 
Global Consensus for Global Problems 
Cardoso e Cunha, EC Energy Commissioner 
In ten years we will find ourselves on the threshold of a new century. In energy are 
concentrated the hopes and question marks of our future; we must strike a balance now 
between two approaches to energy policy, the idealistic and the practical/accountable approach. 
World demand for energy is again going through a phase of sustained growth, while there is a 
gradual tendency once again for diversification of supply to reach limits. In the European 
Community, there is an upturn in our dependency on imported energy supplies. 
This growth in energy consumption is generated by economic growth and in turn affects the 
environment. How do we stimulate growth and at the same time protect the environment 
without jeopardising the security of our energy supply, given the finite nature of fuel resources? 
The first priority is to control growth in energy demand by making more efficient use of energy 
and by diversifying available resources. We can expect rises in the cost of supplies, and we will 
have to alter our life-style and our energy consumption habits. We must act quickly while we 
can still opt for homoeopathic remedies, rather than the painful surgery that will become 
necessary as a result of delay or negligence. 
The second priority is to discover and transport sufficient energy to satisfy growing needs. For 
social and political reasons, we must encourage growth - and therefore an increase in energy 
consumption - in the developing countries; there must be a major transfer of financial resources 
and technology from the North to the South. 
This effort of solidarity will have to be accompanied, in the industrialised countries, by the 
implementation of measures to improve price forecasting and ensure security of supply, 
rendering all the more urgent the need to tackle problems on the basis of large international 
groupings - such as the European Community. Going beyond this, the EC can provide, through 
its culture and democratic traditions, the focal point to draw the international community 
together in this urgent effort to provide energy for a new century. 
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Political Challenge 
Rt. Hon. W. Henson Moore, US Deputy Secretary of Energy 
Energy is a global commodity, critical to every nation's economic, social and strategic well-
being; international in terms of its economic, environmental and strategic impacts. 
Accordingly, it must be traded freely in a global market-place of open competition. Energy 
production and trade must not be manipulated for self-interest, by overt cartel practices or 
subtle 'local preference' barriers. Either approach would result in economic and social 
dislocation affecting all countries. 
Countries must develop long-term plans to serve as a framework for identifying future supply 
needs and sources and determining the appropriate balance between economic and 
environmental interests. The key objectives of the "Groupe des Sages" Report are those we 
seek in our national energy strategy: strong economic growth, a clean environment, moderately 
priced and secure energy supplies. 
An emphasis on conservation and renewable technologies must be central to the energy plans 
of all nations, developed and developing alike. Energy efficiency serves the economic interests 
of all countries and the environmental interests of our entire planet. 
But even 'economic' approaches to environmental improvement come at substantial costs, 
which can only be absorbed by countries with growing economies. Economic growth is essential 
to environmental progress. 
The developed nations have an obligation to share technology through a global marketplace of 
free trade and open competition. A true partnership among nations will serve our mutual 
advantage. 
Fifty years ago, much of the world stood at the edge of a cataclysm. Through staunch alliance, 
Western Europe and the United States successfully met a series of severe challenges. Now, if 
we are to realise the potential of the new century, we must reaffirm our partnership and extend 
it to all who share our values. Free nations engaged in open markets and cooperating over 
environmental problems ensure a better life for people everywhere. 
Mr. B. Tackaev, Vice Minister, Government of the USSR 
The USSR is the world's largest producer of primary fuel and energy resources. 
To maintain oil production, we plan to develop fields in Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, the 
European USSR and in the seabed. The environmental and geological effect of investigations 
of technological geodynamic processes at Tengis oil deposits is of world-wide experimental 
value. 
Natural gas is increasingly important in Soviet industry. A common gas supply unites all gas 
industry enterprises, transport systems, underground gas storage facilities and supply systems. 
New deposits are being developed. 
New thinking and our state policy reflect urgent problems. The idea of a 'Common European 
House' provides for the development of mutually beneficial energy cooperation and integration 
processes. 
Priorities must be developed to make best use of available resources. The USSR's share of 
world coal resources is 45% and in the east, we have practically unlimited possibilities for steam 
coal production expansion. There are wide opportunities within the EC to work out large-scale 
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processing technology. We have already done substantial preliminary work and a coal 
liquefaction pilot plant has been erected in the Moscow region. 
Integration of power consumers in the USSR results in levelling the supply schedule. There are 
similar trends in the EC, and the USSR can increase its participation in EC energy generation. 
We have an offer from Electricité de France for participation in the European power 
generation, and we supply energy to Norway, Turkey and East Europe, and have power 
exchanges with Austria and Greece. 
Cooperation on energy saving and efficiency is a priority. Energy-saving technology and 
replacing out-dated equipment will save resources on mutually beneficial terms. 
Our power generation scale determines widespread toxic pollution. Toxics know no national 
boundaries and while possibilities for using nitrogen and sulphur oxides, and ash reduction, in 
the USSR will improve the environment, international cooperation here is essential. 
We also aim at cooperation through joint ventures in energy; 30 already exist and a further 62 
are being negotiated. 
Mr. Antonio La Pergola, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology of the European Parliament 
In the energy debate, the European Parliament represents a public not adequately represented 
otherwise. On matters so critical to their future, the voice of the public should be heard more 
clearly. 
We can all agree that growth in energy demand, a function of the growth in the world 
population, will change our environment, and that it will be too late by 2010 to start taking 
action on energy demand that is contributing to the greenhouse effect and to global warming. 
But counter-measures should not affect the less developed countries adversely, turn economic 
growth into decline or increase economic disparities within countries; they should lessen them. 
We should encourage efficient use of energy resources and develop renewables through 
focussed research. 
Here we may begin to diverge. Options include an international convention to reduce 
emissions, a carbon tax to raise funds internationally for this reduction; international 
production quotas, and leaseable or tradeable carbon emission permits. 
As a regional grouping with institutional decision-making structures, the EC can help show the 
way. We need a large integrated energy market with greater competition and assured supply, 
which would make energy savings possible and reduce disparities between peripheral and 
central nations. In transport, agriculture, industrial manufacture and urban heating, we need to 
combat environmental problems. We must also help our East European neighbours in these 
areas. 
We need too a clear public commitment to fund further technological research in energy and 
environmental issues. Revision of the Community treaties on energy, research and 
development is an essential part of development towards political union. In its April 1990 
plenary session, Parliament called for an updating of the Coal and Steel Treaty and the 
Euratom Treaty. Our committees will also be studying economic instruments for 
environmental protection, and the energy challenges for the twenty first century. 
A cautionary note: we must act on global warming and the greenhouse effect now. Failure to 
foresee the consequences in this area will be catastrophic. 
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Mr. Robert Molloy, President in Office, EC Council of Ministers (Energy) 
I will concentrate on three vital areas requiring imaginative political responses and multilateral 
cooperation: nuclear energy, oil and gas supplies, and energy and the environment. 
The problem of nuclear energy, and nuclear safety, is urgent. Four years after Chernobyl, the 
consequences are still emerging. The Gardner report on Sellafield in the UK and recent 
disclosures from East Germany raise further misgivings about unnecessary and avoidable risks 
in civil nuclear operations. 
I recognise that nuclear plays an important role in the electricity supply of many countries, but 
nuclear countries must also recognise the legitimate concerns of their non-nuclear neighbours. 
A new spirit of openness must replace the nuclear industry's traditional history of secrecy so 
that nuclear installations can be seen to be safe. 
The Community should pursue closer international cooperation and above all stronger 
institutional arrangements including independent inspection and mutual verification of facilities 
and regulatory regimes. Obsolete facilities should be phased out and smaller and safer reactor 
types researched. Waste should not be accumulated only in one or two regions of the 
Community and discharges into fresh and sea water must be stopped. 
As far as oil goes, the geopolitics are intrinsically unstable, and a chasm still exists between 
producers and consumers which could be overcome by a joint forum representing the interests 
of both sides. An internal energy market in the Community involving gas and electricity grids 
across boundaries would utilise the vast resource of gas to ensure security of supply. 
Our most serious environmental problems are of a global nature and we must act together to 
solve them. We must fund world-wide research into climate changes and we must reduce the 
technological resource gap between developed and developing countries. 
The stabilisation of C02 emissions must be fixed soon and alternative energy policies analysed. 
Getting the fuel mix right from an environmental viewpoint will carry a price tag, and 
governments must remain committed to conservation and the effective use of existing 
resources. 
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Energy Policy Challenges 
Summary 
The current international energy situation is characterised by four factors: 
relatively low prices; 
concern about the use of fossil fuels and their impact on the environment; 
safety fears about nuclear power, which have contributed to the small amount of 
new nuclear development in Europe; 
a general impression that hydrocarbons are in abundant supply and accessible at 
durably low prices. 
In the future, however, the world market for energy will change as the factors governing supply 
and demand change: 
Demand - rapid growth of oil imports, particularly in the United States and 
Japan; growth of natural gas use in Europe; new technologies and the need for 
strict emissions control standards. 
Supply ~ re-structuring efforts of the European coal industry and structural 
changes in the energy industry in general. 
New energy policies are urgently needed in a world where demand is increasing while resources 
are being depleted: The global nature of energy and its effects on the environment mean that a 
global approach must be sought: The EC, given its experience of international cooperation, 
could play a pivotal role in developing global consensus. 
Three areas were identified in which effective multilateral cooperation is necessary: nuclear 
power, oil and gas, and the energy-environment relationship. 
In addition, the EC has several major concerns in the energy field which are shared globally: 
improving energy efficiency and diversification; 
discovering and transporting sufficient resources to satisfy requirements; and 
disseminating technical information, particularly that which promotes the 
environment. 
The draft Directives currently before the Council promise benefits for the EC in all these areas, 
as well as forming the basis for a cohesive energy policy. 
Oil supply will remain a predominant issue for the foreseeable future. Understandably, 
producers and consumers of oil may have different or conflicting perspectives. Consumers, 
including oil companies, are willing to invest in greater production of oil if a secure investment 
climate exists in producer countries; producers, on the other hand, want demand security to 
justify their own enormous investment in production and new technology. A balance must be 
struck between the interests of these two groups if future oil shocks are to be avoided. 
* * * 
Mr. CS. Maniatopoulos, Director General, Directorate-General XVII 
The energy market today is characterised by four factors: relatively low prices; concern about 
the use of fossil fuels, their finite nature and their environmental impact; little new nuclear 
development in Europe, due to safety and waste problems; and a general impression of cheap 
and abundant hydrocarbons, encouraging lax attitudes to use. 
On the other hand, the European public is becoming increasingly interested in environmental 
protection, while security of supply also remains a major issue. 
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In determining the future of the international energy market, the prime factor affecting 
demand is the increase in consumption of hydrocarbons, especially in the US and Japan, as a 
result of economic growth and low oil prices. The penetration of natural gas as the energy of 
the future in Europe is a reflection of the same trend. 
The European internal energy market will bring more competition and a downward pressure on 
energy prices. The completion of the internal energy market, together with the penetration of 
new technologies, may stimulate increased energy demand. We must be vigilant about this 
impact. However, a consensus in favour of limiting pollutant emissions and mandatory 
standards governing efficient use of energy is emerging in Europe. 
On the supply side, there is a restructuring of the European coal industry under way, and a 
more reliable contribution from hydrocarbons. We can expect better use to be made of the 
European electricity and natural gas transport networks. EC planning policies and associated 
programmes to improve energy infrastructures and interconnections are crucial for a better 
economic and social cohesion of the peripheral countries. 
We must also work to establish a balance of interests between producers and consumers of 
hydrocarbons to avoid a new oil crisis. 
These are the areas of crucial importance for the future of the energy sector. At the heart of 
the debate I would pin-point: the rational use of energy, the role of natural gas and nuclear 
power, dependency on fossil fuels, environmentally-friendly energy policies, growth and security 
of supply. 
Mrs. Helga Steeg, Executive Director, International Energy Agency 
I agree with the "Groupe des Sages" that the major challenges faced are demand and supply 
balances; energy security, protection of the environment and economic growth, and the need to 
integrate them; and the changing geopolitics of energy. Energy import dependence is in itself 
not a critical issue, though risks arise when economies are dependent on a single energy source. 
Oil supply remains the predominant energy issue for the foreseeable future. Governments 
must play their part by setting the framework for competition and reducing barriers to trade. 
Rising oil demand, which has been and will be greater outside the OECD than within, means 
the question is no longer 'will oil prices rise?' but how and to what extent? I do not foresee a 
third oil crisis, but I expect prices to fluctuate. Oil companies will invest during a period of 
rising demand if they find a secure investment climate in producing countries. 
Three specific issues I wish to raise are : the need for a more realistic assessment of energy 
developments in Eastern Europe; the need to maintain emergency stocks; and the need for 
continued integration of investments by producer and consumer nations in each other's 
upstream and downstream energy activities. 
Environment need not be the Achilles heal of energy supply and use. Pollution control has long 
been included in energy costs, but the increasingly complex environmental/energy challenge, 
and the issue of climate change, makes calculations harder. 
Longer term response measures will hinge on the protocols of what emerges as an international 
framework agreement on climate change. For the world economy to achieve C02 stabilisation 
within two decades would require a massive and probably impossible effort. OECD countries 
would find this difficult; the problem is compounded by economic growth and thus rising energy 
demand in the non-OECD countries over the next 20 years. Even with improved energy 
efficiency, this will push up C02 emissions. 
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We need to examine energy technology developments and offer cooperation to East European 
countries in these areas. Our focus must go beyond a regional to a global perspective. 
Dr. Subroto, Secretary General, OPEC (speech delivered by Dr. Osayimwese) 
Concentrating on the issue of supply security, the OPEC member countries hold between 77% 
and 84% of proven reserves. The problem, therefore is not supply, but production and export 
capacity. The OPEC countries currently have a sustained production capacity of 27 million 
barrels per day. However, this will not be sufficient to meet world demand beyond 1995. 
Production capacities must consequently be developed as soon as possible; this requires an 
investment of between 40 and 60 billion dollars (a production rise of 6 million barrels per day) 
if an energy gap between now and the end of the century is to be avoided. However, the OPEC 
countries are capable of supplying oil for the next 100 years, compared with only 16 years for 
other producing countries. The EC countries should have more confidence in OPEC's ability 
and reliability to meet its future oil requirements, instead of embarking on policies that depict 
OPEC as an unreliable source of oil supply, when the Single Market comes into being. 
It is certain that oil will continue to be the main energy source, at least for the transport sector, 
in the foreseeable future. According to various scenarios drawn up by the OPEC Secretariat, 
the OPEC countries must enjoy a price of 18 dollars a barrel in real terms between now and 
2000 if they are to have spare revenue to invest in boosting production capacity. Furthermore, 
even if demand remains predictable, other uncertainties persist. For example, there has been 
talk of a tax on oil products. This exacerbates the dilemma for producing countries. 
While we welcome developments in Eastern Europe, the rich nations should not, in their 
enthusiasm for Eastern Europe, forget their commitments to the developing countries. 
The OPEC countries are in a position to supply oil on a secure basis and in an environmentally 
friendly manner, provided that they are guarantied demand security and consumer countries 
are willing to work with them on the development of "clean" technologies. 
Dr. Abdullah El-Kuwaiz, Assistant Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Coming from an oil producing region, I associate myself with the conclusions of the "Groupe 
des Sages" on security of supply, stability of prices, adequacy of world energy for a sustainable 
level of economic growth and the encouragement of efforts to lessen adverse effects on the 
environment. 
This is an opportunity for me to state the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) position. GCC 
contains more than 45% of world oil reserves and has a productive capacity of over 30% of 
global capacity. Given favourable market conditions, GCC can comfortably be called upon to 
meet world oü needs as has been proven in the recent past. We take a long range approach on 
pricing, guided by market mechanisms. Security of supply for expanding demand means 
adequate prices that encourage investment in new capacities. GCC members have been 
moderate in discouraging the attempts by other producers to raise prices unreasonably. We 
believe price shocks are harmful to long-term interest and for the world economy. 
We have called for regular consultations between producers and consumers, similar to the 
present forum to exchange information between GCC and the EC. 
We support efforts at environmental protection through setting standards, R&D, and efficient 
use of energy. But we do not believe an environment tax is helpful for the environment or for 
investment for new capacities. It has been shown that the introduction of a US $50 per ton of 
coal equivalent contributed only marginally to a reduction of C02 emissions. Since demand 
has a low elasticity, carbon taxes are bound to have a small impact unless set at prohibitively 
high levels. 
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Consuming countries in general collect more taxes from oil than oil producing countries, whose 
revenue is not net of cost production. To meet growth in world demand requires massive 
investment in new capacities by major producers. This is a very relevant matter since 
investment in new capacity is going to compete in a world facing possible shortage of investable 
funds as demonstrated by the present trade in interest rate. 
Prof. Jacques Lesourne, President of the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris, 
presenting the report on the "Major Themes in Energy" on behalf of the "Groupe des Sages" 
Broadly speaking, energy is a world problem in which governments, citizens and companies 
must be increasingly sensitive to the globalisation of human relations and markets. 
Six major questions were raised in the report by the "Groupe des Sages". The first is that 
today's energy sources are national in scope, but in the future, two models will probably prevail 
: a market economy with free competition and a more extensive system relying on investment 
planning, a certain degree of synergy and consideration of yields and economies of scales. 
The second major question, the environment, is particularly difficult because it encompasses 
such a wide range of subjects, from air and water pollution, climatic change to industrial 
hazards. 
Third is the Eastern bloc's future as a consumer of energy. As these inefficient industries are 
restructured, demand for energy and energy efficiency will be enhanced. As for the Soviet 
Union, we can expect its economic and social system to encounter difficulties in making 
efficient use of energy reserves. 
The fourth major question is the developing countries. The World's population will grow by 2 
billion between the years 2000 and 2025 and this growth will primarily take place in the 
developing countries. This, coupled with improved standards of living, will mean a sharp 
increase in energy consumption in the Third World. 
The fifth area dealt with is technology. Today we have the means and the time to give practical 
application to new and better technologies in the field of energy. 
The sixth is geopolitical security. We live in a dangerous world that is full of surprises. This 
gives rise to numerous and formidable difficulties for both producers and consumers of energy. 
In conclusion, I would says that there has to be better coordination between growth in the 
world's economy and environmental protection. There is no free lunch. Regardless of whether 
one is talking about energy produced by coal, gas, oil, nuclear or renewable sources, the choices 
will depend primarily on advantages and the cost. 
Consequently, we have to keep three things in mind. Western society cannot take an all-or-
nothing stance and must reach a compromise. Standards, subsidies, incentives and tax breaks 
are of crucial importance and there must be an international exchange of ideas in order to 
reach a global and rational use of energy. 
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Lunch address: The Industriai Dimension 
Mr. Umberto Agnelli, President, Fiat Auto 
Energy is a central problem for industry and a double problem for the car-maker, for the car 
lives on energy. For the motor industry to develop, legal and political constraints (taxation) 
must not create insurmountable barriers to vehicle energy consumption. 
A car-maker has to face two challenges, resulting in a compromise between immediate cost-
competitiveness and a medium-term outlook involving new environmentally-friendly 
technologies such as the non-polluting car. 
European industrialists are concerned about non-homogeneity of energy supplies and of prices 
and taxation as major obstacles to free competition. Businesses in regions like Italy, where 
energy products are disadvantageous compared to EC competitors, are especially worried. 
If we are to build up European energy supply, harmonisation and innovation must come from 
the top. Achieving a single energy market is hampered by national supply monopolies and 
electricity transport difficulties; deregulation is essential. The EC can play a catalysing role by 
bringing together the major players with their different requirements in order to reach a real 
consensus. 
As demand grows, we must mobilise national and community resources, public and private, for 
high efficiency. The accent is on growth in qualitative terms. Technological development is a 
major player in this process, whereby damage to the environment could be repaired. 
The car industry has strived to prove this over the past decade. It is a mistake to think car 
manufacturers are 'on the other side' from those wishing to safeguard the environment. We 
have solved a host of problems and it is in our own interests to reduce vehicle-related pollution. 
Let's not blame the car for its success by curtailing its use and tightening taxation. To reconcile 
energy consumption with the needs of the environment, we need faith in development rather 
than sullen prohibitionism. Prohibitionism never paid. 
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SESSION 1: ENERGY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Co-chairmen: Professor Jacques Lesourne & Dr. Heinz Horn, Chairman of Ruhrkohle 
Summary 
Energy is a means to an end. The importance of energy rests on its ability to extend the quality 
of life ~ a term which embraces economic growth as well as a healthy environment. 
The EC will be competing for energy resources in a fast growing international economy. It 
must find a way to ensure a cost-effective supply of energy that does not at the same time harm 
the environment or otherwise diminish the quality of life. 
New technologies offer significant promise in the effort to reconcile environmental protection 
and energy growth while supporting economic growth. Technology may also be the key to 
solving the energy problems in Eastern Europe. The EC can play a major role through 
technology transfer as well as financial and management support of clean energy options. 
The proper role of regulation must be determined. Industry representatives prefer to deal with 
pollution through standards, financed through the capital programme and recouped in the price 
of electricity, while others - notably environmentalists - favour a greater degree of external 
control. 
The most effective industry structure is also open to question. Because the public expects low 
costs, this implies a monopoly combined with an obligation to supply. However, it was noted 
that liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in the UK encouraged environmentally 
sound energy generation; a freer internal energy market in the EC might have similar 
beneficial effects. 
As industry seeks the best balance between a cost-competitive approach and an 
environment-friendly one, a single energy market with homogeneity of supply, prices and 
taxation would remove some of the major obstacles to success. 
A coherent Community energy policy, however, is a prerequisite to a "common market" in 
energy. Such a policy should be developed in cooperation with industry and cover a period of 
at least ten years. Care for the environment and encouraging growth through technology 
should be cornerstones of the policy. 
The policy should take into account several assumptions: 
energy changes in Eastern Europe in the next ten years will lead to net demand 
increase; 
international dependence on Middle East oil and gas will rise; 
coal will continue to play a major role; 
the EEC will import more and its energy dependence will rise with some 
concern expressed about indigenous production, particularly about coal 
production; 
price volatility will continue. 
The policy should also avoid a number of assumptions, e.g., natural gas at low prices or free 
competition in the energy market. 
An unfortunate fact of life is that fear is often the key to change. Until the public believe their 
quality of life is threatened, they will not act, and any energy policy will fail. Public education is 
critical to the achievement of Community energy goals. 
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Panel 
Dr. Heinz Horn, Chairman, Ruhrkohle 
The global view of energy is essential. Economic growth is expected in the industrialised 
countries; to limit future demand, we in Europe should insist that the private consumer, 
industry and the traffic sector save and use energy as efficiently as possible and invest for these 
purposes, despite today's low prices. 
The time of low energy prices will soon end. Saving energy by investment and behaviour can 
also be achieved in periods of growth; the conviction of people can change the world - both 
these have been proved. 
Increasing growth in the developing countries, with growing populations, is indispensable. 
Consumption will increase, a trend having important impact on world energy markets. 
Energy imports of the European Community will increase anyway. We must safeguard the 
peaceful use of nuclear generation and convince people that it is reliable. Indigenous oil, gas 
and coal production will also be important in security of supply in Europe. 
Mr. Gordon Adam, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology of the European Parliament 
The importance of energy rests on its meaning for people and society, and its ability to improve 
the quality of life. So we should consider carefully who will be called on to curtail their 
requirements if the politicians decide to control the stimulus to demand. 
There is as yet no certainty as to the extent to which C02 emissions are causing global warming 
nor of the effect. If the most predictions are proved, there will have to be a total move away 
from fossil fuels. For the time being, i am much more in favour of looking for the answer to the 
environmental problems of energy use by regulation and not in fiscal control. The latter 
presupposes that technical progress has come to a standstill. I doubt the value of increasing 
prices as a means of trying to control energy policy. 
As the recent Commission Communication on Energy and the Environment showed, the way 
ahead for energy efficiency is unclear and must be brought into sharp focus. Simple problems 
such as reducing the use of domestic energy must be tackled before more complex problems. 
Mr. Philippe Bodson, President of Tractebel 
I would like to talk from the stance of the industrial consumer, given my experience in the glass 
industry, which is a large energy consumer. 
I must disagree with Mr. Adam on the role of prices in solving energy problems, because while 
companies can get round regulations, they can't get round prices. Since increasing prices affect 
everyone, the user will accept the increase grudgingly, and look for ways to reduce energy 
consumption: what the economists call trying to reduce the energy intensity of economic 
growth. 
This is a long-term exercise but slowly it happens, because the motivation - price - to cut waste 
and increase energy saving is there. 
I suggest a recoverable tax which could be claimed back by EC companies exporting to the rest 
of the world. This would ensure the competitiveness of EC companies in the world market, and 
it might be possible to persuade Japan and the US to follow similar policies. But the tax must 
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be modulated to ensure that no positive advantages are given to pollutant fuels or resources 
which are not available. 
Mr. Pierre Desprairies, President of CIFOPE 
I must stress the need for the EC to take account of global concerns - including the world 
energy market - which affect EC policy. Of the scenarios developed by the Commission of 
possible future developments in energy, I find scenario 3, which assumes stable prices, security 
of supply and economic growth, unrealistic. I take scenario 1, 'business as usual', to be the most 
likely. 
The only way to increase drastically spending on environmental protection and reduce energy 
consumption would be through an ecological disaster, for example, a three- year drought in 
Europe and the US. People do not believe in the greenhouse effect. 
I also think we must expect oil prices will rise steeply in 20 years or about as all the 
supplementary production becomes restricted to the Gulf countries, producing at their 
maximum capacity. 
Dr. Klaus Liesen, Chairman of Ruhrgas 
We have already talked about the importance of natural gas in the future, when it will make up 
20% plus of EC energy sources. I would like now to underline the main objectives of the gas 
industry in the internal energy market, which I see broken down into four points. 
Firstly, gas must remain competitive against other sources of energy to maintain its market 
share in the Community. 
Second, we must agree additional volumes from gas exporting nations under contracts running 
a minimum of 20 years, under which importers would have to guarantee sales. This is the way 
to motivate exporting nations to invest adequate capital in the development of gas fields for 
export. 
Third, we must develop gas regions in peripheral EC regions, and fourth, we must achieve 
integration with Eastern Europe gas networks. A policy of autarchy in energy supplies in 
Eastern Europe until now has resulted in little technological innovation, pollution, poor energy 
savings and subsidies which have no relevance to market prices - all problems the gas industry 
in the EC can help solve. 
Mr. Robert Malpas, Chairman of Powergen 
Energy is a means to an end, produced because people want light, heat, cold, transport, 
communication, etc. 
The objective for all of us must be to provide more of these benefits, and greater economic 
growth, for less use of energy. 
How do those of us whose business it is to provide energy, justify advocating less of its uses? 
Firstly, the need for energy is not going away. However efficient the world becomes in its use 
there will always be an enormous demand, so there will be a very large market for energy within 
which to do profitable business. 
Secondly, business is about recognising the realities. Concern for the environment and the 
increasing interest in energy efficiency are now firmly established as major market forces. 
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So businessmen in the business of providing energy are on the side of the solutions, not part of 
the problem, as in generally assumed. 
Increased energy efficiency on the demand, as well as the supply side, is the obvious policy 
option that must be stimulated by all societies. 
However, though the hundreds of millions of individuals who make up the demand side may 
fear the greenhouse effect of their C02 emissions, they are unlikely to do much whilst the price 
of most forms of energy remain as low as they are to-day. Higher prices, through heavy, value 
added type taxation will, in my opinion, be the most effective policy option. 
Finally, a comment on the "Great British ExperimentMn its first month, the world's most 
competitive electricity commodity market is already proving that competition is real and is 
bringing strong downward pressure on prices. The common carrier policy is effective, allowing 
for instance, small generators to compete with large. This open, competitive, market will 
stimulate greater economic growth for correspondingly less use of energy 
Mr. Michel Pecqueur, Vice-President, ERAP 
We need to develop a realistic energy policy through the "sophisticated analysis" of each sector 
affecting energy policy - technical developments, lifestyle, transport tertiary sector and 
residential considerations. 
There are three stages in the development of energy intensive proposals. First comes structural 
development; energy intensity will drop as industry develops. 
Second, we need the optimisation of systems where incentives will ensure financing will go to 
energy savings. And finally the most difficult stage, restrictions limitation - reductions in energy 
use by industry and consumers, encompassing perhaps a ban on traffic at certain times. 
For this third stage to be feasible, people must be well informed about the optimum choices to 
be made, but also the drawbacks involved. Energy is a necessary impetus for economic 
development and we must use all the forms at our disposal, including nuclear power. 
Mr. Henry de Ruiter, Managing Director Royal Dutch Shell 
Although the experience of the industrialised world has shown that economic growth can be 
sustained at lower levels of energy intensity than 20 years ago, we all know that economic 
increases will mean an increase in energy use. 
The EC will be competing for energy resources in a fast growing international economy -
notably the developing world where population growth and industrialisation will mean 
increased use of primary energy sources. 
We have to address problems of both quality and quantity; fuels must be increasingly efficient 
and environmentally sound. Shell's efforts to increase energy efficiency have resulted in a 40-
50% reduction in the use of energy in refineries. 
As far as long-term efforts go, we need to develop new gas fields, and we must guarantee sales 
and avoid legislation which would limit the open gas market, and look at new technologies to 
lessen the pollutant effects of coal. 
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Mr. Masaji Yamamoto, Director General of Energy, MITI, Japan 
Japan is the fourth largest world consumer (5%) and the largest net importer of energy. 
Therefore, the supply/demand situation in Japan affects the rest of the world, and vice-versa. 
Energy demands in Japan have risen sharply recently (5.7% in 1989) due to expansion in the 
economy and lower oü prices. This was a much bigger increase than long-term figures had 
suggested and indicates a trend Japan believes to be unacceptable. 
Since Japan already leads the world in energy conservation, we plan to make the social system 
more efficient. Japan is at present developing a 'new earth 21 programme', a 100 year project 
to clean the environment, for which we hope to gain international cooperation. The plan is to 
gradually phase in better technologies, renewable sources of energy, energy saving processes, 
and to develop nuclear fusion, thus halving emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050. 
Discussion 
Mr Van Hoek (SEP) referred to the question 'how will electricity utilities adapt to increasing 
demand faced with uncertain supply?' He said the utilities would not let this situation develop 
as they have an obligation to supply, but uncertainties would cost the consumer money. 
He suggested rewording question 3 to read: could the public and politicians be made aware that 
opposition through fear may drive utilities to make more costly decisions. Everyone wants to 
avoid the alternative - inability to supply. 
On the question (pl.7) of greater efficiency from structural changes, reforming monopolies and 
open access to networks, Mr Van Hoek said electricity is different. It cannot be stored so 
delicate balancing of generation is needed, yet continuous cheap supply is taken for granted. 
This is only possible in a combination of monopoly and an obligation to supply. 
Meeting demand by more efficient use of networks (p24-25) is a misunderstanding, said Mr 
Van Hoek, as networks are already used to their best capability. This means secure, high 
quality supply, not long distance transport, which said Mr Van Hoek, would lead to lower 
reliability and higher costs. 
Finally, said Mr Van Hoek, common carrier is disadvantageous to small consumers and would 
not be needed if the EC start from the basis of harmonised conditions for generating electricity. 
Sir Keneth Cousins of British Coal stated that the aim of industry must be to help the 
Commission draw up a new energy policy for a period of at least ten years, combining 
economic growth and care for the environment. It is important that the Community has a 
robust policy. This policy statement must avoid a number of pitfalls: it must not rely on a 
"great surge" of electricity in the European Community; it must not rely on a boundless supply 
of natural gas at a low price; it must not rely on massive government intervention in prices and 
management and must not assume that the international energy market is a normal economic 
market with free competition between the main players. On the other hand, it should take 
account of a number of points. Firstly, that the energy changes in Eastern Europe in the next 
ten years will lead to net demand. 
Secondly, that international dependence on Middle East oil and gas will rise. Thirdly, that coal 
will continue to play a major role. Fourthly, the EEC will import more and its energy 
dependence will rise. Finally, there will continue to be price volatility. He concluded that 
there were two lessons to be drawn from all these points: the European Community must not 
wilfully increase its energy dependence and that the main environmental gains in the nineties 
would arise from Eastern Europe and the application of new technologies. 
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Mr I. Osayimwese (OPEC) stated that scenario 3 was unrealistic, in that it implied a drop in 
oil consumption during a period of economic growth. Scenario 1, corresponding 
approximately to OPEC's middle price scenario, was very much business as usual. He felt that 
the solution was rather to look in the 21st century at the relationship between growth and 
demand. 
Mr Simon Roberts (Energy Campaigner, Friends of the Earth, UK) was the first 
environmentalist to speak at the conference. He spoke of a Friends of the Earth report which 
analyses the amount of money which must be spent in order to meet energy demand while 
reducing environmental impact. This report drew three conclusions. Firstly, it is possible to 
achieve stable C02 emissions by 2000 at negative cost to the nation. Secondly, nuclear power 
is the least cost effective measure to satisfy demand while reducing environmental damage. 
Lastly, the energy market in the UK and the EC is targeted on the least cost effective 
measures. Policy must consequently be re-thought. 
Mr J. Tassart (ETUC) put a question to Mr Adam: should not an energy policy at European 
level precede a "common market" in energy? The ETUC views such an approach as 
indispensable, notably to help reduce environmental damage. Mr Adam (Member of the 
European Parliament, Vice-President of the Committee on Energy Research and 
Technology) replied that one of the priorities must be a rational and efficient use of energy. 
Mrs Taschner (European Environment Bureau) stated that a single energy market would 
stimulate competition. This could lead to greater energy use and consequently to more 
environmental problems. She asked Mr Malpas whether his company preferred dealing with 
pollution through standards or through taxation of pollution? Mr Malpas (Chairman of 
Powergen, UK) replied that he preferred emission standards. This will be financed through 
the capital programme and it will be recouped in the price of electricity. 
Mr G. Sanchez-Sierra (Latin American Energy Association) stated that the Association's 26 
member states had come under pressure from multilateral banks to privatise their power 
sector. He asked the question of what happened to the nuclear plants in the UK privatisation 
programme? Mr Malpas replied that you can only run a business if you know the costs. In the 
UK a great deal of confusion surrounded the real costs of running the nuclear plants, 
particularly as regards re-processing and de-commissioning. 
Mr Wilson (CEFIC) stated that the process of liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets 
in the UK had boosted the production of environmentally-sound energy generation. As a 
consequence, emissions of SOX and C02 will drop in the next ten years. We can conclude 
that an internal energy market in the EC will have similar beneficial effects. Mr Malpas 
expressed his support for this viewpoint. 
Mr Frigola (Permanent Representation of France to the European Communities) stressed 
that developing countries wül not benefit immediately from a technology transfer. They will 
consequently follow the same path as that of the developed world in earlier decades. Their 
energy needs, particularly primary energy, will grow in the future. They could consequently 
make two claims: access to fossil fuels and a right to pollute. Mr Desprairies (President of 
CIFOPE) replied that developed countries must help the developing world to avoid taking the 
same path. However, even if the will is there, they would be unable to stop polluting at the 
same rate as the developed nations. The best solution, he felt, would be to encourage 
companies to invest in developing countries and help them thus exploit their own fuel 
resources. 
A participant raised the question of research and development. He stated that the only way of 
reconciling environmental protection and energy growth while not jeopardising economic 
growth was to develop new technologies. He raised the question of whether we were doing 
enough 
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SESSION 2: TECHNOLOGY, EFFICIENCY AND 
ENVIRONMENT 
Co-Chairman: Professor Umberto Colombo, President of the ENEA, Rome & Dr. 
Pieter Winsemius, Director, McKinsey and Company, Amsterdam 
Summary 
If we solve energy problems, we help solve environmental problems. Recent concern for the 
environment has centred on the greenhouse effect, but other problems remain: acid rain, the 
danger of nuclear accidents. A long-term strategy must be devised which ensures that solutions 
for one problem do not exacerbate another. There is also a need for short-term solutions to 
urgent pollution problems. 
Two key questions need to be addressed: 
what environmental agenda is emerging; 
how can technology improve energy efficiency and solve environmental 
problems. 
In the future there will be a change in the perception of environmental problems - moving 
away from the toxic substances themselves to the wider issues of energy, technology, world 
trade and transport. This, in turn, will suggest political solutions, addressing such issues as 
dispersed population patterns, use of mass transit, and efficient use of alternative energy. 
Government's weapons are legislation and taxation; in addition, private initiatives should be 
encouraged. 
Technology can help to solve problems, such as lessening the environmental impact of "dirty" 
energy sources. But it is up to society to bring about lasting change. Governments, in 
particular, should introduce measures which correct the "myopic" and short-term aspects of 
the market place. 
New technologies have made greater conservation possible, but they must be pursued on a 
continuous basis. Research and development should be stepped up and carefully focused. 
Several of the points mentioned during the session are now reflected in EC research 
programmes. 
It is important to note that choices affecting conservation are not made on ecological grounds, 
but on economic criteria. Efficiency gains from technology are often offset by consumer 
behaviour. This view is supported by research in the US which showed that industry made the 
greatest contribution to energy conservation; consumer behaviour accounted for only 15% of 
total savings and was not a durable factor. 
A number of crucial questions remain unanswered: 
K the EC had to reduce C02 emissions by 20% by 2005, could it do it? Should 
we in fact be aiming for stabilisation, not reduction? 
If nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl still catch us off guard, how can we claim 
to have mastered the technology? 
If a total reversal of the economy is necessary to deal with environmental 
problems, will it be possible to alter consumer behaviour? 
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Panel 
Prof. Umberto Colombo, President of ENEA 
The key questions to be tackled are: what environmental agenda is emerging, and how can 
technology improve energy efficiency and solve environmental problems. Western countries 
should ensure vigorous introduction of energy efficiency world-wide to close the intolerable gap 
in the use of energy, with 75% of the world's population - in the developing countries - using 
10% of supplies. 
On global climate and man's role in climate change, technology can help solve problems (acid 
rain, protecting the ozone layer), but society must bring about real changes through economic, 
efficient energy techniques. Government measures - carbon taxes, standardising legislation -
could help correct myopic attitudes. 
With 88% of total energy consumption currently from fossil fuels, there is a danger in relying 
too heavily on one energy source. We must look unemotionally at the possibilities of nuclear 
power and renewable fuels - the latter in particular benefiting developed countries with less 
structured energy industries - such as biomass from agriculture. We can no longer afford to 
remain prisoner of short-term thinking. 
Mr. John Easton, US Assistant Secretary for Energy Affairs 
Among US conclusions on the use of technology in improving energy efficiency, based on 
research between 1973-1988 into energy efficiency, are the following. 
First, although prices affect conservation gains, other factors remain important. Second, the 
development of new technologies have made greater conservation possible, but technology does 
not just appear; it must be pursued on a continuous basis, even during periods of lower prices. 
Third, the turnover of capital stock is the primary mechanism of conservation gains. Choices 
affecting conservation are not made on ecological grounds, rather on economic criteria. 
Fourth, growth and structural change make energy conservation a moving target. Industry has 
made the greatest conservation savings, but fifth, we found conservation trends reflect a 
diversity of response within each sector of the economy, each achieving different savings. And 
lastly, although consumer behaviour reinforced those gains, it made up only 15% of total 
savings and was not a durable factor. 
Mr. Robert Horton, Chairman, British Petroleum 
New technologies have played an important part in energy saving, but the slow turnover of 
stock makes conservation gains a long-term issue. 
Efficiency gains from technology are often offset by consumer behaviour, given that consumer 
saturation point, particularly in the areas of travel, appliance ownership, housing space per 
capita, has not been reached. 
So higher energy prices, new regulations and information on cost saving measures are required 
to help reverse these trends. We need to switch to non-fossil fuels to cut emissions, but nuclear 
power still faces public opposition and the high capital costs and uncertainty of renewable 
sources make them risky investments in an increasingly competitive electricity industry. 
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About half the carbon emissions come from outside the OECD where energy efficiency is low. 
It is likely to take 25-30 years of replacing buildings and much existing equipment with new 
technology before we see any significant reduction in such emissions. 
Dr. Klaus Knizia, Chairman, VEW 
The electricity industry should be based on coal supplies and nuclear energy, because they are 
the most abundant resources. We have to decrease dependence on oil with the help of 
electricity, expecting a probable third oil crisis in the next decade, due to decreasing reserves 
and a higher proportion of them situated in the Persian Gulf. 
We don't fear a lack of energy taking all energies into account but we will have a lack of capital 
so we will have to make the best of it. Now some thoughts about the techniques. 
C02 emissions could be substantially reduced through technologies, for example the 
gasification of coal and use of combined fuel. If atmospheric pollution by C02 is to be reduced, 
the discrimination against nuclear power and electricity in general must cease. We need to 
reduce the risks associated with nuclear power. There are also dangers in forcing prices up and 
thus forcing electricity generating companies to relocate abroad. 
Mr. Paul Lannoye, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology of 
the European Parliament 
Energy is the key parameter of environmental problems; if we solve energy problems we solve 
environmental problems. Recent concern has centred on the greenhouse effect, but other 
problems - acid rain, the danger of nuclear accidents - remain. So we need an overall consistent 
strategy to ensure solutions for one problem not to exacerbate another. 
Nuclear energy is not better than fossil fuel; we need a long-term strategy based on renewable 
energy and rational use of resources. But short-term solutions must be found to urgent 
pollution problems including East Germany's air pollution. 
Carefully focussed research and development must be stepped up, but the real response to 
environmental problems is political. Present wasteful patterns of consumption and production 
(dispersed accommodation problems, inefficient use of solar power, use of road not rail) must 
be used to guarantee energy savings, if properly organised with the same standards pertaining 
across the EC. Taxation and legislation are also weapons in the environmental fight. 
Mr. Aldo Romoli, President, Economic and Social Committee, Energy Section 
The focus has changed in the energy area; in the past market price has been the primary 
motivator but now we must take into account the cost of pollution. We cannot leave the policy 
of monitoring environmental problems to the market, but must develop a policy of rules and 
taxes. 
We should look at the use of agriculture for energy. In the future grain-producing nations in 
Eastern Europe are likely to introduce on to the world market surplus agricultural produce, 
which could be used for energy given sufficient research. 
The ESC is concerned about contradictory national practices, rather than Community norms, in 
the use of nuclear power. The Commission has faüed to address the most important issue of 
nuclear power - safety - and the research budget for safety in the new programme has been 
reduced. 
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On Eastern Europe, I suggest not a shift from coal but the introduction of better desulphurising 
and management techniques. The situation must be tackled urgently. 
Dr. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Director, Institute for European Environmental Policy 
What is the environmental question ahead? There will be a change in the perception of 
environmental problems, movmg away from specific toxic substances to wider issues of energy, 
technology, world trade and transport. 
I expect a move towards greening the economy from within rather than fighting hundreds of 
uphill battles at the ends of hundreds of pipes. Therefore attention will turn to instruments 
which rather change the slope of the battlefield. 
Our task is to internalise external costs, as in Scenario 4. Where solid proofs are available, the 
polluter pays principle is applied today. But the burden of proof should not fall on the state. A 
key instrument for change should be an environment tax, to be introduced gradually over a long 
period - a 5% increase a year - to prevent economic mayhem. To maintain a stable tax burden 
other taxes should be reduced. This policy would provide companies with the motivation to 
make long-term ecological investments. 
Mr. V. Bushuev, Energy Committee of the Supreme Soviet 
The USSR would like to develop closer cooperation with the EC as a whole as well as with 
individual member states. Energy is a major Soviet export which would benefit from reliable 
European partners. 
Environmental problems from energy are a global concern, and we must cooperate to improve 
the situation at a European level. The Supreme Soviet's energy policy to 2005 aims to stabilise 
consumption through energy saving techniques and increased localisation of resources, 
including development of small gas and hydro-electric power stations and the use of solar 
power and renewable energy. In this the USSR needs Western expertise. 
I would like to take this opportunity to apologise to you all for the disaster at Chernobyl. We 
need nuclear power, and we need to popularise it, but since Chernobyl, USSR developments 
have slowed down to ensure greater reliability. 
We need more USSR-EC cooperation on new technologies for fossil fuels and electricity as our 
environment standards move closer. The USSR has an initiative for a centre for the 
development of energy efficiency and new technology. 
Mr. Pieter Winsemius, Director, McKinsey & Company 
The environmental agenda is changing. The issue is not whether we will spend the money but 
where. In Western Europe, or wilfit Be better for the environment, though politically difficult, 
to spend it in Eastern Europe, for example? 
Another question is the role of capital stock. Is the economy the enemy of the environment or 
do we need economic growth with increasing turnover to get an improvement in the 
environment? Certainly Scenario 1, business as usual will lead us into an environmental hole. 
Then, questions from a technological viewpoint. If we had to take action to reduce C02 
emissions by 20% by 2005, could we do it? In nuclear power, we have not yet mastered the 
technology, "because we are unable to cope in a crisis. The reaction of Europe to the Chernobyl 
disaster could be called the ostrich approach. 
Is a total reversal of the economy needed to deal with environmental problems, and can we 
alter consumer behaviour to this end? Despite the US research, I believe this to be possible, 
and that we should be asking if the EC should aim to stabilise C02 emissions by 2000. 
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Discussion 
Mr. Richard Eden (Cambridge University), reacting to a comment by Mr G. Sfligiotti, stated 
that a dichotomy existed between those in favour of free play of market forces and those who 
prefer regulation by government intervention. This has been reflected by what has been said 
during the conference. He went on to stress that there must be awareness of the risk that 
targets for pollution reduction may not be attained and consequently contingency plans must 
be drawn up. In other words, we must learn to adapt to climatic changes in the event of 
possible failure. 
Mr. Eric Price (Department of Energy, UK) stated that one of the main topics was greenhouse 
gas abatement. Nearly all the talk at the conference had been of C02, whereas in the EEC, 
CFC emissions are nearly as important. The latter should be almost completely eliminated by 
the year 2000. To ignore this point is to paint the situation blacker than it actually is. 
Mr Umberto Colombo pointed out that the Commission's research activities have been called 
into question on a number of occasions during the conference. Much has been said about 
research, particularly that more was needed. Mr Lannoye made the criticism that research 
was too long on the same path, although Mr Colombo added that a certain time span was 
needed for research to bear its fruit. A combination of flexibility and stability is required. Mr 
Colombo noted that all the institutions which decide the Commission's activities have brought 
about changes. Pressure comes from different groups at programme definition stage. The 
final programme is the outcome of the combination of these pressures. A growing attempt is 
being made to combine energy and environmental aspects, he added. The most tangible 
evidence of this is the fact that within the DG XII, there is one single Director for the two 
fields. 
Mr. Constance of the European Commission stated that several of the points mentioned 
during the morning's session were now reflected in the research programmes. The 
Commission is seeking to combine economic aspects with protection of the environment. 
Combined cycles and renewable energies are among the priorities. 
The Chairman, Mr Colombo, pointed out that Mr Lannoye had been called to task a number 
of times. Simon Roberts (Friends of the Earth) asked how it was possible to reconcile the 
drive towards lower prices in the context of an internal energy market with a universal call for 
a price level high enough to enable investment? Mr Tassart of the ETUC stated that the 
documents presented four types of domestic appliances incorporating energy saving 
technologies and asked why they were not more widely distributed on the European market. 
He also asked how it would be possible to diffuse these measures on a large scale without 
making things difficult for low income households. Finally, Mr Colombo drew on the 
experience of his own country, Italy, where there is a lack of optimism as to the possibilities for 
future energy policy in the area of energy conservation and renewable energies (e.g. biomass). 
Mr Lannoye replied to the first question concerning low energy prices: is this a factor which 
would prevent the emergence of solutions targeting energy supply on renewable energies? He 
felt that this was a negative factor. Taxes can push up prices, but sudden changes must be 
avoided, while taking a firm hand. He then moved on to the topic of co-generation, stating 
that the technology was not new: the obstacle to its use was institutional and economic. Part of 
the problem is that nuclear power requires costly investments and people consequently 
attempt to stimulate demand to make their investments pay. This is not rational. Everyone 
agrees on the principle of co-generation, but no-one is willing to put it into practice. Much 
more has to be done, he concluded, in the technological sphere. 
Mr Bloch (European Petroleum Association) stated that if we want better protection of the 
environment, we need government intervention via norms and taxation. But he felt that the 
role of decisions by private companies was being ignored. In the environmental area, the 
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private sector is beginning to take initiatives which go further than the law. Governments 
must take steps to encourage such initiatives. 
A participant reminded the conference that a scientific consensus existed and stated that at 
present we are living a kind of experiment, where we emit greenhouse gases without really 
knowing the effects this will have. On what was said by Mr von Weisacker concerning the fact 
that in a market economy, taxation can have a major effect, she stated that despite the fact 
energy is extremely expensive in Japan, they are facing the same problems as Europe. While 
taxation can play a role, it is not the whole answer. Legislation is also important and this is 
where the European Community can play a role. 
Mr von Weisacker (IPEE) agreed that legislation was important and felt that there was no 
contradiction between the two approaches. We live in a multicultural Europe and must 
consequently adapt instruments to the situation. If we look at the economic performance of 
the four biggest industrial states, the same hierarchy is seen in economic and energy 
performance prices. It is therefore a fairytale that high energy prices kill an economy. There 
is no theoretical problem to tradeable permits, it is the practical application and control which 
pose big problems. Mr von Weisacker suggested that the subject of permits be re-discussed 
in "climate diplomacy arenas", setting up for example permits based on the number of adults 
living in the country. Poor countries would consequently have a surplus of permits which they 
could sell to the richer ones. On the question of taxes, he suggested that the existing 
counter-productive taxes be replaced by taxes working in the right ecological direction, while 
being economically beneficial. The basic role of such green taxes would be to give a clear 
steering signal for technology and consumer behaviour. 
Mr Easton (US Energy Department) spoke of the example of the United States, which 
experimented with different types of regulations before concluding that a command-control 
approach was less effective than tradeable permits (bubble concept). In the area of 
greenhouse gases, the suggestion is to assess the relative impact of all these gases and then 
attempt to cut then as a function of this impact. 
Mr Romoli (President of the Economic and Social Committee, Energy Section) stated that 
with the polluter pays concept, it is the consumer who carries the buck, for costs are recouped 
through prices. While the concept is a good slogan, attention should be devoted rather to 
structures. We must combine energy and environment policy with market economics. As 
regards Eastern Europe, a distinction must be drawn between the different countries. For 
example, the reunification of the two Germanys will rapidly deal with the pollution problems 
in the GDR. The main difficulty will be the other countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia): 
medium-level technology must be transferred to help them solve their pollution problems. 
Western European engineering firms are currently seeking advanced technologies, but 
Poland's problems, for example, can be resolved by existing technology, which must 
consequently be revitalised. We cannot rely on market forces to do the job, Mr Romoli stated. 
The Commission must consequently give financial incentives, for a balance must rapidly be 
found between risks and costs. 
In response to a question from Mr J. Riggs (US House of Representatives) concerning the 
amount of toxic gases lost in the USSR via leakage upon firing, Mr V Bushuev (Energy 
Committee of the Supreme Soviet) replied that a distinction must be drawn between three 
sources of leakage: networks, consumers and production sites. Networks and consumers 
register a 2% loss, compared with 4% for production sites. Steps are currently being taken to 
reduce the effects of gas firing to 2%. However, Mr Bushuev stressed that these gases have 
little impact (2%) on the greenhouse effect. 
Several questions and comments were raised at this point in the debate: 
1) Given that the price of energy must embrace both production cost and environmental 
costs, how in this situation can the total cost of nuclear plants be calculated? 
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2) Mr Frigola (Permanent Representation of France to the EEC) noted there were no 
representatives of the nuclear industry on the panel and that nuclear energy had been 
discussed only from the viewpoints of safety and waste management. 
3) Mr Levi felt that the assessment of French energy policy had been too rapid, as had the 
rejection of nuclear power in favour of renewable energies. 
4) Mr Stevens (Nuclear Energy Agency) noted that the general public was not ready to 
adopt all the reduction measures for C02 and that unacceptable targets should not be 
adopted. 
5) A participant remarked that a study has just been published on the comparative costs of 
coal and nuclear energy in the OECD. It concluded that nuclear power was only 
economically favourable in five to ten of the OECD countries. He also stated that too 
many illusions were made to unachievable goals. 
6) Is the public well informed about the risks of nuclear power compared with those of 
other sources? One participant quoted an argument from "The Spectator" whereby if 
someone lived at equidistant from a nuclear or coal-fired power plant, they would be 
more likely to die from pollution from the latter. The nuclear industry, however, is 
forced to spend a great deal more money on waste disposal. 
In reply, Dr. K. Knizia (Chairman of VEW) stated that it was difficult to measure risk in such 
a way. In any event, we need both coal and nuclear energy and we must use both in a manner 
which is safe for the environment. "I am a member of a private company", stated Dr Knizia, 
"and we have established a combined nuclear-coal process, without either tax incentives or 
disincentives. Nuclear power is no different a risk from any other", he concluded. 
Professor. Colombo stated that the future for the energy world is pluralistic in terms of sources 
and technology. All of the energy options pose problems, but we cannot do without any of 
them. 
Dr Hans von Bulow explained the Danish policy in this area. The government plans to bring 
down C02 by 20% by 2005. This will be achieved by consuming more natural gas, less coal, 
more renewable energies and no nuclear. Denmark has a good starting point, with the highest 
C02 per capita output in Europe. A separate plan will be drawn up for the transport sector. 
Mr B. Jones (Australian Embassy, Brussels) stated that to compare fossil fuels with 
non-fossil fuels was not the answer. If we are to have demand restraint, people must 
understand the facts. Furthermore, we must convince the developing countries not to follow 
our path, while offering them tangible solutions. 
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SESSION 3: GEOPOLITICS AND SUPPLY OF 
ENERGY 
Co-chairmen: The Rt. Hon. D. Howell, M.P., U.K. & Dr. M. Gallego, President, 
Hidroastur, Madrid 
Summary 
Known oil resources represent over 40 years of oil supplies, 68 of gas and 100 of coal. 
Combined with new energies, this should be no danger of an energy crisis. 
But many of these supplies are in remote, undeveloped or politically volatile areas. Sudden 
moves affecting supply or demand could be destabilising. This implies the need for energy 
policies which can cover possible interruptions and market failures. 
The world energy market is slowly moving from a buyer's to seller's market, with the EC 
becoming more dependent on outside suppliers. More long-term investment is needed and 
the best way to guarantee that is by ensuring that companies earn enough to make investment 
an attractive proposition, rather than through subsidies or regulation. Regional imbalances in 
primary energy sources, environmental protection, taxation and operating conditions must be 
overcome to ensure fair competition across the community. 
The influence of other economic problems on energy policy must also be considered. In Latin 
America, for example, factors such as external debt loads and certain protectionist barriers to 
supply have made it difficult for countries to develop a coherent energy policy which takes 
environmental issues into account. Technology can help, but technical costs must be shared. 
One view is that companies will be more successful than governments at developing energy 
alternatives, provided companies have the financial room to manoeuvre. Availabüity of 
financial resources for exploration and development should be considered before burdening 
certain sectors with fiscal measures aimed at protecting the environment. 
The availability and appropriateness of nuclear power is a world-wide issue that must be 
addressed, especially as industrialised countries step up their capacity and other countries 
develop theirs. The long-term risks of investment in nuclear or any other energy source must 
be assumed by society, since short-term uncertainties may mean that energy is not available 
when needed. 
Gas appears to hold promise as a future energy supply. Major gas reserves, especially in the 
USSR, have not yet been tapped. The EC will need to develop new contracts with new gas 
exporters to ensure stability of supply. Bringing gas to the market in an orderly manner is one 
of the major challenges. 
Finally, energy policy needs to be debated in the political arena, which implies the need for 
greater public information. 
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Panel 
Dr. Gallego, President, Hidroastur 
European Community will be more dependent from outside because their fossil fuel 
production will decrease one quarter - about 100 Mtoe from 1990 to 2010, and coal and gas 
imports will growth significantly. Nevertheless there is no feeling now and no prospect for the 
near future of a shortage kind of fuel resources crisis, because present plus potential discoveries 
will extend the oil life horizon to at least 70 years, gas to twice that figure and coal to many 
times more. 
On the other hand there can be an energy availability crisis, especially of electricity, because of 
the political and financial constraints of acceding to some of the existing fuels and coping with 
the environmental problems and risks of its use. 
Any way the future is going to appear the same up to 2010, because we will have to continue 
using coal, oil, gas and nuclear as we cannot afford to go without any ofthem, and overreliance 
on one reduces the stability and flexibility of the system. But the future will be different 
because security will never exist, neither for the supply nor for the demand side , neither for the 
utilities nor for the primary energy producers; with coal imports forecast ranging from 100 to 
240 Mtoe, gas imports from 160 to 300 Mtoe, oil imports between 420 and only 220 Mtoe and 
additional electricity requirements differing as much as 170 GW. 
In addition the internal energy market will produce a radical change in the structure and 
organization of the utilities, but an energy policy will also be needed to cope with market 
failures, specially in relation with the environment and security. 
Finally energy can and must be used as a tool for cooperation in promoting the economic 
development of less developing countries, where continues to exist an energy crisis, but can 
contribute to decreasing tensions, not only on the world energy balance, but also on the more 
essential political and social aims to which energy is only a mean. 
Mr. Antonius Grotens, President, Gasunie 
In the past 25 years in various countries in W-Europe natural gas has taken, in competition with 
other fuels, between 15 and 30% of the primary energy market. 
This success originates not only from the quality of the product itself, but also from the 
structure of the industry, stable markets, long-term contracts and an extensive transmission 
network made it possible to invest many hundreds of billion ECU's both in the upstream and 
downstream side. 
For the future we expect that demand for gas will increase to 400 BCM a year in 2010 for W-
Europe or even more. Imports from non-EC countries will rise to between 170 and 280 BCM a 
year in 2010 (1990 about 100 BCM). 
Present demand is met from EC-production and imports from non-EC countries (38% in 1989). 
For the period from 1995 onwards there will be a great need to contract new volumes, a need 
which will be enhanced by developments in E-Europe with its desire to improve the 
environmental situation. 
To make the production and transport of these large quantities of gas possible, large 
investments have to be made, which are now estimated at more or less 175 billion ECU's. And 
in addition the transportation companies will have to enter in take-or-pay contracts with a value 
of some 650 billion ECU's in addition to the current commitments of some 350 billion ECU's. 
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This will only be possible in a stable and predictable business climate. One of the most 
important elements is prolongation of the structure which up till now has been proven 
successful for the development of the EC-market. 
Mr. Rolf Linkohr, European Parliament 
The world energy market is slowly moving from a buyer's to a seller's market and the EC is 
becoming more dependent on outside suppliers. More long-term investment is needed and the 
best way to guarantee that is by ensuring that companies earn enough to make investment an 
attractive proposition, rather than through subsidies or regulation. 
We need a global vision created from consensus on mutual interests, through increased 
exchanges with the third world and the US. We must work towards a world-wide network, 
which would take into account the third world, industrialised countries, debt and the 
environment to create a real geopolicy. 
EC Treaties dealing with energy are no longer relevant and we must bring energy increasingly 
into the political arena, with issues simplified to be understood by the public. We also need a 
new division of labour; aluminium and steel could be produced at lower economic and 
environmental cost than in the EC. On geopolitics and supply, we must ask if population 
growth is constant or if it could be slowed. 
/ 
Mr. Alessando Ortis, Vice-President, ENEL 
How can economic growth be sustained while preserving the environment and security of 
supply in the EC? How will energy supplies adjust to changing markets? 
We think that the electric supply industry has the potential for a large contribution to economic 
growth, environmental protection and security of supply. However this potential will be 
developed in full only within framework of a sound energy policy, harmonized at the European 
level. In order to be most efficient in its contribution to the above aims the industry needs 
flexibility in access to all primary energy sources and a long-term approach. On the contrary, 
misinterpreted concepts of competition, disregarding the factual technical characteristic of 
electricity, would lead to the choice of short-term and small solutions, then limiting substantially 
the ability to implement long-term policies. Pushing the electricity sector to massively 
concentrate its investment choices on techniques which appear the cheapest at the moment 
could bring about a more volatile and uncertain world energy market. Actually these solutions 
are captive to natural gas, then drastically reducing the aimed for flexibility in input sources. 
Electricity is at crossroads, and we must ask how the utilities will adapt to increased demand , 
given the uncertainly of future supply. Regional imbalances with regard to primary energy 
sources and environmental protection must be overcome along with difference in taxation and 
operating conditions to ensure fair competition. Anyhow we, as electricity energy suppliers, are 
pursuing a mix of cooperation and competition in order to increase electricity integration. The 
European electricity stock exchange and the consultation on investments are two major recent 
initiatives. Others are the World Association of Nuclear Operators and our "code" of 
environmental protection, a first of its kind in industry. 
Mr. Alexei Macarov, (USSR Academy of Science) 
The Soviet Union gives priority to energy savings and has developed technical conservation 
methods which have increased efficiency by 36%. We have the means to double that saving by 
2010, but will not use all the methods available because only half are economically viable. The 
USSR is increasingly replacing oil with gas, and expects to increase gas production from 680 
Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 1990 to 950 Mtoe in 2010. There are potential 
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developments of gas exports beyond the EC and Eastern Europe to the Far East (China, Korea 
and Japan). 
The environmental benefits of gas will mean a reduction in toxic gas emissions (sulphur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxide) of 40% by 2010 and a reduction in ash. However, we expect a 15% 
increase in greenhouse gases because the technical methods for stabilisation or reduction are 
too expensive for implementation. We need intensified international cooperation in the field of 
technological energy conservation. 
Mr. William Ramsay, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources and Food 
On the question of oil, emphasis must be shifted from the perceived problem of the location of 
supplies in the Middle East to "economic disposition". Although there are no new large 
deposits to be discovered, there are still reserves. It is possible to rediversify supply, it was 
done after the oil crisis in the 70s, by changing the investment climate, and could be done again. 
Reserves are available and can be brought onto the international market given the right 
incentives. 
On the integration of Eastern Europe's energy systems with those of Western Europe, the 
problems the West experiences in siting refineries could be solved by upgrading those based in 
Eastern Europe. This would have benefits for the environment, increase refining facilities for 
the West and provide much needed foreign currency for the East. 
As far as the expansion of East/West gas and electricity networks are concerned, potential 
technical problems could be overcome in the knowledge that integration would lessen 
dependence on certain suppliers; the development of new, more flexible systems would provide 
greater diversity of supply. We should be creative in deciding how the European aggregate 
market could work, in the interests of efficiency, the maximisation of resources and 
minimisation of transport costs. 
Mr. Garcia Sanchez-Sierra, Latin American Energy Organization, (OLADE) 
In the current geopolitical context, most of the world is moving towards the formation of blocs -
Europe, the United States and Canada, Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries of Asia -
while the countries of the South are living in a "labyrinth of solitude". 
In this international context, the economic and energy development of Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been negatively influenced by such crucial factors as increased protectionism the 
part of industrialized countries: Deteriorating, unfair terms of trade, fluctuations on the 
international oil market, where current prices in constant terms are only one third of 1980. 
From the stand-point of the energy sector in the Region's broader economic and development 
context, the issues of vital concern for Latin America and Caribbean at present includes: 
. The energy sector debt, US $ 80 billion, which accounts for 18% of the Region's total 
foreign debt, and therefore has major implications for both sectoral and overall 
development efforts in the Latin America and Caribbean countries. 
. The search for ways to balance development efforts with growing pressure from the 
North for environmental protection. The Region must indeed strengthen the concept 
of environmental management in tapping its energy resources. However, we must not 
lose sight of the fact that industrialized countries have had the major responsibility for 
deterioration to date and should thus make a substantial contribution towards covering 
the higher cost that this will now entail for our Region. 
. The Region's declining energy efficiency, due to low growth in industrial demand during 
recent years, obsolete industrial and vehicle park, and low petroleum prices. 
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As critically important as these issues are for Latin America and the Caribbean, they are 
regrettably not a top priority for the countries of the North, where environment has become the 
key concern. Nonetheless, in light of today's closely interrelated world, developing countries 
problems cannot be left aside. 
As you are all aware, there is a new wave of democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean 
region; and to defend this democracy, we must improve our standard of living. However, to do 
so, everyone - in industrialized and developing countries alike - must work together in a global 
approach. 
Mrs. Helga Steeg, Executive Director, International Energy Agency 
We have to answer the question of where, how and when resources are going to be developed 
and by whom. Investment decisions of this kind are the business of the petroleum industry 
itself and the financial institutions which finance energy investments. If the right investment 
climate exists, they will be drawn in naturally. 
If our economies are burdened by governments imposing punitively heavy environmental taxes, 
the questions arises will enough investment capital be available for the energy industry to 
support the expansion of oil and gas production capacity needed world-wide and to cooperate 
with the emerging economies in Eastern Europe. Therefore we should strike a balance 
between the need to ensure our economies operate in the most environmentally effective 
manner, using fiscal incentives, and the need to protect the ability of the same economies to 
generate the investment income that energy developments require. 
On developing countries, I will be provocative and suggest that those with very high population 
growth rates must try seriously to improve the situation. 
As for Mr Linkohr's proposal for a world-wide network, I believe this can come only after 
consensus has been reached, as any organisation is only as good as its constituent members 
want it to be. 
Mr Uematsu, Director of the ΝΕΑ 
The nuclear electricity generation in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) area, which currently makes up about 23 % of the demand, will slightly decline 
after 1995. While the nuclear power capacity is globally sufficient for the present time, it will 
need to be increased in the future growing demand. Although the European Community 
countries have few plans for construction of new nuclear plants, Canada has plants for 10 new 
units in the coming decade, the US is moving back towards nuclear power, Japan is maintaining 
a strong commitment to nuclear energy, and other countries, including Taiwan, Korea, China, 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia, are already relying on nuclear power, or are planning to do so. 
Uranium supplies are cheap and will be sufficient until at least 2000. While the currently 
operating nuclear reactors have achieved high safety levels, there is a desire to move towards 
cheaper, smaller and simpler reactors. Research in this area should be based on international 
co-operation, given the importance of using past experience and the need to share the high 
expenses involved. 
Beyond technological and economic consideration, however, we need to enhance public 
information and openness as a prerequisite for understanding and acceptance. I suggest the 
ΝΕΑ as a possible instrument to contribute bridging the communication gap between experts 
and the public. 
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Rt. Hon. David Howell, MP, UK 
Consumers have made pro-environmental choices by choosing energy efficient goods, showing 
the important role the public have to play. I do not believe that economic growth and 
conservation are in conflict, rather that demands for conservation are providing the impetus for 
economic growth. An example is the new generation of high-tech power plants and 
developments in electricity transit - notably the efficient transmission from ac to dc systems at 
low cost. 
The new scene is one in which the major dangers to energy supply could come less from 
primary energy shortages and more from lack of investment in energy transmission and 
production facilities.Short term uncertainties and financial pressures make the long lead times 
of major power and gas transmission projects harder and harder to plan and undertake. 
Meanwhile we have, of course, to continue shielding ourselves from the inherent volatility of oil 
prices and the ever-present prospect of short-term oil supply interruptions, (made more likely 
by growing US imports once again). 
So the key question is whether we can get the alternative gas, electricity and conservation 
investment in place to meet demands effectively - within both the timescale required and within 
the rapidly growing constraints imposed by environmental concerns. 
Finally, Eastern Europe is the area for concentrated efforts in the 90s. While EC policy must 
centre on environmental issues, massive investment will be needed to update infrastructure, in 
order to implement the latest energy supply technology. 
Discussion 
Opening the discussion session, which followed on from the presentations given by the various 
members of the panel, Mr. I. Osayimwese, representative of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) remarked that energy savings constituted an important issue. In 
geopolitical terms, there are a number of pervasive aspects, such as supply safety and reduction 
of energy dependence. However, these are political rather than market concepts, he 
underlined. Geopolitics goes much further than these aspects, according to Mr. Osayimwese, 
also covering the demand side of the equation. The impression given by the discussions is that 
this factor was not sufficiently taken into account in the last twenty years. 
The Chairman of the Panel called for a reaction from representatives of the coal industry, who 
had kept relatively quiet during the conference. Dr. Seeliger (CEPCEO), questioned whether 
the productivity angle of coal had been properly analysed. He did not believe that this was the 
case, rendering the problem a major one, for dependence will consequently rise. He also 
stressed that the EEC represents one third of world coal demand. Evolution in Eastern Europe 
and the Third World will furthermore create supply-side risks, according to Dr. Seeliger. The 
scenarios in the Report by the "Groupe des Sages" concentrate chiefly on supply diversification, 
despite the fact that coal reserves form one aspect of supply security and political strategy. Dr. 
Seeliger concluded by regretting that the Commission has predicted that current coal 
production will drop by 50% by 2010. and suggests that precautionary measures should be taken 
to maintain a well-balanced energy mix as a safeguard against unforeseen environmental risks 
or new perceptions which may mean any energy may have to be ruled out in the future. 
A participant speaking from the floor raised the question of safety in mines and attempted to 
bring the conference "back to earth" by speaking about the human cost outside the EC. It 
would appear that there are no more indigenous energy reserves in the EEC and that the 
Community only has a "half guarantee" of supply. Conflicts in the Gulf region destabilise the 
situation on the supply market. Coal is purchased at low prices - for the working conditions in 
these countries enable them to achieve low prices - despite the fact that thé" Community has its 
own coal, which it does not use. 
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The representative of the Latin American Energy Organisation, Mr. G. Sanchez-Sierra, made a 
comment on coal subsidies. He remarked that Europeans - in particular Germans - often use 
different terms for what are in fact subsidies, at least when speaking of themselves. On the 
question of the safety of miners, he remarked that in Colombia, safety conditions vary 
considerably from mine to mine. 
A representative of the Petroleum Industry Association responded to the presentation made at 
the beginning of the afternoon by the Vice-Chairman of the ENEL (Entente nationale pour 
l'énergie électrique), Mr. A. ORTIS, on the reliability of electricity. He stressed that oil and 
gas were equally reliable. Both these energy sources have enabled an improvement of living 
conditions : the replacement of wood by butane or diesel oil and the upgrading of 
communications thanks to oil. This latter sector has now begun to pay closer attention to 
environmental issues. He concluded that there should be more cooperation with the OPEC 
countries. 
Mr. G. van Hoek, representative of the Association of Electricity Producers, referred to 
document 3B (page 5), which raised the question of reduced adaptation of electricity producers 
to the environment. He believed that steps must be taken to ensure that this situation did not 
occur. Uncertainties will cost consumers dear. 
A representative of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) asked Mr. R. Linkohr, 
Member of the European Parliament, what European political circles think of the import into 
the EEC of South African coal? Mr. Linkohr replied that his political grouping in the 
European Parliament has always been in favour of the application of economic sanctions 
against South Africa as a weapon against the government's policy of Apartheid. 
In this connection, he declared that Mr. Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National 
Congress (ANC) had accepted an invitation from the President of the European Parliament, 
Mr. Enrique Baron, and will visit the Parliament in Strasbourg on June 13. However, economic 
pressure does not always have the hoped for results. If the same yardstick was to be used for 
other countries, we would have to cut off relations with many. Touching upon steel production, 
Mr. Linkohr mentioned the case of Venezuela, where German and Italian companies set up 
very modern plant, but Europeans then refused to buy the Venezuelan steel produced there. 
One of the lessons which can be drawn from these examples is that an international division of 
labour would also have economic and social advantages. 
A representative of the European Environment Bureau (EEB) asked Mr. Linkohr a question on 
ecological concerns and the International Energy Agency (IEA). Mr. Linkohr pointed out that 
the creation of the Agency had been the Western response to the creation and strategy of the 
OPEC and stated that he personally thought it had been "a good idea". But other challenges 
have arisen in the interim, such as that of environmental protection, and it is difficult to say why 
the IEA has not reacted more to these problems. International bodies dealing with these 
aspects must be created or reinforced to tackle the ecological challenges, he concluded. 
The Executive Director of the IEA, Mrs. H. Steeg, stated that from the organisation's 
viewpoint there were a number of relevant analyses already conducted, two of which she 
referred to on energy and environment topics, which had been undertaken in collaboration with 
IEA's Member countries 
In reply to a question as to whether the United Nations favours a global and multidisciplinary 
approach in the energy sector, the UN representative stated that this was indeed the case. He 
revealed that the Organisation is preparing a conference on this topic which will take place in 
1992 in Brazil. The conference will cover all the topics raised by the Panel, he maintained. He 
extended an invitation to the authors of the "Rapport des Sages" to take part in discussions. 
127 
Conference Proceedings 
A representative of Friends of the Earth emphasised that all those active in the area of energy 
supply should read the report distributed during the morning on the climate. He maintained 
that the effects of energy production on climatic changes meant that production would have to 
be cut to a certain extent, to defuse the play-off between supply and demand and thus protect 
the environment. 
Mr. Jean Tassar (CFDT, France) put a question to Mrs. H. Steeg on competitiveness prospects 
for production prices in KW/hour, asking whether the IEA had studied this matter. Mrs. Steeg 
felt that at present there was not sufficient information available to be able to give an exact 
answer to this very technical question, although the Agency is in contact with certain bodies, 
such as the ENEL. Its comparisons of production costs vary according to the hypotheses: in 
some cases it is nuclear and in others coal which have a better ratio. 
Mr. G. Sanchez-Sierra from the Latin American Energy Organisation came back to the subject 
of deforestation. He suggested that kerosene production could help temper this phenomenon. 
Wood consumption for cooking purposes only has secondary impact on deforestation in Latin 
America, he stated, which results chiefly from social pressure for the extension of farm land. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
CS. Maniatopoulos, Director General, Directorate-General XVII 
At the end of the discussion, the Director General of the DG XVII of the European 
Commission, Mr. C.S.Maniatopoulos, strove to draw lessons from the two days of debates. He 
expressly stipulated that he was not attempting to produce "conclusions or a summary of the 
work" but to put across what he saw to be the main messages. His first introductory remark 
concerned the nature of participation in the conference. Mr. Maniatopoulos emphasised that 
the conference had been extremely fortunate "to enjoy the presence of very high level political 
officials, leaders of European industry, representatives of our people and of the press". It was 
interesting to note that during the debates, no reference had been made to scenario 2 in the 
report by the "Groupe des Sages", i.e. the "how things could go wrong". This reflects awareness 
that the world is changing and that this presents challenges and risks, but that uncontrollable 
tensions are not expected. There must be "smooth" movement towards the future, with analysis 
of how, rather then whether European industry is going to be restructured. This raises the 
question of prices, taxation, environmental protection and so on. We must act quickly but not 
abruptly, taking the path of "evolution not revolution". Mr. Maniatopoulos expressed his 
agreement with one of the panel participants, who stated that "energy is not an end in itself: all 
the interests entering into the equation must be analysed and once they have been examined, 
the final choice made. 
On the question of the development of energy and the resultant pollution, Mr. Maniatopoulos 
underlined that "all changes must be paid for in one way or another". The cost must be 
minimised, but the development cannot be stopped and we cannot go into reverse. 
"Competitiveness is a requirement", he added, "it is one of the prerequisites for survival in a 
world where Europe is not alone". Although we use more energy than in the past, we use it 
better. 
Mr. Maniatopoulos raised the point of taxation and prices, indirectly but clearly related to the 
previous question. He stressed that the notion of "progressiveness" put forward by one of the 
panels was interesting. Along with the notion of gentle change, it constitutes a "political choice 
which must be made". The question is to know how evolution will be mastered, for growth is 
both inevitable and desirable. 
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Mr. Maniatopoulos then gave several responses to the work of the different panels. "We need 
an European energy policy", he declared. "This is vital for our economies and for our standard 
of living, even if it is something which will be difficult to achieve. I hope that we will have the 
courage, as in the United States, to speak openly of energy". All kinds of energy have a role to 
play in the future, he emphasised. It is unrealistic to think that we do not need coal, but we 
must think in terms of "clean coal", as we have done for nuclear energy. 
Gas is an energy of the future, Mr. Maniatopoulos then declared. It is a pity however that there 
is reticence to change structures and that the internal market in energy is seen as posing a 
threat to current energy structures. Industry must jump at the opportunity offered by gas. 
As for renewables, they will, unfortunately, continue to play a limited role in the foreseeable 
future. Information for the general public is essential. Good effective decisions cannot be 
taken without democratic control. The closed attitude of the European energy industry in 
recent decades has not facilitated the creation of a European policy, according to Mr. 
Maniatopoulos. Clear and lasting signals must be given to the market and to industry. 
Touching upon the topic of energy demand security, Mr. Maniatopoulos stated that this 
concept was "interesting", but emphasised that he disagreed with this point. The concept would 
be a "barrier to progress". "There is no evolution without risks", he stated. Why should the 
producer not also take risks? Moreover, market confidence reigns for as long as there is 
evolution or progress. The notion is consequently "meaningless", it is interesting to note that 
European industry has also called for such demand security for its services, and consequently its 
market and monopoly. "I find this bad, it is a sign of rigidity", commented Mr. Maniatopoulos, 
adding that it would be a form of "protectionism". While recognising that the creation of a 
European energy policy would be an uphill task, he concluded that the messages received from 
the work of the conference would indicate priority elements for this policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Any energy forecast is necessarily based on quantitative analysis. The document 
"Major Themes in Energy Revisited" presents the summary of the whole analysis. This 
annex contains the main assumptions and results for each scenarios. 
The methodological aspects including tools and models are summarized in chapter 2 
while chapter 3 shows the characterization of the scenarios: Demography, economy, 
energy prices. 
The global context is in chapter 4 where a summary of World-wide assumptions and 
results (energy, atmospheric pollutants) is shown for the main OECD countries as well 
as Eastern European countries and South Mediterranean basin. 
Chapter 5 contains summary results for each Community Member State with a special 
focus by form of energy. It also contains a summary of the main effects on energy 
demand of higher energy prices to consumers (scenario 4). 
Chapter 6 shows a sensitivity analysis on the fuel mix for electricity generation in 
scenario 3 
Detailed results by Member State are available in working documents 1, 2 and 3. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The identification of the major issues facing the energy sector in the future was done 
with the help of national energy balance forecast. 
The four scenarios were developed on the basis of demographic, economic, social and 
technological assumptions. In all cases, demand-side forecast dominated our analysis. 
No supply constraints were considered. We can therefore say that the study is mainly a 
"bottom-up" approach. 
The "Conventional Wisdom" scenario was first developed by a detailed analysis using 
the MEDE and EFOM models. The results were then discussed with the different 
Member States and modified accordingly so as to incorporate many comments and 
suggestions. 
The other three scenarios were developed with a more flexible approach. In these 
cases , and because energy demand is the focal point, MEDEE was always used but 
supply was mainly obtained by the MSSSE spreadsheet model. 
In the case of scenario 4, because of the need to identify the impact of higher energy 
prices to all users, price elasticities derived from MIDAS model were used. 
In all scenarios particular attention was paid to the electricity sector and its investment 
needs. 
The energy balances associated with each scenario were then inputted to the 
HECTOR model to calculate air polluting emissions (S02, NOX and C02). 
Certain feedback analysis were also done. This is the case, for example, of oil and coal 
demand forecasts and their impact on international prices. 
The "Conventional Wisdom" scenario was also analysed in a world-wide perspective. 
Special focus has been put on energy-related issues concerning Eastern European 
countries as well as OECD Member countries. 
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3. SCENARIO DEFINITION 
Scenario 1 ­ «Conventional Wisdom» 
This scenario is based on steady if unspectacular economic growth, with the gradual development of existing 
policies and ways of thinking about issues. Technology will continue to improve and the effects on end use 
and on production could be important resulting in improved efficiencies. The distinguishing feature is the 
lack of special concern with energy policy; with market forces driving the system within existing frameworks. 
Definition: 
1. International situation 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU USD 17.5/bbl in 1995; USD 20/bbl in 2000 and USD 30/bbl in 2010; 
Gas indexed to oil up to 2Ó00 and to coal thereafter; 
Coal USD 49/tce in 1995; USD 50/tce in 2000 and USD 60/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 3.2% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010 
CPEs at 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010: 
LDCs at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010: 
OECD at 2.8% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Moderate, but positive macroeconomic effect. The economic outlook up to 1993 is 
similar to that indicated in the report "Europe in 1993" prepared by BIPE et al (2.6 % annual GDP 
growth rate). 
■ GDP: 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010 (that for 1968­88 averaged 2.8 %). 
Sectors: 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Domestic 
some industrial growth; stability of energy­intensive branches; 
strong growth of services; 
2.5% growth in private consumption from 1990 to 2010. 
3. Energy­related aspects 
■ Resources: Assumes that over the next 20 years there are no physical resource limitations. 
■ Technology. Further penetration of new (although existing) industrial processes (e.g. electric 
furnace, continuous casting); penetration of more efficient industrial equipment (10% improvement); 
efficiency of domestic thermal uses improving by 10%; renewal of equipment at end of normal life 
time; penetration of electric appliances at a faster rate thus improving efficiency. 
■ Behaviour: Industrial energy demand following economic climate; wealthier people facing relatively 
low prices leading to reversible behaviour (e.g. car mileage; higher space heating) up to 1995 and 
more rational behaviour thereafter. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Following most of current views in Member States and uncertainties about 
final decisions of the Council, there is no explicit assumption of a complete internal market in 
energy, such as in the fields of tax harmonisation and electricity and gas trade; some convergence of 
both pre­tax fuel and investment costs between Member States is anticipated. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation; this is not expected to significantly constrain 
the energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix). 
■ Energy: No special concern on energy, allowing market forces to drive the whole system within the 
existing policy framework. 
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Scenario 2 ­ «Driving Into Tensions» 
Objective : 
To demonstrate that high economic growth without appropriate policy measures and only based on market 
mechanisms will drive the system into a situation where supply capacities are under pressure (supply gaps 
and price shocks) and polluting emissions will attain high levels. 
Definition : 
1. International situation 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU USD 20/bbl in 1995; USD 26.5/bbl in 2000 and USD 40/bbl in 2010. 
Gas slight decoupling with oU up to 2000 and indexed to coal thereafter. 
Coal USD 55/tce in 1995; USD 65/tce in 2000 and USD 70/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.8 % from 2000 to 2010; 
CPEs at 3.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.5 % from 2000 to 2010; 
LDCs at 4.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.5 % from 2000 to 2010; 
OECD at 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.6 % from 2000 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Important macroeconomic effect leading to about 1 % higher GDP growth rate 
than in Scenario 1. However, this increase in the growth rate is not only the result of a successful 
internal market but also of a better international situation. On the other hand, due to high energy 
prices (driven by higher energy demand levels) the economic situation deteriorates after 2000 with a 
faU of economic growth to a rate slightly below of that of Scenario 1. 
■ GDP : 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000, and 2.5 % from 2000 to 2010. 
■ Sectors: 
Industry relaunch of energy­intensive industries (chemicals, steel, non­metalic) up to 2000 and 
stability after; rest of industries (speciaUy equipment goods) with more growth; 
Tertiary similar growth rates as for industry; 
Domestic 3.0% average annual growth untU 2000, 2% from 2000 to 2010. 
3. Energy­related aspects 
■ Technology: Same as in Scenario 1 but faster penetration due to more new capacity requirements; 
more opportunities for innovation and new products. 
■ Behaviour From 1990 to 2000 "no concern" approach leading to a partial loss of theoretical gains 
brought by technology, after 2000 as in Scenario 1 due to prices. No energy management especially in 
transport up to 2000. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Given the global philosophy of the scenario (important economic impact), a 
more integrated energy market is assumed : 
­ fiscal harmonisation (details yet to be defined); 
­ ftdl convergence of pre­tax fuel prices; 
­ liberalisation of electricity and gas trade which results in a rationalisation of the respective supply 
systems; 
­ convergence of investment costs as result of public procurement directive and free capital 
movements and access. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation; this could lead to a serious constraint on the 
energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix) given the system's very high levels of 
emissions. 
■ Energy: No special concern on energy, aUowing market forces to drive the whole system within the 
existing policy framework (return to high prices will tend to slow down demand). 
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Scenario 3 ­ «Sustaining High Economie Growth» 
Objective : 
To demonstrate that sustained high economic growth is not in conflict with strict environmental standards 
and that both objectives can be achieved within a secure energy future through mastering both energy 
consumption (more efficiency via technological innovation and improved consumer behaviour, such as 
through traffic management) and more efficient means of production. 
Definition : 
1. International situation 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU USD 20/bbl in 1995; USD 25 in 2000; USD 20/bbl in 2010; 
Gas same as Scenario 2 but more decoupling; 
Coal USD 50/tce inl995; USD 60/tce in 2000 and USD 50/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.5% from 2000 to 2010; 
CPEs at 3.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.7% from 2000 to 2010; 
LDCs at 4.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 4.0% from 2000 to 2010; 
OECD at 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.0% from 2000 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Important macroeconomic effect leading to about 1 % higher GDP growth rate 
than in Scenario 1. However, this increase in the growth rate is not only the result of a successful 
internal market but also of a better international situation. Because a 3.5 % per year GDP growth 
rate could lead to some tensions there is a slight slow down after 2000 to 3 % per year. 
■ GDP : 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.0% from 2000 to 2010. 
Sectors: 
Industry same as Scenario 2 untU 1995; between 1995 and 2010 decline of energy­intensive branches and sustained growth of others (mainly equipment goods and specialised 
chemicals); 
same as Scenario 2 untU 1995; between 1995 and 2010 tertiary continues to grow 
(compensating the slow down in industry); 
3.0% average annual growth untU 2000; 2.5% from 2000 to 2010. 
3. 
Tertiary 
Domestic 
Energy­related aspects 
■ Technology: UntU 1992 as in Scenario 2; due to policy decisions taken as of 1992, strong innovation 
in equipment and high capital turn­over leading to more economic and energy efficiency. 
■ Behaviour: UntU 1992 as in Scenario 2; due to policy decisions taken as of 1992 as weU as new 
avaUable technologies (more efficient equipment) and better infrastructures (more and better roads 
and traffic management), consumer behaviour wiU tend towards more rational behaviour nothwith­
standing higher incomes. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Given the global philosophy of the scenario (important economic impact), a 
more integrated energy market is assumed : 
­ fiscal harmonisation (details yet to be defined); 
­ fuU convergence of pre­tax fuel prices; 
­ liberalisation of electricity and gas trade which results in a rationalisation of the respective supply 
systems; 
­ convergence of investment costs as result of public procurement directive and free capital move­
ments and access. 
In addition, there is fuU implementation of a common energy policy which sustains high economic 
growth. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation untU 1992; due to policy decisions taken as of 
1992 much stricter environmental standards wUl be implemented thus restraining the possibilities for 
a merely market­oriented expansion of the energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix). 
■ Energy: After 1992 special focus on energy policy with emphasis on: 
­ stricter environmental regulations; 
­ stricter and mandatory technological gains as weU as encouragement of rational use; 
­ diversification of fuels avoiding oil but more use of gas, relaunch of nuclear after 2000, new 
technologies on end use and production. 
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Scenario 4 ­ «High Prices» 
Objective: 
To demonstrate the effect of a moderate economic growth (as in scenario 1) combined with stricter 
environmental objectives, particularly C02 emissions, and through mastering both energy consumption 
(demand management of scenario 3 type plus C02 taxes on fossU fuels) and more efficient means of production 
(as in Scenario 3). 
Definition: 
l.International situation 
■Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU US$17.5/bbl in 1995, US$20/bbl in 2000 and US$30/bbl in 2010; 
Gas indexed to oU up to 2000 and to coal thereafter; 
Coal US$49/tce in 1995; US$50/tce in 2000 and US$60/tce in 2010. 
■Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 3.2% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
CPEs at 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
LDCs at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
OECD at 2.8% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010. 
2.European Community 
■Internal market: Moderate but positive macroeconomic effect; the economic outlook is the same as 
in Scenario 1. 
■GDP: 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010. 
■Sectors: 
Industry Slowdown of the activity due to higher energy prices. 
Tertiary Compensating growth untU 1995, afterwards same as scenario 1. 
3.Energy­related aspects 
■Resources: As in Scenariol. 
■Technology: UntU 1992 as in Scenario l;due to policy decisions taken as of 1992,strong innovation in 
equipment and high capital turn­over (as in Scenario 3) leading to more economic and energy 
efficiency. 
■Behaviour: As in Scenario 3 but reinforced via higher fuel price due to special taxes (see below under 
environment). 
4.Policy aspects 
■Energy internal market: As in Scenario 1. 
■Environment: As in Scenario 3 plus a carbon tax imposed on all fossU fuels. 
■Energy: As in Scenario 3 but with nuclear capacity estimated at 115 GW by 2010 (105 GW in 1990). 
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3.1 International Assumptions 
Table 3.1.1 
Annual GDP growth rate 
Macroeconomic Outlook 
%/year 
Scenarios 
Europe 12 
OECD 
USSR and other 
Eastern European 
Countries 
LDCs 
World 
80 to 87 
1.8 
2.4 
1.8 
3.0 
2.7 
87 to 90 
3.4 
3.5 
0.5 
4.1 
3.1 
1=4 
2.7 
2.8 
1.7 
4.0 
2.9 
1990 to 2000 
2 
3.5 
3.5 
4.5 
3 
3.5 
3.5 
4.5 
1=4 
2.7 
2.8 
2.6 
4.0 
3.0 
2000 to 2010 
2 
2.5 
2.6 
3.5 
3 
3.0 
3.0 
4.0 
Source: IMF, OECD, SOEC, OGII and DGXV1IA2 estimates. 
Table 3.1.2 
Crude oil 
Fuel Prices (1) ($87) 
Unit 
Scenarios 
Scenario 1 and 4 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
$/bbl 
1985 
29.2 
$/bbl 
1990 
15.5 
1995 
17.5 
20.0 
$/bbl 
2000 
20.0 
26.5 
25.0 
2010 
30.0 
40.0 
20.0 
1995 
126.9 
145.0 
$/toe 
2000 
145.0 
192.1 
181.2 
2010 
217.5 
290.0 
145.0 
Steam coal 
Unit 
Scenarios 
Scenario 1 and 4 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
$/tce 
1985 
48.8 
$/tce 
1990 
44.6 
1995 
49.0 
55.0 
50.0 
$/tce 
2000 
50.0 
65.0 
60.0 
2010 
60.0 
70.0 
50.0 
1995 
70.0 
78.6 
71.4 
$/toe 
2000 
71.4 
92.9 
85.7 
2010 
85.7 
100.0 
71.4 
Natural Gas Prices 
Unit 
Scenarios 
Scenario 1 and 4 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
$/MBTU 
1985 
4.1 
$/MBTU 
1990 
2.0 
1995 
2.5 
2.7 
2.6 
$/MBTU 
2000 
2.8 
4.0 
3.2 
2010 
3.5 
4.1 
2.8 
1995 
100.2 
106.4 
104.7 
$/toe 
2000 
109.8 
156.9 
126.6 
2010 
139.8 
162.9 
110.0 
(1) Weighted CIF average for Europe 12 
Source: SOEC data, DGXVII A2 estimates 
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3.2 Demographic Assumptions 
Table 3.2.1 A relatively stable population 
(all scenarios) 
million 
inhabitants 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
9.85 
5.12 
53.88 
61.57 
9.64 
3.40 
56.43 
0.36 
14.15 
9.77 
37.39 
56.31 
317.87 
1985 
9.86 
5.11 
55.17 
61.02 
9.93 
3.58 
57.14 
0.37 
14.49 
10.16 
38.60 
56.35 
321.78 
1987 
9.87 
5.13 
55.63 
61.20 
9.99 
3.54 
57.34 
0.37 
14.67 
10.25 
38.88 
56.93 
323.80 
1990 
9.73 
5.14 
56.10 
62.00 
10.08 
3.54 
57.33 
0.37 
14.93 
10.34 
39.30 
56.90 
325.76 
1995 
9.78 
5.16 
57.10 
61.55 
10.11 
3.60 
57.76 
0.37 
15.28 
10.45 
40.10 
57.40 
328.66 
2000 
9.62 
5.16 
57.90 
61.05 
10.35 
3.67 
57.96 
0.37 
15.70 
10.57 
40.50 
57.90 
330.75 
2005 
9.49 
5.11 
58.35 
59.68 
10.50 
3.71 
58.13 
0.37 
15.90 
10.90 
40.85 
58.05 
331.04 
2010 
9.37 
5.06 
58.80 
58.30 
10.65 
3.75 
58.30 
0.37 
16.10 
11.22 
41.20 
58.20 
331.32 
1987-2010 
per year 
-0.2% 
-0.1% 
0.2% 
-0.2% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.0% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.1% 
Table 3.2.2 Household size declines 
(all scenarios) 
persons per 
household 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
2.9 
2.4 
2.8 
2.5 
3.3 
3.9 
3.1 
3.0 
2.7 
3.3 
3.7 
2.8 
2.9 
1985 
2.8 
2.4 
2.7 
2.3 
3.2 
3.8 
3.0 
2.8 
2.6 
3.2 
3.4 
2.6 
2.7 
1987 
2.8 
2.3 
2.7 
2.3 
3.1 
3.7 
2.9 
2.8 
2.6 
3.2 
3.4 
2.6 
2.7 
1990 
2.7 
2.3 
2.6 
2.3 
3.0 
3.5 
2.8 
2.6 
2.6 
3.1 
3.4 
2.6 
2.6 
1995 
2.6 
2.3 
2.5 
2.2 
2.9 
3.5 
2.6 
2.6 
2.5 
3.0 
3.3 
2.5 
2.6 
2000 
2.5 
2.2 
2.5 
2.2 
2.8 
3.4 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.9 
3.1 
2.5 
2.5 
2005 
2.5 
2.2 
2.4 
2.2 
2.7 
3.3 
2.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.8 
2.9 
2.4 
2.5 
2010 
2.4 
2.2 
2.4 
2.2 
2.7 
3.2 
2.5 
2.5 
2.4 
2.8 
2.8 
2.4 
2.4 
1987-2010 
per year 
-0.6% 
-0.3% 
-0.5% 
-0.2% 
-0.6% 
-0.7% 
-0.7% 
-0.5% 
-0.4% 
-0.7% 
-0.8% 
-0.5% 
-0.5% 
Source : SOEC Demographic statistics, DG XVII A2 estimates. 
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3.3 Economic Assumptions 
Table 3.3.1 GDP by Member State : Conventional Wisdom 
(idem for scenario 4) 
billion ECU 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1987 
current prices and 
exchange rates 
120.4 
87.9 
764.1 
969.5 
41.1 
25.5 
659.2 
5.2 
184.9 
31.9 
251.3 
580.1 
3721.1 
1987-1990 
3.7% 
1.4% 
3.3% 
3.7% 
3.0% 
4.5% 
3.5% 
4.3% 
3.2% 
4.4% 
4.6% 
2.8% 
3.4% 
% 
1990-1995 
2.8% 
2.3% 
2.6% 
2.7% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
2.9% 
2.8% 
2.2% 
4.4% 
3.4% 
2.6% 
2.7% 
per year in volume 
1995-2000 
2.8% 
2.8% 
2.5% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
2.9% 
2.6% 
3.0% 
2.7% 
4.4% 
3.2% 
2.4% 
2.7% 
2000-2010 
2.8% 
2.8% 
2.6% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
2.7% 
2.5% 
2.8% 
2.8% 
4.2% 
3.1% 
2.4% 
2.7% 
1987-2010 
2.9% 
2.5% 
2.7% 
2.9% 
2.9% 
3.0% 
2.7% 
3.0% 
2.7% 
4.3% 
3.4% 
2.5% 
2.8% 
Table 3.3.2 The Others scenarios: Faster Growth scenarios 2 and 3. 
Slowdown after 2000 in scenario 2 - Sustainable in scenario 3 
GDP volume 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
% per year 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc. 2 
sc . 3 
sc. 2 
sc. 3 
sc . 2 
sc. 3 
1990-1995 
3.2% 
-
3.0% 
-
3.1% 
-
3.4% 
-
4.2% 
-
5.8% 
-
3.5% 
-
3.1% 
-
3.1% 
-
6.2% 
-
6.9% 
-
3.2% 
-
3.6% 
-
1995-2000 
3.4% 
-
3.2% 
-
3.5% 
-
3.5% 
-
4.9% 
-
4.9% 
-
3.5% 
-
3.5% 
-
3.0% 
-
6.1% 
-
5.1% 
-
3.5% 
-
3.6% 
-
2000-2010 
2.5% 
2.9% 
2.5% 
2.7% 
2.5% 
2.9% 
2.5% 
2.8% 
2.8% 
3.5% 
2.9% 
3.8% 
2.5% 
2.9% 
2.5% 
2.9% 
2.5% 
2.9% 
3.5% 
4.1% 
3.0% 
4.0% 
2.5% 
2.8% 
2.6% 
3.0% 
1987-2010 
3.0% 
3.2% 
2.6% 
2.7% 
2.9% 
3.1% 
3.1% 
3.2% 
3.6% 
3.9% 
4.2% 
4.6% 
3.1% 
3.2% 
3.1% 
3.3% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
4.8% 
5.0% 
4.5% 
4.9% 
2.9% 
3.0% 
3.1% 
3.3% 
Sources: SOEC National Accounts, Economic forecasts 1990 DG II, DG XVII estimates 
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3.4 Industrial Sector Assumptions 
Table 3.4.1 Value added in the industrial sector : The Conventional Wisdom. 
billion ECU 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdo 
Europe 12 
1985 
current prices an 
exchange rates 
21.6 
12.7 
142.8 
240.4 
7.3 
6.9 
132.1 
1.4 
27.8 
8.1 
53.3 
135.8 
790.2 
1985-1990 
1.9% 
1.5% 
2.3% 
2.3% 
1.8% 
3.7% 
2.9% 
3.6% 
1.9% 
3.6% 
3.5% 
2.2% 
3.4% 
1990-1995 
2.1% 
2.7% 
2.0% 
2.2% 
2.3% 
4.0% 
2.3% 
2.8% 
2.1% 
3.7% 
3.5% 
2.0% 
2.7% 
% per year 
1995-2000 
2.1% 
2.8% 
2.0% 
2.2% 
3.2% 
3.2% 
2.1% 
2.8% 
2.9% 
3.7% 
2.7% 
1.9% 
2.7% 
n volume 
2000-2010 
2.1% 
3.2% 
2.0% 
2.1% 
3.1% 
3.0% 
2.0% 
1.8% 
3.3% 
3.1% 
2.3% 
1.6% 
2.7% 
1985-2010 
2.1% 
2.7% 
2.1% 
2.2% 
2.7% 
3.4% 
2.3% 
2.6% 
2.7% 
3.4% 
2.9% 
1.9% 
2.8% 
Table 3.4.2 The Other scenarios : An industrial revival up to 1995 (except scenario 4) 
followed by a slowdown In activity by the end of the period. 
V.A industry 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
% per year 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
Conv. wisd 
2.1% 
2.1% 
2.7% 
3.1% 
2.0% 
2.0% 
2.2% 
2.1% 
2.3% 
3.1% 
4.0% 
3.1% 
2.3% 
2.0% 
2.8% 
2.1% 
2.1% 
3.2% 
3.7% 
3.3% 
3.5% 
2.4% 
2.0% 
1.7% 
2.7% 
2.7% 
Scenario 2 
3.0% 
2.1% 
3.1% 
2.2% 
2.8% 
2.1% 
2.8% 
2.0% 
4.8% 
3.4% 
5.9% 
3.4% 
3.0% 
2.1% 
3.0% 
2.3% 
2.8% 
2.3% 
6.1% 
3.4% 
6.6% 
3.4% 
3.0% 
2.1% 
3.2% 
2.2% 
Scenario 3 
3.0% 
1.9% 
3.1% 
2.0% 
2.8% 
1.9% 
2.8% 
1.8% 
4.8% 
3.7% 
5.9% 
3.9% 
3.0% 
1.9% 
3.0% 
2.0% 
2.8% 
2.0% 
6.1% 
3.6% 
6.6% 
3.8% 
3.0% 
2.0% 
3.2% 
2.1% 
Scenario 4 
1.5% 
1.8% 
1.4% 
2.3% 
1.3% 
1.6% 
1.0% 
1.7% 
2.1% 
2.9% 
2.1% 
2.6% 
1.4% 
1.5% 
1.6% 
1.8% 
0.8% 
2.0% 
3.2% 
3.1% 
2.0% 
2.8% 
1.4% 
1.5% 
1.3% 
1.8% 
Sources : SOEC National Accounts detailed by sector, DG XVII estimates 
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Table 3.4.3 Crude steel production in the Conventional Wisdom scenario. 
Smooth in global activity. 
Stabilization of production in major countries ( Europe 4 ). 
million tonnes 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
12.3 
0.7 
23.2 
43.8 
0.9 
0.0 
26.5 
4.6 
5.3 
0.6 
12.6 
11.3 
141.8 
1985 
10.7 
0.5 
18.6 
40.5 
1.0 
0.2 
23.9 
4.0 
5.5 
0.7 
14.2 
15.8 
135.6 
1988 
11.2 
0.7 
18.7 
41.0 
1.0 
0.3 
23.8 
3.7 
5.5 
0,8 
11.6 
19.0 
137.3 
1990 
11.8 
0.6 
18.9 
39.9 
1.0 
0.3 
24.8 
3.7 
5.7 
0.8 
15.4 
16.6 
139.5 
1995 
12.2 
0.6 
19.1 
40.2 
1.1 
0.3 
24.2 
3.8 
5.9 
0.9 
15.7 
17.0 
140.8 
2000 
12.2 
0.6 
19.3 
40.4 
1.1 
0.3 
23.6 
3.8 
6.0 
0.9 
17.0 
17.4 
142.6 
2010 
12.2 
0.6 
19.7 
40.8 
1.3 
0.3 
23.1 
3.8 
6.1 
0.9 
17.9 
17.4 
144.1 
Table 3.4.4 The Other scenarios : More steel products in the scenario 2. 
Lower production in scenario 3 & 4 than in Conventional Wisdom. 
million tonnes 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
Scenario 2 
12.2 
12.3 
0.6 
0.6 
19.5 
19.6 
41.5 
40.7 
1.1 
1.2 
0.3 
0.3 
25.0 
24.7 
3.9 
3.9 
5.9 
6.0 
0.9 
0.9 
16.2 
17.5 
17.4 
17.5 
144.5 
145.1 
Scenario 3 
_ 
10.9 
. 
0.5 
-
17.1 
-
35.1 
. 
1.2 
-
0.3 
-
21.2 
-
3.8 
-
5.4 
-
0.9 
-
17.4 
-
15.6 
144.5 
129.5 
Scenario 4 
11.0 
10.9 
0.5 
0.5 
18.0 
17.1 
37.9 
35.1 
1.1 
1.2 
0.3 
0.3 
22.8 
21.2 
3.7 
3.8 
5.5 
5.4 
0.9 
0.9 
15.0 
17.4 
16.1 
15.6 
132.7 
129.5 
Sources : SOEC Iron & steel, DG XVII estimale» 
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30 
10 
CRUDE STEEL IN EUROPE 
Conventional Wisdom 
Towards flat production growth 
M tona 
1960 1966 1870 1976 1960 1986 1990 1996 2000 2006 2010 
FRO "France Italy UK 
Penetration of more efficient technics 
2010 
2006 
2000 
1S86 
1990 
1866 
I860 
■i i l lMBM 
0.7 
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 60% 100% 
ESS Continuoua caating ^ ! Electric furnace 
But decreasing energy consumption 
overall. 
toe/ton 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0 .2-
0.1 
1970 1876 1880 1886 1880 1886 2000 2006 2010 
FRO. 'Franc· Italy UK 
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0.6 
0.5 
toe/ton 
Efficiency of steel production 
The main Improvements have already taken place. 
1970 1980 2000 2010 
Historic Conv. Wisdom Scenario 3 
Table 3.4.5 Specific Energy Consumption for Crude Steel Production 
( Energy Efficiency Assumptions ) 
The national mix of technical processes explains an important part of the ranges between the countries 
toe/ton 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc, 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
0.43 
-
0.27 
-
0.51 
-
0.45 
-
0.57 
-
-
0.33 
-
0.44 
-
0.40 
-
0.52 
-
0.32 
-
0.58 
-
0.43 
-
1985 
0.40 
-
0.25 
-
0.46 
-
0.44 
-
0.29 
-
0.20 
-
0.33 
-
0.36 
-
0.40 
-
0.40 
-
0.32 
-
0.43 
-
0.40 
-
1987 
0.40 
-
0.25 
-
0.45 
-
0.43 
-
0.29 
-
0.20 
-
0.32 
-
0.36 
-
0.40 
-
0.39 
-
0.31 
-
0.42 
-
0.39 
-
1990 
0.39 
-
0.24 
-
0.42 
-
0.40 
-
0.29 
-
0.19 
-
0.31 
-
0.36 
-
0.39 
-
0.37 
-
0.30 
-
0.41 
-
0.37 
-
1995 
0.38 
-
0.23 
-
0.40 
-
0.38 
-
0.28 
-, 
0.18 
-
0.30 
-
0.35 
-
0.37 
-
0.34 
-
0.28 
-
0.40 
-
0.35 
-
2000 
0.37 
0.36 
0.23 
0.23 
0.38 
0.36 
0.37 
0.36 
0.28 
0.28 
0.18 
0.18 
0.29 
0.26 
0.35 
0.34 
0.37 
0.36 
0.32 
0.31 
0.26 
0.25 
0.39 
0.37 
0.34 
0.33 
2010 
0.36 
0.30 
0.22 
0.21 
0.35 
0.29 
0.34 
0.29 
0.27 
0.26 
0.17 
0.17 
0.27 
0.24 
0.33 
0.32 
0.37 
0.30 
0.30 
0.27 
0.24 
0.22 
0.36 
0.31 
0.31 
0.28 
Source : DG XVII estimates from SOEC stallatica 
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Table 3.4.6 Cement Production in the Conventional Wisdom Scenario. 
Smooth growth of activity similar to the other energy intensive dutries. 
million tonnes 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
7.5 
1.9 
29.1 
33.1 
12.7 
1.9 
41.9 
0.3 
3.7 
5.8 
28.0 
14.8 
180.7 
1985 
5.7 
2.1 
22.2 
29.0 
13.5 
1.4 
38.5 
0.3 
3.0 
5.5 
27.0 
13.4 
161.6 
1987 
5.9 
1.8 
23.6 
29.0 
12.5 
1.5 
39.1 
0.4 
3.1 
5.9 
25.7 
14.2 
162.6 
1990 
6.2 
1.7 
23.3 
30.7 
15.2 
1.6 
39.5 
0.3 
3.3 
6.8 
30.4 
14.3 
173.3 
1995 
6.6 
1.8 
23.3 
32.6 
16.8 
1.7 
40.5 
0.3 
3.4 
7.1 
31.9 
15.0 
181.0 
2000 
7.0 
1.9 
23.3 
33.4 
18.1 
1.9 
40.5 
0.3 
3.5 
7.1 
33.6 
15.8 
186.4 
2010 
7.7 
2.1 
23.8 
35.1 
20.9 
2.2 
42.6 
0.3 
3.5 
7.1 
37.1 
17.4 
199.8 
Tab le 3.4.7 T h e Other scenarios : Higher production in the scenario 2. 
Lower production in scenarios 3 & 4 than in the Conventional Wisdom. 
million tonnes 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
1995 
2010 
Scenario 2 
6.8 
7.3 
1.8 
2.0 
24.5 
25.1 
33.2 
34.9 
17.2 
19.0 
1.8 
2.0 
41.5 
42.6 
0.4 
0.4 
3.5 
3.7 
7.4 
7.8 
34.4 
37.4 
15.5 
16.7 
188.0 
198.7 
Scenario 3 
6.7 
1.7 
20.3 
29.4 
19.8 
2.1 
38.0 
0.3 
3.1 
7.2 
35.6 
15.5 
188.0 
179.6 
Scenario 4 
6.5 
6.7 
1.6 
1.7 
22.0 
20.3 
30.7 
29.4 
16.7 
19.8 
1.7 
1.9 
38.5 
38.0 
0.3 
0.3 
3.1 
3.1 
6.9 
7.2 
30.5 
35.6 
14.5 
15.5 
173.0 
179.6 
Source»: SOEC Industrial productions, OG XVII estimate« 
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3.5 Transport Sector Assumptions 
Scenarios up to 2010 Private Car 
Increeelng road traf f ic 
Prooraaalon of ra i lway· 
Smooth eff ic iency Improvement· 
Higher fuel p r i c e · 
alowdown of t ranaport act lv i t lee 
Expanaion of railway» 
Energy eavlng moaauroa 
Scenario 4 
Car market 
Saturation over the longer term 
Road traff ic Jama 
<■■> more economic growth 
<■■» leek of traff ic management 
Deterioration of fuel efficiency 
million care 
cars per 
WOO Inhabitant· 
Global treff lc ménagement 
Ex pañalón of rai lway· 
Decreeae of road traff ic 
Promotion of moat eff icient vehlcloa 
■ Car ownerehlp 
Scenario 3 
Car Ownership: 
Difference diminish but at higher level 
700 
eoo 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100-
BOO 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
B DK D GR IRL. I L NL Ρ E UK Β DK F D OR IRL I L NL Ρ E UK 
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Table 3.5.1 Trends In The Private Car Market Conventional Wisdom 
1.The stock of cars will increase rapidly up to 1995, but growth will moderate over the longer term. 
million cars 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
3.2 
1.4 
18.8 
23.2 
0.9 
0.7 
17.4 
0.1 
4.6 
1.6 
7.6 
14.5 
93.8 
1985 
3.3 
1.5 
20.9 
25.9 
1.2 
0.8 
22.4 
0.2 
5.1 
1.7 
9.3 
16.7 
108.8 
1987 
3.5 
1.5 
22.4 
26.9 
1.4 
0.8 
23.0 
0.2 
5.4 
1.9 
10.0 
17.7 
114.7 
1990 
3.8 
1.6 
24.9 
28.6 
1.7 
0.8 
23.9 
0.2 
5.9 
2.3 
11.2 
19.4 
124.2 
1995 
4.2 
1.9 
28.6 
29.7 
2.5 
0.9 
26.5 
0.2 
6.8 
3.1 
12.9 
22.2 
139.6 
2000 
4.7 
2.2 
32.2 
30.6 
3.5 
1.0 
28.8 
0.2 
7.8 
3.6 
15.3 
24.3 
154.0 
2010 
5.0 
2.9 
33.9 
31.4 
3.7 
1.4 
30.9 
0.2 
8.4 
4.0 
17.4 
27.7 
166.8 
2. Diesel cars will penetrate the market up to 1995 - stabilization or decrease thereafter. 
% car stock 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
6.0% 
3.6% 
4.3% 
4.9% 
4.7% 
2.7% 
2.8% 
6.0% 
3.1% 
5.2% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
3.5% 
1985 
12.6% 
4.0% 
8.5% 
9.1% 
4.9% 
5.3% 
7.8% 
12.6% 
5.0% 
10.9% 
6.0% 
1.0% 
7.0% 
1987 
15.1% 
5.1% 
9.9% 
9.9% 
5.1% 
5.6% 
10.3% 
15.1% 
6.0% 
11.0% 
7.3% 
2.0% 
2.0% 
1990 
19.9% 
7.5% 
12.4% 
11.3% 
5.3% 
6.2% 
15.5% 
19.9% 
8.0% 
11.1% 
9.9% 
4.0% 
11.0% 
1995 
20.1% 
10.2% 
15.0% 
12.0% 
5.2% 
7.8% 
17.1% 
20.1% 
8.2% 
9.3% 
10.0% 
6.6% 
12.4% 
2000 
17.8% 
10.1% 
15.0% 
12.0% 
4.9% 
7.8% 
14.0% 
17.8% 
8.5% 
9.0% 
10.0% 
7.5% 
11.8% 
2010 
14.9% 
10.0% 
15.0% 
12.0% 
4.9% 
8.0% 
10.0% 
14.9% 
8.9% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
8.0% 
11.0% 
3. New registrations will lead to a high turnover of the car stock 
1000 per year 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
430 
74 
1907 
2426 
34 
90 
1640 
25 
450 
75 
574 
1570 
9295 
1985 
388 
157 
1766 
2379 
105 
60 
1800 
29 
506 
115 
595 
1804 
9704 
1987 
420 
124 
2105 
2900 
110 
60 
1920 
33 
580 
135 
927 
1963 
11277 
1990 
400 
150 
2340 
2900 
145 
70 
2250 
34 
580 
195 
940 
1900 
11904 
1995 
510 
200 
3150 
3190 
315 
79 
2960 
34 
615 
245 
1330 
2450 
15078 
2000 
430 
210 
3275 
3050 
355 
82 
2800 
32 
705 
240 
1400 
2320 
14899 
2010 
280 
255 
3225 
3135 
340 
110 
3085 
30 
726 
325 
1500 
2615 
15626 
Source : SOEC Transport & Communications yearbook, DG XVII estimates 
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CAR MARKET INDICATORS 
( French Example ) 
More private cars 
million 
Κ>βΟ Wee WOO TS96 2000 2006 2010 
I Qaaollne ÏDioaet 
And less annual mileage by car 
km/car/year (Thouaanda) 
» 8 0 W M WOO 1906 2000 2006 2 0 « 
Average ì Gasoline ¡ ^ Dleael 
But with less specific fuel consumption 
WeO W86 «MO W96 2000 2006 2010 
- Qaaollne — Dieaei 
: Towards stabilization 
of total fuel consumption 
W60 W86 WOO 1996 2000 2006 2010 
¡ ^ Qaaollne ^ Dieeet 
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Fuel efficiency of cars 
The potential for improvement covere 
a wide range 
1970 
Historic Conv. Wisdom 
2000 2010 
Scenario 3 
Table 3.5.2 Specific fuel consumption Of cars (Average conventional value ] 
Scenario 3 presents strong improvements in fuel efficiency after a deterioration in the earlier 90's 
1/100 km 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
12.4 
-
10.7 
-
10.8 
-
12.1 
-
11.2 
-
10.5 
-
9.5 
-
12.4 
-
10.5 
-
9.5 
-
10.0 
-
12.8 
-
11.0 
-
1985 
9.9 
-
9.4 
-
9.0 
-
11.2 
-
9.3 
-
9.1 
-
8.4 
-
9.9 
-
9.3 
-
8.7 
-
8.9 
-
10.5 
-
9.4 
-
1987 
9.7 
-
9.4 
-
8.8 
-
11.1 
-
9.3 
-
9.0 
-
8.4 
-
9.6 
-
9.2 
-
8.7 
-
8.9 
-
10.4 
-
9.3 
-
1990 
8.7 
-
9.0 
-
8.0 
-
11.0 
-
9.0 
-
8.6 
-
8.1 
-
8.7 
-
8.9 
-
8.3 
-
8.9 
-
10.1 
-
8.9 
-
1995 
8.7 
9.0 
8.7 
9.4 
7.4 
8.1 
10.6 
11.6 
8.7 
9.5 
8.5 
9.4 
7.7 
8.3 
8.7 
9.2 
8.7 
9.1 
8.0 
8.7 
8.5 
9.4 
9.9 
10.6 
8.6 
9.3 
2000 
8.5 
8.3 
8.3 
7.9 
7.3 
7.0 
10.0 
10.1 
8.3 
8.1 
8.3 
8.1 
7.6 
7.3 
8.5 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
7.7 
8.0 
8.1 
7.9 
9.6 
9.4 
8.3 
8.2 
2010 
8.0 
6.1 
7.6 
5.6 
7.0 
5.2 
8.9 
6.7 
7.7 
6.6 
7.7 
5.8 
7.0 
5.2 
8.0 
6.2 
7.9 
6.0 
7.4 
6.3 
7.5 
6.2 
9.2 
6.7 
7.8 
6.0 
Sources : DGXVII estimates from SOEC statistics. 
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Road and Railways Transports 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
PASSENGERS 
The Conventional Wisdom 
Expansion of cars but growth of railways 
Index 1970 - 100 (p.km) 
The Sustained High Growth Scenario 
Expansion of railways, decline of cars 
Index W70 ■ 100 (p.km) 
1970 1976 W80 W86 W90 W96 2000 2006 2010 1970 W76 1980 1986 1990 « 9 6 2000 2006 2010 
FREIGHT 
The Conventional Wisdom 
The hegemony of the road is becoming 
more pronounced... 
Index 1970 ­ 100 (Lkm) 
The Sustained High Growth Scenario 
A new future for the railways 
Index W70 ■ 100 (Lkm) 
1970 1976 1980 1986 1900 1996 2000 2006 2010 
..BUT the railways are growing 
1970 W76 1980 W86 1990 W96 2000 2006 2010 
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Table 3.5.3 Passengers Traffic Main modal splits. 
1 .Traffic associated with private cars will grow significantly in the Conventional Wisdom scenario. 
Restriction in the use of private cars is expected in scenario 3. 
billion p-km 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc, 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
61.5 
36.5 
452.5 
535.0 
17.3 
22.5 
280.0 
3.0 
113.7 
21.6 
119.3 
355.0 
2017.9 
-
1985 
80.0 
41.7 
494.4 
563.8 
27.5 
25.4 
326.2 
4.4 
135.5 
33.0 
162.0 
410.0 
2303.9 
-
1987 
85.7 
44.0 
549.9 
610.2 
33.1 
27.1 
373.0 
4.7 
145.4 
39.1 
183.1 
465.0 
2560.2 
-
1990 
104.0 
47.7 
645.1 
687.1 
43.6 
29.9 
456.0 
5.7 
161.5 
50.5 
220.0 
570.8 
3021.9 
-
1995 
117.6 
118.3 
56.2 
55.9 
725.3 
737.9 
699.1 
710.1 
63.2 
63.5 
31.9 
33.6 
513.0 
518.6 
6.4 
6.5 
177.9 
180.7 
66.9 
67.8 
276.6 
282.8 
646.4 
648.2 
3380.5 
3423.9 
2000 
119.8 
124.9 
64.7 
63.8 
786.6 
804.5 
690.8 
710.1 
82.2 
80.0 
35.4 
40.2 
531.3 
544.6 
6.5 
6.8 
186.3 
191.6 
72.5 
73.0 
334.2 
347.8 
687.4 
710.2 
3597.7 
3697.5 
2010 
124.6 
91.0 
79.5 
53.4 
819.9 
600.9 
683.5 
525.6 
83.2 
73.5 
46.1 
43.9 
540.0 
419.9 
6.7 
4.9 
185.0 
157.1 
77.7 
70.3 
380.7 
346.5 
739.2 
582.1 
3766.1 
2969.1 
2. Ftailway traffic : An important expansion in the scenario 3 after 2000. 
billion p-km 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
8.6 
-
4.3 
: 
54.7 
-
40.5 
-
1.5 
-
1.1 
-
46.3 
-
0.3 
-
8.9 
-
6.1 
-
14.8 
-
37.1 
-
224.2 
-
1985 
8.1 
-
4.6 
-
62.0 
-
42.7 
-
1.8 
-
1.1 
-
43.7 
-
0.3 
-
9.0 
-
5.7 
-
17.0 
-
36.4 
-
232.3 
-
1987 
8.1 
-
4.6 
-
63.9 
-
41.9 
-
1.8 
-
1.2 
-
46.4 
-
0.3 
-
9.2 
-
5.8 
-
17.1 
-
37.8 
-
238.1 
-
1990 
8.1 
-
4.7 
-
67.0 
-
40.7 
-
2.0 
-
1.3 
-
50.8 
-
0.3 
-
9.5 
-
5.9 
-
17.2 
-
40.0 
-
247.5 
-
1995 
8.3 
7.5 
4.9 
4.8 
73.1 
70.0 
42.4 
40.0 
2.5 
2.5 
1.5 
1.5 
55.8 
52.2 
0.3 
0.3 
10.3 
9.3 
6.1 
6.0 
18.1 
18.0 
43.0 
40.0 
266.3 
252.1 
2000 
8.6 
9.0 
5.2 
5.5 
79.2 
87.4 
43.2 
45.0 
3.1 
4.0 
1.5 
1.6 
60.7 
61.1 
0.3 
0.3 
11.1 
11.5 
6.4 
7.1 
18.6 
20.0 
45.2 
46.0 
283.1 
298.6 
2010 
9.3 
27.0 
5.5 
17.7 
90.8 
237.8 
44.1 
161.9 
3.7 
6.1 
1.7 
4.4 
71.8 
153.0 
0.3 
0.3 
12.2 
29.2 
7.5 
15.3 
19.5 
58.4 
48.9 
148.3 
315.2 
859.4 
Sources : SOEC transport & Communications yearbook, DG XVII estimates 159 
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Table 3.5.4 Freight Transport Main modal splits. 
1. The hegemony of the road is becoming more marked within the Conventional Wisdom, 
but the market is declining after 2000 in scenario 3. 
billion tons-km 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
10.4 
-
6.1 
-
103.9 
-
124.4 
-
7.2 
-
4.7 
-
119.6 
-
0.3 
-
17.4 
-
8.1 
-
85.0 
-
92.4 
-
579.5 
-
1985 
14.0 
-
8.8 
-
89.1 
-
132.3 
-
8.8 
-
5.5 
-
144.1 
-
0.2 
-
19.0 
-
9.2 
-
110.0 
-
102.1 
-
643.1 
-
1987 
16.0 
-
10.0 
-
95.8 
-
136.2 
-
9.5 
-
5.9 
-
155.4 
-
0.3 
-
19.7 
-
9.7 
-
121.9 
-
121.9 
-
702.3 
-
1990 
18.8 
-
12.6 
-
106.8 
-
142.3 
-
10.7 
-
6.5 
-
174.1 
-
0.3 
-
20.7 
-
10.5 
-
142.3 
-
158.9 
-
804.5 
-
1995 
20.5 
22.7 
13.5 
14.9 
112.1 
126.3 
160.0 
175.7 
13.4 
14.9 
7.5 
8.5 
196.6 
213.1 
0.3 
0.4 
22.9 
25.2 
12.3 
14.1 
166.1 
188.3 
169.3 
189.1 
894.5 
992.8 
2000 
22.0 
23.4 
14.5 
15.3 
117.9 
125.4 
171.5 
176.1 
17.3 
18.8 
8.2 
9.1 
213.3 
226.9 
0.4 
0.4 
24.6 
26.0 
14.6 
16.6 
189.4 
214.8 
181.1 
195.6 
974.8 
1048.0 
2010 
23.9 
17.9 
19.0 
12.3 
130.4 
97.8 
180.6 
121.8 
27.9 
25.7 
10.7 
9.8 
234.2 
178.3 
0.4 
0.3 
27.8 
21.1 
21.4 
17.3 
266.5 
223.3 
196.1 
153.6 
1138.9 
879.1 
2. Railway traffic in scenario 3 : A new market is coming . 
billion tons-km 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
8.0 
-
1.6 
-
66.4 
-
63.8 
-
0.8 
-
0.6 
-
18.7 
-
0.7 
-
3.5 
-
1.0 
-
11.2 
-
17.6 
-
194.0 
-
1985 
8.3 
-
1.7 
-
55.8 
-
63.0 
-
0.7 
-
0.6 
-
18.4 
-
0.6 
-
3.3 
-
1.3 
-
12.6 
-
17.2 
-
183.4 
-
1987 
8.0 
-
1.9 
-
57.8 
-
66.1 
-
0.8 
-
0.6 
-
19.0 
-
0.6 
-
3.3 
-
1.3 
-
12.7 
-
18.0 
-
190.1 
-
1990 
8.1 
-
2.2 
-
61.1 
-
71.0 
-
0.8 
-
0.7 
-
20.0 
-
0.6 
-
3.7 
-
1.5 
-
13.6 
-
14.6 
-
197.9 
-
1995 
8.6 
8.6 
2.4 
2.4 
64.1 
64.1 
75.5 
75.5 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.5 
22.1 
22.1 
0.6 
0.6 
4.0 
4.0 
1.8 
1.2 
14.5 
14.5 
15.7 
15.7 
210.9 
209.9 
2000 
9.0 
9.3 
2.5 
2.7 
67.5 
68.5 
80.1 
84.1 
0.8 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
23.8 
24.3 
0.8 
0.8 
4.2 
4.4 
2.1 
2.2 
15.4 
16.6 
16.9 
17.5 
223.8 
232.0 
2010 
10.6 
13.6 
3.3 
5.1 
74.5 
91.3 
89.7 
112.9 
0.9 
2.3 
0.9 
2.0 
27.6 
55.1 
0.8 
0.8 
5.5 
8.9 
3.1 
6.9 
17.0 
44.1 
19.6 
37.5 
253.5 
380.3 
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Airway Transport 
( EUROPE12 ) 
An expanding mode of transport 
(all scenarios) 
million paeeanoere 
2006 
I Hlatorlc ESS Cony. Wledom 
Never the less je t fuel demand growth w i l l s lowdown 
- Size of planes and load fac to rs are ra is ing 
- Improving fuel e f f i c iency t rend is con t inu ing 
Table 3.5.5 AIRWAY PASSENGERS TRAFFIC 
million passengers 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
5.4 
-
9.1 
-
23.8 
-
46.6 
-
9.9 
-
3.1 
-
12.5 
-
0.6 
-
11.1 
-
3.9 
-
31.7 
-
49.4 
-
207.1 
-
1985 
6.0 
-
9.9 
32.6 
-
53.2 
-
10.9 
-
3.6 
-
15.0 
-
0.8 
-
14.9 
-
5.1 
-
43.6 
-
66.0 
-
261.6 
-
1987 
6.3 
-
10.9 
-
34.8 
-
54.9 
-
11.2 
-
4.3 
-
15.8 
-
0.8 
-
17.2 
-
5.6 
-
47.4 
-
71.4 
-
280.5 
-
1990 
6.7 
-
12.6 
-
38.3 
-
57.5 
-
11.7 
-
5.5 
-
17.1 
-
1.0 
-
21.3 
-
6.4 
-
53.7 
-
80.3 
-
312.1 
-
1995 
7.9 
8.3 
15.4 
16.9 
44.3 
46.9 
66.0 
70.4 
13.3 
15.5 
7.1 
8.6 
19.8 
21.0 
1.2 
1.3 
24.5 
26.7 
8.0 
9.3 
64.9 
80.6 
94.4 
100.9 
366.8 
406.2 
2000 
9.1 
10.1 
17.7 
20.1 
50.6 
57.0 
75.2 
84.5 
15.5 
20.2 
8.1 
10.6 
22.3 
24.9 
1.4 
1.5 
27.8 
31.3 
9.9 
13.0 
75.6 
104.6 
106.8 
123.0 
420.0 
501.2 
2010 
12.1 
13.8 
23.4 
26.4 
65.4 
76.6 
98.0 
112.3 
20.8 
29.0 
10.0 
14.1 
27.8 
32.4 
1.8 
2.0 
33.9 
39.2 
13.8 
19.9 
101.6 
149.9 
134.6 
159.5 
543.2 
675.3 
Sources : SOEC transport & Communications yearbook, DG XVII estimates 
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3.6 Residential and Tertiary Sector Assumptions 
Scenarios up to 2010 
Increasing equ ipment s tocks 
Growth of e l e c t r i c i t y consumpt ion 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in s p e c i f i c uses 
Con t inu ing cur ren t t rend 
in e f f i c i ency improvements 
Higher fue l and e l e c t r i c i t y p r i ces 
1 
Strong energy saving measures 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 2 
Same as Convent iona l Wisdom 
but more pronounced un t i l 1995 
(more a c t i v i t y & income) 
E f f i c iency improvements on ly 
lead by h igher tu rn over un t i l 2000 
Τ 
S u b s t i t u t i o n of gas 
instead of e l e c t r i c i t y in therma l uses 
Promot ion of most e f f i c i e n t equ ipments 
Scenario 3 
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Table 3.6.1 ABOUT HOUSING : The Conventional Wisdom 
1. The number of households is growing 
million 
households 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
3.4 
2.1 
19.1 
25.1 
2.9 
0.9 
18.2 
0.1 
5.2 
3.0 
10.1 
20.3 
110.4 
1985 
3.6 
2.2 
20.4 
26.5 
3.1 
0.9 
19.1 
0.1 
5.5 
3.1 
11.4 
21.3 
117.1 
1987 
3.6 
2.2 
20.9 
26.9 
3.2 
1.0 
19.9 
0.1 
5.6 
3.2 
11.5 
21.8 
119.9 
1990 
3.6 
2.3 
21.6 
27.6 
3.3 
1.0 
20.8 
0.1 
5.7 
3.3 
11.7 
21.9 
123.0 
1995 
3.7 
2.3 
22.7 
27.6 
3.5 
1.0 
22.2 
0.1 
6.1 
3.5 
12.2 
22.9 
127.8 
2000 
3.8 
2.3 
23.6 
27.5 
3.8 
1.1 
23.2 
0.2 
6.4 
3.6 
13.1 
23.6 
132.1 
2010 
3.9 
2.3 
24.8 
26.6 
3.9 
1.2 
23.8 
0.2 
6.7 
4.1 
14.7 
24.6 
136.8 
1987-2010 
per year 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.7% 
-0.1% 
0.9% 
1.0% 
0.8% 
0.6% 
0.8% 
1.1% 
1.1% 
0.5% 
0.6% 
2. New construction of dwellings is adjusted to reflect the demography and economic trends 
1000 per year 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1970 
46 
50 
457 
480 
114 
39 
376 
1.6 
117 
26 
308 
361 
2376 
1980 
26 
24 
378 
350 
110 
27 
180 
1.3 
125 
33 
330 
175 
1759 
1985 
26 
24 
340 
340 
90 
24 
170 
1.3 
115 
31 
230 
180 
1571 
1987 
26 
22 
345 
340 
90 
23 
185 
1.3 
115 
33 
250 
188 
1618 
1990 
26 
20 
. 330 
335 
90 
20 
210 
1.3 
115 
35 
300 
200 
1682 
1995 
33 
20 
320 
300 
90 
20 
220 
1.3 
105 
40 
250 
195 
1594 
2000 
31 
19 
340 
300 
85 
20 
250 
1.3 
100 
40 
250 
180 
1616 
2010 
31 
19 
350 
250 
80 
20 
250 
1.3 
85 
50 
200 
170 
1506 
Source : SOEC Family budgets, DG XVII estimates 
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Tab le 3.6.2 I N D I C A T O R S FOR E L E C T R I C A L A P P L I A N C E S ( e g washing-machines ) 
1. Washing-machine ownership is raising... 
% households 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1980 
80% 
54% 
79% 
81% 
41% 
55% 
75% 
84% 
90% 
25% 
65% 
76% 
74% 
1985 
84% 
61% 
84% 
84% 
53% 
80% 
78% 
88% 
94% 
40% 
75% 
85% 
80% 
1987 
87% 
65% 
86% 
86% 
56% 
82% 
81% 
91% 
94% 
44% 
77% 
87% 
83% 
1990 
92% 
71% 
89% 
90% 
61% 
86% 
87% 
96% 
95% 
51% 
81% 
91% 
87% 
1995 
93% 
79% 
91% 
92% 
70% 
90% 
91% 
98% 
95% 
66% 
90% 
92% 
90% 
2000 
95% 
88% 
95% 
95% 
83% 
95% 
95% 
100% 
100% 
79% 
93% 
95% 
94% 
2010 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
95% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
95% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
2. Specific electricity consumption is decreasing in all scenarios, especially in scenario 3 
kwh/appliance 
per year 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Europe 12 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
sc. 1 
sc. 3 
1980 
300 
-
400 
-
280 
-
350 
-
330 
-
330 
-
450 
-
300 
-
295 
-
450 
-
480 
-
415 
-
373 
-
1985 
283 
-
400 
-
275 
-
265 
-
330 
-
330 
-
440 
-
283 
-
290 
-
450 
-
460 
-
400 
-
346 
-
1987 
280 
-
380 
-
272 
-
260 
-
326 
-
325 
-
435 
-
280 
-
280 
-
440 
-
450 
-
395 
-
340 
-
1990 
275 
-
350 
-
265 
-
250 
-
320 
-
320 
-
420 
-
275 
-
265 
-
430 
-
430 
-
385 
-
331 
-
1995 
267 
267 
320 
320 
260 
260 
245 
245 
310 
310 
310 
310 
390 
390 
267 
267 
245 
245 
410 
410 
415 
415 
350 
350 
316 
316 
2000 
250 
210 
250 
235 
255 
210 
240 
210 
300 
250 
300 
250 
370 
270 
250 
210 
240 
210 
390 
300 
400 
290 
320 
250 
302 
250 
2010 
240 
200 
235 
200 
250 
200 
235 
200 
290 
200 
290 
200 
320 
200 
240 
200 
235 
200 
350 
200 
350 
200 
260 
200 
275 
200 
Source: SOEC Family budgets, UNÍPEDE statistics, DG XVII estimates 
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Electricity Prospect in the Household Sector. 
EUROPE 12 CONSUMPTION 
( Conventional Wisdom ) 
392 Twh 633 Twh 
Space heating 
10% 
Specific U I · ! 
68% 
1985 
Space heating 
1β% 
Specific uaea 
6 8 « 
2010 
refrigerator-freezer 
washing machine 
dish washer 
TV 
E x a m p l e : W a s h I n g - M a c h I n e I n d i c a t o r · 
More washing-machine)· With ΙβΜ specific energy consumption 
1 m m M V 
Leading to stable electricity 
consumption 
er.e are ara 
m 
MM flOW 
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Table 3.6.3 Value added in the service sector: Conventional Wisdom 
billion ECU 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
1985 
current prices and 
exchange rates 
65.5 
45.1 
416.2 
462.7 
21.0 
11.6 
331.6 
3.4 
96.0 
15.3 
131.0 
340.2 
1939.6 
1985-1990 
4.7% 
0.9% 
3.6% 
3.3% 
2.4% 
2.3% 
3.5% 
3.7% 
3.0% 
4.7% 
4.8% 
3.8% 
3.5% 
% per year in volume 
1990-1995 
3.2% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
3.2% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
3.5% 
3.0% 
2.5% 
5.1% 
4.2% 
3.4% 
3.2% 
1995-2000 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.2% 
3.3% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
5.1% 
3.6% 
3.1% 
3.1% 
2000-2010 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.9% 
3.0% 
4.9% 
3.5% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
1985-2010 
3.5% 
2.5% 
3.1% 
3.1% 
2.8% 
2.9% 
3.3% 
3.5% 
2.9% 
4.9% 
3.9% 
3.2% 
3.2% 
Table 3.6.4 The other scenarios : Scenario 3 was the most services oriented growth. 
A relative slowdown is expected in scenario 2 after 1995 
V.A services 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United kingdom 
Europe 12 
% per year 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2010 
Conv. wisd 
3.2% 
3.2% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
3.0% 
3.1% 
3.5% 
3.1% 
3.0% 
3.7% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
5.1% 
5.0% 
4.2% 
3.5% 
3.4% 
2.9% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
scenario 2 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.6% 
3.0% 
4.0% 
3.1% 
4.3% 
3.7% 
5.9% 
3.8% 
4.1% 
3.1% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.2% 
2.9% 
6.3% 
4.8% 
7.2% 
4.2% 
3.5% 
3.3% 
4.0% 
3.2% 
scenario 3 
3.2% 
3.3% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
3.6% 
3.6% 
4.0% 
3.3% 
4.3% 
4.1% 
5.9% 
4.6% 
4.1% 
3.8% 
3.2% 
3.5% 
3.2% 
3.2% 
6.3% 
5.4% 
7.2% 
5.1% 
3.5% 
3.6% 
4.0% 
3.7% 
scenario 4 
3.9% 
3.1% 
3.5% 
2.9% 
4.1% 
2.9% 
4.3% 
3.0% 
4.1% 
3.0% 
4.1% 
3.1% 
4.6% 
3.1% 
3.5% 
3.6% 
3.2% 
3.0% 
5.5% 
5.0% 
4.7% 
3.7% 
3.9% 
2.9% 
4.2% 
3.1% 
Sources: SOEC national accounts detailed by sector, DG XVII estimates 
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Service Sector Prospect 
In all scenarios the service sector 
grows faster than GDP 
A growing share for services up to 2010 
Structural Change 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Others 
18% Industry 
24% 
Others 
14% 
Service 
58% 
Service 
65% 
Industry 
21% 
1985 2010 
OOP: 3333 billion ecu 1986 
Conventional Wisdom 
QDP: βββ3 billion scu 1S86 
Others 
15% 
Others 
15% 
Industry 
21% 
Service 
64% 
Service 
66% 
Industry 
19% 
2010 2010 
Driving Into Teneion· 
QDP: 7086 billion ecu 1986 
Sustaining High Eoonomio Q row t h 
QDP: 73B3 billion eou 1986 
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3.7 Energy Efficiency 
Potential Realistically Attainable 
Major improvements in the energy efficiency can be still 
obtained. The range of equipments is wide according to the 
specific consumption. 
A large diffusion of the most efficient technics at current 
economical conditions will save very significantly the 
energy for the same end-use on the long term: the half of 
the fuel consumption for car driving, a third of the 
electficity for lighting... 
Private cars 
lltera/100 km 
Present average Present best 
Motor spirit Gasoil 
Washing machine Freezer 
Kwh/sppllance/year kwh/appllance/year 
400 
Present average Present best Present average 
HP-J¡j| 
Present best 
Source: Les équipements de maîtr ise de l'énergie (EXPLICIT) 
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UP TO 2010 
Electricity Network Integration 
Old practice but ? 
Benefits ? 
Fiscal Harmonisation 
Energy in Europe 
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INTEGRATION IS AN OLD PRACTICE FOR THE UTILITIES, 
but is its potential fully exploited? 
EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS 
Main eyncronoue grids 
UCPTE-Electricity exchanges 
Grid borders 
DC Inter-gr id links 
W60 ISSO 1870 1080 100O 
Energy exchangee Power exchangee 
Link capaciti·· 
ASSESSING BENEFITS OF 
HIQHER LEVELS OF INTEGRATION 
Transmission 
Capacities 
Generation 
Mix 
LIMITED 
Existing 
+ ' 
Country planned 
Individual National 
Policies 
Low level 
of 
Nuclear development 
In the Countries 
MAXIMUM 
Existing 
+ 
Country planned 
+ 
Required additions 
Blanket Policies for 
9 Countries 
as a whole 
Possibility 
of 
Higher level 
of 
Nuclear development 
in France 
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IN THE INTERNAL MARKET FRAMEWORK 
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Electricity 
Systems 
Electricity 
Demand 
Fuel 
Costs 
Investments 
Power Unite 
Characteristics 
8 EC countries ♦ Switzerland 
public networks 
"Conventional Wiedom' ecenarlo 
growth rate 
Full prices harmonization on CIF basis 
other than gas 
Differences in national 
transportation costs 
No differences In taxation 
No harmonization of total costs 
No harmonization of planning policy 
No differences in efficiency 
No differences in availability 
INVESTMENT COST DISPERSION 
B E L G I U M 
F R A N C E 
G E R M A N Y 
ITALY 
N E T H E R L A N D S 
P O R T U G A L ' 
SPAIN-
T E D K I N G D O M -
S W I T Z E R L A N D 
- . r e « | 
M 
— 
mmmì 
HTTÏIÏÏMÏÏTÏÏl 
Ρ — I 
— ] 
1 
ΚΚΜΚΜΜΙ 
-τ τ O 1 0 0 
N U C L E A R 
1 0 0 0 t o o 
COAL 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
C O M B I N E D CYCL 
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Β 
i 
ι 
o 
η 
E 
C 
υ 
8 
5 
Potential benefits exist even 
in respect of present integration 
Assessed benefits of larger integration 
(annuities) 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
investments 
fuel 
maximum integration 
limited integration 
1.2 
'W-0-
11.2 
shor t term 
0 
1.2 
0 
1.2 
medium term 
0.1 
0.7 
4.3 
1.0 
long term 
0.7 
1.5 
9.5 
1.7 
fuel i l W investments 
The gains of present integration are 
assessed as 1 bil l ion ECU 'Θ5 each year. 
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IMPACT OF TAX HARMONIZATION 
National VAT and excise duties 
toward harmonized rates 
VAT 
Premium gaaollne 
Excise tax 
Premium guollne 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
' C u . I. Intr Italt C * M f, upper Uralt 
Gata abanar unii ED var n Αρηι teat 
Franc· Unft.d llaly 
Kragdor 
[λ'.Ί E u l u i l Apri »aO Caw 2 
Impact of harmonization 
on final energy demand 
% of d i f f e r e n c e f rom C a s e 1 
Case 2 Case 
GERMANY 
a Oil prod 
FRANCE 
• Oil prod 
UK. 
• Oil prod. 
ITALY 
• Oil prod. 
AVERAGE 
•Oil prod. 
- 19% 
- 5.1 % 
♦ 1.4 % 
• 2.6% 
♦ 0.1 % 
- 0 . 7 % 
•4.4 % 
♦ 6.7 % 
♦ 0.6 % 
♦ 0 . 1 % 
- 3 . 4 
- 7.4 
-1.2 
-2 .5 
- 2 . 0 
- 3 . 8 
♦ 1 5 
♦2.7 
- 1.5 
- 3 . 4 
Germany 
eTaTJ Total (Caae 2) 
CD Total (Caae 31 
EH3 Oil prod. (Ceae 21 
55553 Oil prod. (Caae 31 
NOTE: 
Case 1: No harmonization, the national taxation systems 
continue as In the paat. 
Case 2: Strict harmonization of VAT rates and excise dutie 
Case 3: Harmonization of VAT rates and excise duties, with 
a single VAT rate for all fuels (normal rate, 15% 
minimum), alignment of the excise duties on motor 
fuels at highest level, alignment of excise duties 
on heating gasoil in an average brcket, alignment 
of the excise duties on heavy fuel oil at lowest 
level. 
The analysis was carried out using the resulte of the 
simulation of these three cases by the MIDAS model, over 
period 1988-2000. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
4.1 World Energy Outlook 
This section presents the main results of the world energy outlook under the "conventional 
wisdom" scenario, up to 2010. For the purposes of this analysis the world has been divided in the 
following zones: 
1. Europe-12 (EUR-12) 
2. USA 
3. Canada 
4. Japan 
5. Rest of the OECD (ROECD: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Australia, New Zealand) 
6. Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Yugoslavia) 
7. USSR 
8. China 
9. Rest of the World (ROW) 
Historical data used come from a variety of sources: SOEC, IEA, UN, BP and PlanEcón. 
The following conventions have been used to harmonize statistical information from 
different sources: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
ë-
Bunkers are included in primary energy consumption. 
Hydro-electricity is treated in a fuel-equivalent basis, using a theoretical generation 
efficiency of 38.5%. 
Geothermal energy used for electricity generation is included in hydro figures. 
Nuclear energy production and primary consumption outside the European Community is 
calculated using a theoretical generation efficiency of 34%, equal to the EUR-12 average. 
Net electricity imports are ignored, with the exception of EUR-12 and the ROECD. 
Stock variations are included in the net import figures. 
Renewable and non-commercial fuels are based on IEA data for the USA, Canada and the 
non-OECD zones. "Other fuels" of the SOEC balance sheet for EUR-12 are also 
included. 
Therefore, the EUR-12 figures in this chapter are slightly different from those shown in the 
rest of this document. 
More details are available in the working documents 14 (World Energy Outlook) and 13 
(Energy Outlook of the USSR and Eastern Europe). 
TABLE 4.1.1 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: GDP/GNP Assumptions. 
Countries 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest Of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
8.China 
g.Rest of the World 
TOTAL WORLD 
1987 
(billion US $) 
4305 
4525 
415 
2390 
950 
12585 
630 
1660 
300 
2450 
17625 
1980-87 
1.8 
2.7 
3.0 
3.8 
1.8 
2.4 
1.4 
2.0 
9.6 
3.0 
2.7 
Average 
1987-90 
3.4 
3.1 
3.5 
4.9 
2.8 
3.5 
1.2 
0.2 
8.0 
4.1 
3.1 
annual growth of GDP 
1990-95 
2.7 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
1.4 
1.2 
6.0 
4.0 
2.8 
1995-2000 
2.7 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.1 
2.1 
5.5 
4.0 
2.9 
¡n%) 
200005 
2.7 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.5 
2.6 
5.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2005-10 
2.7 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.6 
2.6 
5.0 
4.0 
3.0 
Source«: SOEC, OECD, IMF, World Bank, DG XV1I/A2 estimato· 
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TABLE 4.1.2 World Energy Outlook 1987-2010: Primary Energy Consumption Mtoe 
SOLID FUELS 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Rest of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
OIL 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Rest of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
NATURAL GAS 
t .Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Rest of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
NUCLEAR 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3,Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Rost of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
1980 
233 
383 
23 
5Θ 
48 
755 
247 
307 
308 
179 
1787 
580 
794 
88 
238 
119 
1818 
115 
449 
90 
584 
3055 
171 
507 
48 
23 
20 
771 
67 
317 
12 
118 
1285 
44 
67 
10 
21 
12 
154 
β 
18 
0 
4 
182 
HYDRO, GEOTHERMAL,etC 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 Japan 
5.Rest of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
9.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
TOTAL CONVENTIONAL 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
S.Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Reet of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
e.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
9.Reet of the World 
WORLD 
44 
83 
58 
21 
5 2 
238 
13 
47 
13 
88 
397 
1076 
1825 
225 
358 
248 
3734 
447 
1138 
423 
974 
6717 
RENEWABLES AND NON-C 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 Japan 
5.Rest of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
e.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
T O T A L E N E R G Y 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4 J a p a n 
5.Re«t of O E C D 
TOTAL O E C D 
e.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
B.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
2 
58 
8 
0 
0 
85 
4 
48 
37 
306 
461 
1078 
1881 
233 
358 
249 
3798 
451 
1187 
480 
1280 
717Θ 
1985 
239 
446 
28 
74 
53 
841 
264 
295 
414 
234 
2048 
489 
722 
89 
203 
106 
1588 
104 
444 
94 
645 
2876 
185 
449 
45 
36 
23 
738 
76 
466 
12 
169 
1460 
124 
103 
15 
40 
25 
308 
12 
42 
0 
17 
378 
43 
66 
68 
2 0 
59 
255 
12 
53 
21 
114 
454 
1078 
1788 
226 
373 
267 
3730 
468 
1300 
540 
1178 
7217 
2 
67 
8 
0 
0 
77 
4 
41 
42 
338 
502 
1081 
1852 
234 
373 
287 
3807 
472 
1341 
583 
1518 
7718 
1987 
231 
458 
33 
88 
74 
887 
271 
308 
448 
282 
2157 
508 
783 
71 
208 
112 
1858 
108 
448 
108 
887 
3007 
198 
437 
41 
3 8 
28 
738 
8 0 
5 1 8 
13 
190 
1541 
138 
122 
2 0 
48 
28 
353 
18 
48 
0 
2 3 
440 
44 
59 
71 
18 
83 
255 
12 
54 
2 2 
120 
482 
1118 
1841 
238 
377 
304 
3874 
484 
1375 
593 
1282 
7808 
2 
75 
7 
0 
0 
84 
4 
3 8 
44 
344 
515 
1118 
1818 
243 
377 
304 
3857 
488 
1414 
837 
1828 
8122 
1990 
235 
485 
35 
78 
81 
824 
270 
313 
500 
315 
2322 
548 
794 
77 
230 
111 
1757 
111 
443 
127 
781 
3219 
213 
478 
54 
48 
31 
824 
78 
584 
14 
232 
1732 
181 
147 
22 
51 
28 
410 
21 
8 0 
0 
27 
517 
47 
88 
70 
25 
59 
270 
12 
80 
31 
130 
503 
1201 
1974 
258 
431 
321 
4188 
482 
1458 
873 
1483 
8282 
2 
78 
7 
0 
0 
85 
4 
37 
47 
355 
528 
1203 
2050 
288 
431 
321 
4271 
488 
1498 
720 
1838 
8821 
1995 
246 
525 
35 
84 
101 
992 
264 
297 
574 
422 
2569 
572 
844 
81 
238 
115 
1848 
124 
434 
158 
911 
3474 
233 
528 
60 
59 
39 
919 
97 
740 
18 
306 
2078 
180 
151 
29 
70 
29 
458 
26 
75 
3 
31 
592 
50 
70 
81 
28 
84 
291 
13 
66 
43 
158 
571 
1281 
2119 
288 
474 
348 
4508 
544 
1812 
792 
1827 
9283 
3 
83 
7 
0 
0 
93 
4 
33 
52 
377 
559 
1283 
2202 
283 
474 
349 
4801 
548 
1845 
845 
2203 
9842 
2000 
275 
554 
44 
89 
111 
1073 
303 
281 
652 
547 
2854 
560 
881 
84 
229 
113 
1888 
139 
425 
188 
1027 
3645 
249 
589 
67 
67 
45 
1017 
122 
904 
18 
397 
2459 
196 
154 
30 
9 0 
29 
499 
32 
90 
5 
47 
872 
53 
83 
87 
30 
88 
322 
14 
77 
SO 
192 
664 
1333 
2281 
312 
505 
367 
4777 
609 
1778 
823 
2 2 1 0 
10295 
4 
89 
β 
0 
0 
100 
4 
32 
58 
400 
593 
1338 
2349 
318 
505 
367 
4877 
813 
1808 
980 
2810 
10887 
2005 
298 
633 
51 
95 
125 
1203 
321 
277 
722 
707 
3230 
542 
895 
84 
219 
109 
1849 
154 
422 
218 
1129 
3773 
263 
614 
75 
78 
52 
1082 
152 
1085 
2 0 
516 
2855 
2 2 0 
160 
33 
109 
20 
542 
39 
105 
β 
56 
748 
54 
91 
94 
32 
75 
346 
14 
90 
76 
234 
761 
1378 
2383 
338 
534 
382 
5021 
878 
1980 
1044 
2842 
11388 
5 
94 
8 
0 
0 
107 
3 
3 0 
64 
424 
829 
1381 
2487 
344 
534 
382 
5128 
883 
2010 
1107 
3087 
11995 
2010 
322 
717 
58 
98 
138 
1332 
335 
284 
802 
890 
3822 
524 
897 
84 
212 
108 
1822 
171 
423 
253 
1224 
3893 
2 7 7 
835 
85 
β β 
59 
1144 
164 
1291 
22 
881 
3302 
252 
181 
34 
127 
14 
587 
45 
120 
9 
82 
823 
55 
104 
100 
34 
81 
373 
15 
100 
88 
271 
857 
1428 
2513 
380 
558 
388 
5258 
748 
2198 
1183 
3107 
124Β6 
β 
100 
8 
0 
0 
115 
3 
28 
70 
451 
887 
1438 
2813 
388 
558 
398 
5374 
752 
2228 
1253 
3558 
13163 
176 
TABLE 4.1.3 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: Primary Energy Production 
Mtoe 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
e.Eastern Europe 
7. USSR 
e.China 
9. Rest of the World 
WORLD 
Soilds 
166 
502 
40 
8 
109 
826 
272 
326 
454 
264 
2142 
Oil 
151 
471 
80 
1 
77 
780 
17 
626 
136 
1426 
2986 
1987 
Nat.Gas 
129 
422 
71 
2 
44 
668 
44 
586 
13 
276 
1587 
TOTAL 
627 
1651 
288 
77 
323 
2965 
366 
1679 
669 
2453 
8132 
Soilds 
143 
600 
55 
5 
140 
943 
260 
330 
620 
410 
2563 
Oil 
125 
404 
89 
1 
95 
715 
11 
598 
186 
1963 
3474 
1995 
Nat.Gas 
137 
460 
115 
2 
60 
774 
35 
850 
16 
405 
2080 
TOTAL 
636 
1768 
377 
104 
390 
3275 
348 
1952 
920 
3343 
9838 
Soilds 
122 
660 
65 
5 
180 
1032 
240 
340 
700 
540 
2852 
Oil 
112 
380 
94 
0 
63 
649 
10 
578 
218 
2190 
3645 
2000 
Nat.Gas 
135 
500 
127 
2 
70 
834 
25 
1060 
19 
520 
2458 
TOTAL 
621 
1865 
411 
127 
413 
3437 
324 
2176 
1059 
3889 
10885 
Soilds 
105 
880 
80 
0 
260 
1325 
200 
360 
900 
840 
3625 
Oil 
103 
350 
69 
0 
27 
549 
10 
553 
283 
2497 
3893 
2010 
Nat.Gas 
119 
490 
140 
2 
80 
831 
10 
1560 
24 
875 
33O0 
TOTAL 
640 
2085 
432 
162 
464 
3782 
283 
2721 
1383 
4995 
13164 
(1) Total Includes fossil fuels, hydro, nuclear and non-commercial 
TABLE 3.1.4 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: Net Energy Imports 
Mtoe 
1.Europe-I 2 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6. Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
8.China 
9.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
Soilds 
65 
-42 
-7 
61 
-35 
42 
-2 
-17 
-6 
-2 
15 
Oil 
356 
292 
-9 
205 
35 
879 
89 
-180 
-27 
-739 
22 
1987 
Nat.Gas 
69 
15 
-30 
35 
-16 
71 
36 
-67 
0 
-86 
-46 
TOTAL 
491 
265 
-46 
301 
-19 
992 
123 
-264 
-33 
-827 
-9 
Soilds 
103 
-75 
-20 
79 
-39 
48 
24 
-33 
-46 
7 
0 
Oil 
446 
440 
-8 
235 
20 
1133 
113 
-164 
-30 
-1052 
0 
1995 
Nat.Gas 
96 
68 
-55 
57 
-21 
145 
62 
-108 
0 
-99 
0 
TOTAL 
647 
433 
-83 
371 
-42 
1326 
199 
-305 
-76 
-1144 
0 
Soilds 
152 
-106 
-21 
84 
-69 
40 
63 
-59 
-49 
5 
0 
2000 
Oil Nat.Gas 
448 114 
501 89 
-10 -60 
229 65 
50 -25 
1218 183 
129 97 
-153 -156 
-30 0 
-1164 -124 
0 0 
TOTAL 
716 
484 
-91 
378 
-46 
1441 
289 
-368 
-79 
-1283 
0 
Soilds 
217 
-164 
-22 
98 
-122 
7 
135 
-96 
-98 
52 
0 
Oil 
421 
547 
14 
212 
79 
1273 
161 
-131 
-30 
-1273 
0 
2010 
Nat.Gas 
157 
145 
-55 
86 
-21 
312 
174 
-269 
-1 
-216 
0 
TOTAL 
797 
528 
-63 
396 
-66 
1592 
470 
-496 
-129 
-1437 
0 
(1) Negative numbers Indicate net exports 
(2) 1987 figures include stock variations and statistical errors 
(3) Total figures for EUR-12 and ROECD include net electricity exchanges 
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TABLE 4.1.5 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: World Final Energy Demand 
Mtoe 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Electricity 
Heat 
Others 
TOTAL 
1980 
850 
2373 
817 
592 
153 
459 
5243 
1985 
922 
2324 
895 
703 
179 
500 
5523 
1987 
912 
2450 
947 
759 
185 
512 
5764 
1990 
982 
2638 
1090 
836 
179 
527 
6252 
1995 
1041 
2854 
1268 
982 
185 
555 
6884 
2000 
1101 
3018 
1431 
1149 
198 
587 
7484 
2005 
1164 
3165 
1594 
1335 
212 
623 
8091 
2010 
1226 
3292 
1773 
1537 
224 
659 
8710 
% 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Electricity 
Heat 
Others 
TOTAL 
1980 
16.2 
45.3 
15.6 
11.3 
2.9 
8.8 
100.0 
1985 
16.7 
42.1 
16.2 
12.7 
3.2 
9.1 
100.0 
1987 
15.8 
42.5 
16.4 
13.2 
3.2 
8.9 
100.0 
1990 
15.7 
42.2 
17.4 
13.4 
2.9 
8.4 
100.0 
1995 
15.1 
41.5 
18.4 
14.3 
2.7 
8.1 
100.0 
2000 
14.7 
40.3 
19.1 
15.4 
2.6 
7.8 
100.0 
2005 
14.4 
39.1 
19.7 
16.5 
2.6 
7.7 
100.0 
2010 
14.1 
37.8 
20.4 
17.6 
2.6 
7.6 
100.0 
TABLE 4.1.6 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: 
A. ELECTRICITY GROSS PRODUCTION 
World Electricity 
TWh 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
e.China 
9.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
of which: 
Hydro etc 
i n % 
Nuclear 
i n % 
Thermal 
in % 
1980 
1403 
2427 
373 
576 
458 
5238 
483 
1294 
301 
1000 
8316 
1802 
21.7 
714 
8.6 
5800 
69.7 
1985 
1573 
2622 
459 
672 
578 
5903 
551 
1544 
411 
1432 
9841 
2067 
21.0 
1492 
15.2 
6282 
63.8 
1987 
1659 
2733 
496 
719 
625 
6232 
577 
1664 
497 
1610 
10580 
2104 
19.9 
1739 
16.4 
6736 
63.7 
1990 
1801 
3016 
549 
817 
670 
6852 
592 
1681 
602 
1906 
11633 
2286 
19.7 
2023 
17.4 
7324 
63.0 
1995 
2039 
3446 
625 
935 
746 
7791 
661 
1832 
761 
2598 
13643 
2592 
19.0 
2317 
17.0 
8734 
64.0 
2000 
2242 
3889 
710 
1061 
817 
8719 
748 
2075 
944 
3477 
15963 
3012 
18.9 
2630 
16.5 
10321 
64.7 
2005 
2426 
4336 
801 
1189 
884 
9637 
847 
2359 
1149 
4566 
18557 
3444 
18.6 
2935 
15.8 
12178 
65.6 
2010 
2635 
4811 
894 
1320 
956 
10616 
938 
2648 
1398 
5773 
21372 
3879 
18.2 
3217 
15.1 
14276 
66.8 
B. INPUTS TO THERMAL POWER STATIONS 
Mtoe 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Others 
TOTAL 
Electricity produced 
Efficiency-in % 
1980 
882 
410 
279 
2 
1572 
499 
31.7 
1985 
1042 
321 
369 
2 
1734 
540 
31.2 
1987 
1116 
320 
398 
2 
1837 
579 
31.5 
1990 
1212 
330 
435 
2 
1979 
630 
31.8 
1995 
1398 
356 
588 
4 
2346 
751 
32.0 
2000 
1621 
355 
789 
5 
2770 
888 
32.0 
2005 
1930 
327 
1004 
6 
3268 
1047 
32.1 
2010 
2256 
312 
1252 
7 
3828 
1228 
32.1 
% 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Others 
TOTAL 
1980 
56.1 
26.1 
17.7 
0.1 
100.0 
1985 
60.1 
18.5 
21.3 
0.1 
100.0 
1987 
60.8 
17.4 
21.7 
0.1 
100.0 
1990 
61.2 
16.7 
22.0 
0.1 
100.0 
1995 
59.6 
15.2 
25.1 
0.2 
100.0 
2000 
58.5 
12.8 
28.5 
0.2 
100.0 
2005 
59.1 
10.0 
30.7 
0.2 
100.0 
2010 
58.9 
8.2 
32.7 
0.2 
100.0 
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TABLE 4.1.7 World Energy Outlook, 1987-2010: 
A PRIMARY ENERGY DEMAND 
C02 Emissions 
Mtoe 
1.Europe-12 
2. USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5.Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
8.China 
9.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
Part of EUROPE-12 
in Total World in % 
1967 
1116 
1916 
243 
377 
304 
3957 
489 
1414 
637 
1626 
8122 
13.8 
1995 
1263 
2202 
293 
474 
349 
4601 
546 
1645 
845 
2203 
9842 
13.0 
i n % 
1987-95 
1.7 
1.8 
2.4 
2.9 
1.7 
1.9 
1.4 
1.9 
3.6 
3.9 
2.4 
2000 
1336 
2349 
319 
505 
367 
4877 
613 
1808 
960 
2610 
108Θ7 
12.3 
i n% 
1995-2000 
0.8 
1.3 
1.7 
1.3 
1.0 
1.2 
2.3 
1.9 
3.0 
3.4 
2.0 
2010 
1436 
2613 
368 
559 
398 
5374 
752 
2226 
1253 
3558 
13163 
10.9 
i n % 
2000-10 
0.7 
1.1 
1.4 
1.0 
0.8 
1.0 
2.1 
2.1 
2.5 
3.1 
1.9 
i n% 
1987-2010 
1.1 
1.4 
1.8 
1.7 
1.2 
1.3 
1.9 
2.0 
3.0 
3.5 
2.1 
B. C02 EMISSIONS 
Million tonnes of C 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6.Eastern Europe 
7. USSR 
8.China 
9. Rest of the World 
WORLD 
of which: 
1.Solid Fuels 
2.Oil 
3.Natural Gas 
4.Non-commercial 
Part of EUROPE-12 
in Total World in % 
1987 
767 
1395 
121 
258 
184 
2725 
437 
1075 
631 
1245 
6113 
2416 
2225 
1014 
458 
12.5 
1995 
654 
1599 
143 
312 
224 
3132 
479 
1165 
615 
1706 
7317 
2679 
2569 
1372 
497 
11.7 
i n% 
1987-95 
1.4 
1.7 
2.1 
2.4 
2.5 
1.8 
1.2 
1.2 
3.3 
4.0 
2.3 
2.2 
1.8 
3.8 
1.0 
2000 
886 
1711 
160 
319 
238 
3314 
529 
1265 
932 
2022 
8062 
3197 
2695 
1642 
527 
11.0 
in % 
1995-2000 
0.7 
1.4 
2.3 
0.4 
1.2 
1.1 
2.0 
1.3 
2.7 
3.5 
2.0 
2.1 
1.0 
3.7 
1.2 
2010 
930 
1949 
189 
332 
273 
3673 
635 
1501 
1162 
2801 
9772 
4056 
2876 
2247 
593 
9.5 
in% 
2000-10 
0.5 
1.3 
1.7 
0.4 
1.4 
1.0 
1.8 
1.7 
2.2 
3.3 
1.9 
2.4 
0.6 
3.2 
1.2 
i n% 
1987-2010 
0.8 
1.5 
2.0 
1.1 
1.7 
1.3 
1.6 
1.5 
2.7 
3.6 
2.1 
2.3 
1.1 
3.5 
1.1 
C. C02 INTENSITY 
Kg of C/Toe 
1.Europe-12 
2.USA 
3.Canada 
4.Japan 
5. Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
6.Eastern Europe 
7.USSR 
S.China 
9.Rest of the World 
WORLD 
1967 
686 
726 
496 
684 
606 
689 
894 
761 
991 
766 
753 
1995 
665 
726 
488 
658 
643 
661 
674 
720 
965 
774 
743 
i n % 
1967-95 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.5 
0.7 
-0.1 
-0.3 
-0.7 
-0.3 
0.1 
-0.2 
2000 
663 
728 
501 
632 
649 
680 
863 
700 
951 
775 
741 
i n% 
1995-2000 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
-0.8 
0.2 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.6 
-0.3 
0.0 
-0.1 
2010 
648 
746 
513 
594 
686 
684 
844 
674 
927 
787 
742 
i n% 
2000-10 
-0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
-0.6 
0.6 
0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.3 
0.2 
0.0 
i n % 
1987-2010 
-0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.6 
0.5 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.5 
-0.3 
0.1 
-0.1 
C02 Emission factors: 
Solid Fuels 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Non-commercial 
HgC/GJ 
26.7 
19.6 
13.6 
21.3 
KgC02/GJ 
98 
72 
50 
78 
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Table 4.1.8 ENERGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN 
Fastest growth of energy demand in the non european countries 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Greece 
[1] EUROPE 4 
Morocco 
Algeria 
Tunisia 
Libya 
Egypt 
[2] N. AFRICA 
Malta 
Yugoslavia 
Albania 
Turkey 
Cyprus 
Syria 
Lebanon 
Israel 
[3] OTHER 
Population GDP /cap 
(million) ($US) 
1987 1987 
38.9 5625 
55.6 11950 
57.3 10000 
10.0 3580 
161.8 9223 
23.3 610 
23.2 2832 
7.6 1180 
4.1 5460 
50.7 700 
108.9 1346 
0.4 3800 
23.4 2480 
3.1 870 
51.4 1240 
0.7 5190 
11.2 1640 
2.8 na 
4.4 6800 
97.3 1878 
Total 
1987 
73.7 
201.4 
139.8 
18.1 
433.1 
5.8 
21.1 
3.8 
9.6 
27.5 
67.8 
0.5 
52.3 
3.3 
46.7 
1.4 
9.7 
2.8 
8.9 
125.6 
primary 
2010 
111.4 
286.0 
182.5 
36.1 
615.9 
14.0 
56.7 
7.6 
29.8 
82.0 
190.1 
0.8 
83.0 
5.4 
140.1 
2.6 
24.8 
7.0 
16.9 
280.4 
Energy Demand ( Mtoe ) 
%p . a. 
1987-2010 
1.8% 
1.5% 
1.2% 
3.0% 
1.5% 
3.9% 
4.4% 
3.1% 
5.0% 
4.9% 
4.6% 
2.3% 
2.0% 
2.1% 
4.9% 
2.8% 
4.2% 
4.1% 
2.8% 
3.6% 
Final 
1987 
9.4 
23.7 
16.2 
2.2 
51.4 
0.6 
0.9 
0.4 
1.2 
2.4 
5.4 
0.1 
5.6 
0.2 
3.0 
0.1 
0.5 
0.4 
1.3 
11.2 
electricity 
2010 
16.5 
41.3 
28.3 
5.4 
91.5 
2.0 
4.7 
1.5 
6.5 
13.4 
28.1 
0.2 
13.6 
0.6 
24.3 
0.3 
2.2 
1.7 
3.3 
46.2 
% p. a. 
1987-2010 
2.5% 
2.4% 
2.5% 
4.1% 
2.5% 
5.6% 
7.7% 
6.1% 
7.5% 
7.8% 
7.4% 
3.8% 
3.9% 
3.8% 
9.5% 
4.0% 
6.8% 
6.5% 
4.1% 
6.3% 
TOTAL [1+2 + 3] 368.0 4951 626.5 1086.4 2.4% 68.1 165.7 3.9% 
For memory: 
Population GDP/cap 
(million) ($US) 
1987 1987 
Total primary demand ( Mtoe ) 
1987 
% p.a. 
2010 1987-2010 
Final electricity ( Mtoe ) 
1987 2010 
% p.a. 
1987-2010 
EUROPE 12 323.8 10000 1062 1368 1.1% 120 192 2.1% 
MED in % EUR 12 114% 59% 79% 57% 86% 
koe / inhabitant 
1987 
ENERGY DEMAND PER CAPITA 
Electricity Total primary demand 
1987 2010 
EUROPE 4 
N. AFRICA 
OTHER 
318 
50 
115 
541 
157 
338 
2676 
623 
1291 
3646 
1060 
2054 
TOTAL MED 185 342 1702 2241 
Sources: SOEC, World Bank, United Nations, Planecon, DG XVII estimates 
Primary energy demand based on SOEC conversion factors 
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4.2 World Oil Market 
OECD OIL DEMAND 
OECD-mbd 
32 Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—Γ-Γ" 
1970 1975 1980 1986 1990 1996 2000 2006 2010 
- Historic Soanirlo 2 --'Scenario 3 
LDC OIL DEMAND 
20-
10-
LDC-mbd 
•"-ZZ***0"^ 
^¿"' 
"J> 
s¿^ 
^ i<<~---~~ 
1980 1986 1990 1996 
CALL ON OPEC CRUDE 
35 
OPEC crude-mbd 
16 I I I I I l t ι ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι—r—r-
1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 1996 2000 2005 2010 
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Table 4.2.1 Oil Supply and Demand 
Summary of 3 scenarios 
D 
S 
Mbd 
CONSUMPTION 
OECD 
LDCs 
TOTAL 
1973 
40.5 
7.5 
43.0 
1979 
41.8 
10.6 
52.4 
1985 
34.4 
12.4 
46.8 
1989 
37.4 
14.5 
51.9 
1990 
37.9 
15.0 
52.9 
1995 
Sc. 1 
39.9 
17.5 
57.4 
1995 
Sc. 2 /3 
41.5 
17.9 
59.4 
2000 
Sc. 1 
40.3 
19.7 
60.0 
2000 
Sc. 2 
43.6 
20.4 
64.0 
2000 
Sc. 3 
40.4 
19.9 
60.3 
2010 
Sc. 1 
39.5 
23.5 
63.0 
2010 
Sc. 2 
41.8 
23.6 
65.4 
2010 
Sc. 3 
32.5 
21.8 
54.3 
SUPPLY 
OECD 
LDC 
Processing gains 
CPEs-Net exports 
TOTAL NON OPEC 
OPEC 
(of which: Crude) 
TOTAL 
13.9 
3.3 
0.6 
0.4 
18.2 
31.2 
30.8 
49.4 
14.7 
5.2 
0.8 
1.2 
21.9 
31.5 
30.6 
53.4 
17.0 
8.6 
1.1 
1.9 
28.6 
17.5 
16.0 
46.1 
16.0 
9.6 
1.1 
2.1 
28.8 
23.6 
21.7 
52.4 
16.3 
9.9 
1.1 
2.0 
29.3 
24.1 
22.2 
53.4 
15.4 
11.5 
1.2 
1.5 
29.6 
27.8 
25.9 
57.4 
15.8 
11.5 
1.2 
1.5 
30.0 
29.4 
27.5 
59.4 
14.0 
12.9 
1.2 
1.0 
29.1 
30.9 
28.9 
60.0 
14.6 
12.9 
1.2 
1.0 
29.7 
34.3 
32.3 
64.0 
14.5 
12.9 
1.2 
1.0 
29.6 
30.7 
28.8 
60.3 
11.8 
15.2 
1.3 
0.0 
28.3 
34.7 
32.5 
63.0 
13.8 
15.9 
1.4 
0.5 
31.6 
33.8 
31.6 
65.4 
11.8 
14.6 
1.4 
0.0 
27.8 
26.5 
24.3 
54.3 
Stock changes 1.4 1.0 -0.7 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% p. a. 
CONSUMPTION 
OECD 
LDCs 
TOTAL 
1973 1979 
0.5 
5.9. 
1.5 
1985 
-3.2 
2.6 
-1.9 
1989 
2.1 
4.0 
2.6 
1990 
1.3 
3.4 
1.9 
1995 
Sc. 1 
1.0 
3.1 
1.6 
1995 
Sc. 2 /3 
1.8 
3.6 
2.3 
2000 
Sc. 1 
0.2 
2.4 
0.9 
2000 
Sc. 2 
1.0 
2.6 
1.5 
2000 
Sc. 3 
-0.5 
2.1 
0.3 
2010 
Sc. 1 
-0.2 
1.8 
0.5 
2010 
Sc. 2 
-0.4 
1.5 
0.2 
2010 
Sc. 3 
-2.2 
0.9 
-1.0 
SUPPLY 
NON OPEC 
OPEC 
(of which: Crude) 
TOTAL 
3.1 
0.2 
-0.1 
1.3 
4.5 
-9.3 
-10.2 
-2.4 
0.2 
7.8 
7.9 
3.3 
1.7 
2.1 
2.3 
1.9 
0.2 
2.9 
3.1 
1.5 
0.5 
4.1 
4.4 
2.2 
-0.3 
2.1 
2.2 
0.9 
-0.2 
3.1 
3.3 
1.5 
-0.3 
0.9 
0.9 
0.3 
■0.3 
1.2 
1.2 
0.5 
0.6 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.2 
-0.6 
-1.5 
-1.7 
-1.0 
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5. FINAL RESULTS OF SCENARIOS 1 TO 4. 
5.1 Energy Balances at Europe 12 level 
Table 5.1.1 TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIREMENT - SCENARIO 1 
MTOE 
1. Indigeneous Production 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
2. Net Imports 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Electricity 
3.lnland Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Others 
4. Electr. Generation Input 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
-Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
5. Final Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Industry 
- Transport 
- Tertiary-Domestic 
% 
Share of oil in inland 
energy consumption 
Share of coal and nuclear 
in electr. production 
Supply dependance on 
imports 
1980 
482.64 
197.45 
92.89 
129.17 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
591.95 
52.45 
495.84 
42.26 
1.39 
1023.29 
238.52 
551.32 
171.01 
44.01 
18.44 
306.60 
140.25 
71.06 
32.16 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
697.28 
249.51 
170.41 
277.36 
1980 
53.88 
60.10 
57.85 
1985 
592.48 
172.58 
150.85 
127.11 
123.62 
16.65 
1.67 
456.54 
62.14 
333.86 
59.35 
1.19 
1026.73 
238.33 
462.66 
184.71 
123.62 
17.42 
349.88 
140.32 
39.45 
28.18 
123.62 
16.65 
1.66 
676.48 
213.06 
181.53 
281.89 
1985 
45.06 
75.44 
44.47 
1987 
604.53 
168.94 
150.90 
129.00 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
489.08 
59.55 
356.53 
71.41 
1.59 
1062.25 
230.15 
476.58 
198.23 
136.25 
21.04 
367.30 
146.37 
36.34 
28.89 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
701.63 
213.84 
198.81 
288.97 
1987 
44.87 
76.95 
46.04 
1990 
617.99 
158.33 
147.10 
131.21 
160.56 
18.81 
1.98 
558.80 
76.83 
398.62 
81.42 
1.93 
1148.33 
235.16 
517.26 
212.63 
160.56 
22.72 
407.75 
155.93 
43.57 
27.01 
160.56 
18.81 
1.87 
752.77 
226.18 
222.42 
304.17 
1990 
45.04 
77.62 
48.66 
1995 
607.94 
143.36 
125.18 
136.82 
179.58 
20.21 
2.79 
646.96 
102.79 
446.38 
95.86 
1.93 
1226.29 
246.15 
542.95 
232.68 
179.58 
24.93 
461.18 
170.81 
55.29 
33.19 
179.58 
20.21 
2.10 
792.32 
235.60 
237.24 
319.48 
1995 
44.28 
75.98 
52.76 
2000 
591.40 
122.35 
111.93 
135.26 
196.06 
22.00 
3.80 
715.43 
152.19 
447.51 
114.05 
1.68 
1278.07 
274.54 
530.68 
249.31 
196.06 
27.48 
508.09 
203.01 
46.54 
37.94 
196.06 
22.00 
2.54 
813.52 
242.37 
245.72 
325.43 
2000 
41.52 
78.54 
55.98 
2010 
609.28 
105.34 ' 
103.30 
119.36 
251.51 
23.42 
6.35 
796.39 
216.94 
420.96 
157.30 
1.19 
1376.59 
322.28 
495.18 
276.66 
251.51 
30.96 
597.42 
250.75 
20.98 
47.15 
251.51 
23.42 
3.61 
849.82 
261.85 
253.77 
334.20 
2010 
35.97 
84.07 
57.85 
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Table 5.1.2 TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIREMENT - SCENARIO 2 
MTOE 
1. Indigeneous Production 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
2. Net Imports 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Electricity 
3.Inland Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Others 
4. Electr. Generation Input 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
-Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
5. Final Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Industry 
- Transport 
- Tertiary-Domestic 
% 
Share of oil in inland 
energy consumption 
Share of coal and nuclear 
in electr. production 
Supply dépendance on 
imports 
1980 
482.64 
197.45 
92.89 
129.17 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
591.95 
52.45 
495.84 
42.26 
1.39 
1023.29 
238.52 
551.32 
171.01 
44.01 
18.44 
306.60 
140.25 
71.06 
32.16 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
697.28 
249.51 
170.41 
277.36 
1980 
53.88 
60.10 
57.85 
1985 
592.48 
172.58 
150.85 
127.11 
123.62 
16.65 
1.67 
456.54 
62.14 
333.86 
59.35 
1.19 
1026.73 
238.33 
462.66 
184.71 
123.62 
17.42 
349.88 
140.32 
39.45 
28.18 
123.62 
16.65 
1.66 
676.48 
213.06 
181.53 
281.89 
1985 
45.06 
75.44 
44.47 
1987 
604.53 
168.94 
150.90 
129.00 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
489.08 
59.55 
356.53 
71.41 
1.59 
1062.25 
230.15 
476.58 
198.23 
136.25 
21.04 
367.30 
146.37 
36.34 
28.89 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
701.63 
213.84 
198.81 
288.97 
1987 
44.87 
76.95 
46.04 
1990 
617.99 
158.33 
147.10 
131.21 
160.56 
18.81 
1.98 
558.80 
76.83 
398.62 
81.42 
1.93 
1148.33 
235.16 
517.26 
212.63 
160.56 
22.72 
407.75 
155.93 
43.57 
27.01 
160.56 
18.81 
1.87 
752.77 
226.18 
222.42 
304.17 
1990 
45.04 
77.62 
48.66 
1995 
627.27 
143.86 
132.33 
140.51 
187.35 
20.34 
2.88 
709.77 
116.61 
479.14 
112.01 
2.01 
1308.43 
260.47 
582.87 
252.52 
187.35 
25.23 
489.52 
182.53 
58.21 
38.90 
187.35 
20.34 
2.19 
848.95 
247.96 
263.57 
337.42 
1995 
44.55 
75.56 
54.25 
2000 
626.95 
123.55 
126.44 
140.60 
209.87 
22.55 
3.94 
821.15 
181.71 
498.68 
139.01 
1.74 
1419.35 
305.26 
596.36 
279.61 
209.87 
28.23 
560.74 
230.14 
49.35 
46.15 
209.87 
22.55 
2.68 
907.83 
258.61 
296.82 
352.40 
2000 
42.02 
78.47 
57.85 
2010 
656.81 
107.84 
119.02 
132.55 
266.60 
24.32 
6.48 
874.28 
239.24 
459.01 
174.82 
1.21 
1502.01 
347.08 
548.95 
307.37 
266.60 
32.01 
646.33 
272.82 
23.86 
54.99 
266.60 
24.32 
3.74 
934.58 
271.29 
300.93 
362.36 
2010 
36.55 
83.46 
58.21 
184 
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Table 5.1.3 TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIREMENT - SCENARIO 3 
MTOE 
1. Indigeneous Production 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
2. Net Imports 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Electricity 
3.Inland Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
-Others 
4. Electr. Generation Input 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
-Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
5. Final Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Industry 
- Transport 
- Tertiary-Domestic 
% 
Share of oil in inland 
energy consumption 
Share of coal and nuclear 
in electr. production 
Supply dependance on 
Imports 
1980 
482.64 
197.45 
92.89 
129.17 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
591.95 
52.45 
495.84 
42.26 
1.39 
1023.29 
238.52 
551.32 
171.01 
44.01 
18.44 
306.60 
140.25 
71.06 
32.16 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
697.28 
249.51 
170.41 
277.36 
1980 
53.88 
60.10 
57.85 
1985 
592.48 
172.58 
150.85 
127.11 
123.62 
16.65 
1.67 
456.54 
62.14 
333.86 
59.35 
1.19 
1026.73 
238.33 
462.66 
184.71 
123.62 
17.42 
349.88 
140.32 
39.45 
28.18 
123.62 
16.65 
1.66 
676.48 
213.06 
181.53 
281.89 
1985 
45.06 
75.44 
44.47 
1987 
604.53 
168.94 
150.90 
129.00 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
489.08 
59.55 
356.53 
71.41 
1.59 
1062.25 
230.15 
476.58 
198.23 
136.25 
21.04 
367.30 
146.37 
36.34 
28.89 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
701.63 
213.84 
198.81 
288.97 
1987 
44.87 
76.95 
46.04 
1990 
617.99 
158.33 
147.10 
131.21 
160.56 
18.81 
1.98 
558.80 
76.83 
398.62 
81.42 
1.93 
1148.33 
235.16 
517.26 
212.63 
160.56 
22.72 
407.75 
155.93 
43.57 
27.01 
160.56 
18.81 
1.87 
752.77 
226.18 
222.42 
304.17 
1990 
45.04 
77.62 
48.66 
1995 
627.27 
143.86 
132.33 
140.51 
187.35 
20.34 
2.88 
709.77 
116.61 
479.14 
112.01 
2.01 
1308.43 
260.47 
582.87 
252.52 
187.35 
25.23 
489.52 
182.53 
58.21 
38.90 
187.35 
20.34 
2.19 
848.95 
247.96 
263.57 
337.42 
1995 
44.55 
75.56 
54.25 
2000 
609.91 
123.14 
122.64 
139.79 
197.80 
22.33 
4.21 
737.47 
146.40 
451.34 
138.71 
1.02 
1318.40 
269.54 
545.02 
278.50 
197.80 
27.56 
520.66 
202.07 
45.67 
50.24 
197.80 
22.33 
2.55 
846.46 
248.44 
255.15 
342.87 
2000 
41.34 
76.80 
55.94 
2010 
646.10 
105.00 
113.15 
126.46 
268.37 
23,74 
9.38 
561.92 
114.97 
270.85 
177.24 
-1.14 
1178.94 
219.97 
354.92 
303.70 
268.37 
31.98 
550.99 
168.85 
18.94 
67.46 
268.37 
23.74 
3.64 
712.49 
229.02 
164.88 
318.59 
2010 
30.11 
79.35 
47.66 
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Table 5.1.4 TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIREMENT - SCENARIO 4 
MTOE 
1. Indigeneous Production 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
2. Net Imports 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Electricity 
3.Inland Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
- Natural Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Others 
4. Electr. Generation Input 
of which : 
- Solids 
-Oil 
-Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Hydro & Geotherm. 
- Others & Renew. 
5. Final Energy Consumption 
of which : 
- Industry 
- Transport 
- Tertiary-Domestic 
% 
Share of oil in inland 
energy consumption 
Share of coal and nuclear 
in electr. production 
Supply dependance on 
imports 
1980 
482.64 
197.45 
92.89 
129.17 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
591.95 
52.45 
495.84 
42.26 
1.39 
1023.29 
238.52 
551.32 
171.01 
44.01 
18.44 
306.60 
140.25 
71.06 
32.16 
44.01 
17.47 
1.66 
697.28 
249.51 
170.41 
277.36 
1980 
53.88 
60.10 
57.85 
1985 
592.48 
172.58 
150.85 
127.11 
123.62 
16.65 
1.67 
456.54 
62.14 
333.86 
59.35 
1.19 
1026.73 
238.33 
462.66 
184.71 
123.62 
17.42 
349.88 
140.32 
39.45 
28.18 
123.62 
16.65 
1.66 
676.48 
213.06 
181.53 
281.89 
1985 
45.06 
75.44 
44.47 
1987 
604.53 
168.94 
150.90 
129.00 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
489.08 
59.55 
356.53 
71.41 
1.59 
1062.25 
230.15 
476.58 
198.23 
136.25 
21.04 
367.30 
146.37 
36.34 
28.89 
136.25 
17.28 
2.16 
701.63 
213.84 
198.81 
288.97 
1987 
44.87 
76.95 
46.04 
1990 
617.99 
158.33 
147.10 
131.21 
160.56 
18.81 
1.98 
558.80 
76.83 
398.62 
81.42 
1.93 
1148.33 
235.16 
517.26 
212.63 
160.56 
22.72 
407.75 
155.93 
43.57 
27.01 
160.56 
18.81 
1.87 
752.77 
226.18 
222.42 
304.17 
1990 
45.04 
77.62 
48.66 
1995 
608.20 
143.36 
125.10 
136.78 
179.58 
20.21 
3.17 
610.41 
89.75 
429.93 
88.81 
1.93 
1190.01 
233.11 
526.42 
225.59 
179.58 
25.31 
456.63 
167.40 
53.08 
34.06 
179.58 
20.21 
2.30 
759.70 
220.70 
230.41 
308.59 
1995 
44.24 
75.99 
51.29 
2000 
587.29 
122.35 
111.81 
135.14 
191.57 
22.00 
4.42 
610.61 
112.59 
396.24 
100.14 
1.64 
1168.94 
234.94 
479.09 
235.28 
191.57 
28.06 
473.48 
176.93 
41.38 
38.76 
191.57 
22.00 
2.84 
729.47 
218.73 
218.12 
292.62 
2000 
40.98 
77.83 
52.24 
2010 
549.03 
101.94 
102.83 
119.36 
192.14 
23.42 
9.34 
455.64 
106.23 
219.56 
128.81 
1.04 
975.59 
208.17 
293.31 
248.17 
192.14 
33.80 
459.54 
169.36 
19.50 
51.11 
192.14 
23.42 
4.01 
574.59 
191.02 
124.04 
259.53 
2010 
30.06 
78.67 
46.76 
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MAIN ENERGY INDICATORS 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Intensities fall fastest in 
scenario 3 and scenario 4 
Total Primary Energy / GDP 
Toe/1000 EOI 86 
0.1 I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Γ I I I ! Ι Ι Ι Γ I I 1 I I 
1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 1996 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 2010 
Mitotic 
SCENARIO 3 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 4 
SCENARIO > 
Electricity Consumption / GDP 
Κ Wh/ECU 86 
I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 1996 2 0 0 0 2006 2010 
m u o r i t 
SCENARIO 3 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 4 
SCENARIO 2 
Per capita total consumption falls in 
scenario 3 and scenario 4 
Total Final Consumption / Capita 
Tos/Capits 
2.76-
2.6 
2.26-
2 
1.76-
1 s , , ι ι Ι ι ι ι I I I I I 1 I I 1 1 ! I 1 1 I 1 I I I 1 1 - f - i - i - i - H - i - r - r - r -
1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 1996 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 2010 
Historic 
SCENARIO 3 
8CENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 4 
SCENARIO 2 
Electricity Consumption / Capita 
9 
8 
7 
β 
6 
4 
3 
K W h / C « p i t s 
I I I I — Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι ι ι ι Ι ι—ι ι ι Ι ι ι I I I I 
1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 1996 
Historic 
SCENARIO 3 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 4 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 
SCENARIO 2 
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Table 5.1.5 MAIN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY INDICATORS 
TIME 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1995 
Sc. 1 
Sc. 2 
Sc. 3 
Sc. 4 
2000 
Sc. 1 
Sc. 2 
Sc. 3 
Sc. 4 
2005 
Sc. 1 
Sc. 2 
Sc. 3 
Sc. 4 
2010 
Sc. 1 
Sc. 2 
Sc. 3 
Sc. 4 
TFC/GDP 
Toe/Thousand ECU 
0.261 
0.257 
0.264 
0.274 
0.266 
0.267 
0.265 
0.268 
0.274 
0.280 
0.286 
0.281 
0.284 
0.259 
0.247 
0.241 
0.240 
0.236 
0.237 
0.240 
0.223 
0.213 
0.206 
0.202 
0.201 
0.203 
0.201 
0.200 
0.194 
0.191 
0.195 
0.179 
0.184 
0.184 
0.172 
0.161 
0.165 
0.154 
0.145 
0.145 
0.147 
0.122 
0.113 
0.129 
0.132 
0.096 
0.088 
TPER/GDP 
Toe/Thousand ECU 
0.343 
0.337 
0.345 
0.355 
0.349 
0.349 
0.344 
0.347 
0.353 
0.360 
0.369 
0.368 
0.369 
0.372 
0.359 
0.344 
0.350 
0.340 
0.341 
0.346 
0.330 
0.319 
0.308 
0.303 
0.304 
0.309 
0.305 
0.303 
0.296 
0.290 
0.298 
0.277 
0.283 
0.284 
0.269 
0.253 
0.257 
0.239 
0.231 
0.230 
0.233 
0.195 
0.185 
0.209 
0.211 
0.159 
0.148 
TFC/POP 
Toe/capita 
1.363 
1.397 
1.491 
1.601 
1.632 
1.691 
1.732 
1.796 
1.921 
2.062 
2.191 
2.214 
2.319 
2.226 
2.157 
2.071 
2.156 
2.163 
2.236 
2.324 
2.179 
2.078 
2.015 
2.003 
2.041 
2.101 
2.135 
2.174 
2.176 
2.216 
2.311 
2.410 
2.583 
2.583 
2.315 
2.459 
2.744 
2.559 
2.210 
2.512 
2.782 
2.346 
1.960 
2.565 
2.821 
2.151 
1.738 
TPER/POP 
Toe/capita 
1.792 
1.835 
1.948 
2.073 
2.140 
2.209 
2.246 
2.324 
2.468 
2.648 
2.825 
2.896 
3.018 
3.200 
3.132 
2.958 
3.147 
3.122 
3.214 
3.352 
3.224 
3.106 
3.013 
3.009 
3.085 
3.198 
3.233 
3.284 
3.311 
3.365 
3.525 
3.720 
3.970 
3.972 
3.610 
3.850 
4.277 
3.972 
3.520 
3.992 
4.395 
3.751 
3.210 
4.139 
4.517 
3.542 
2.928 
ELECT./GDP 
KWh/ECU 
0.312 
0.318 
0.330 
0.343 
0.349 
0.359 
0.367 
0.374 
0.383 
0.395 
0.401 
0.408 
0.418 
0.426 
0.426 
0.427 
0.438 
0.440 
0.447 
0.456 
0.454 
0.455 
0.451 
0.455 
0.463 
0.472 
0.472 
0.475 
0.471 
0.474 
0.470 
0.465 
0.476 
0.476 
0.461 
0.448 
0.456 
0.422 
0.419 
0.424 
0.430 
0.373 
0.362 
0.401 
0.406 
0.331 
0.313 
ELECT/POP 
MWh/capita 
1.632 
1.731 
1.863 
2.003 
2.138 
2.273 
2.396 
2.501 
2.684 
2.904 
3.071 
3.215 
3.415 
3.663 
3.717 
3.673 
3.938 
4.035 
4.206 
4.413 
4.436 
4.431 
4.418 
4.518 
4.693 
4.887 
4.998 
5.150 
5.279 
5.490 
5.563 
6.241 
6.674 
6.674 
6.186 
6.819 
7.590 
7.025 
6.383 
7.363 
8.128 
7.200 
6.290 
7.951 
8.704 
7.379 
6.199 
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5.2 Electricity Sector 
TWh 
ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
INCREASING TOTAL DEMAND 
(including transmission losses 
and energy sector consumption) 
T W h 
1987 1995 2000 2010 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 3 
□ SCENARIO 2 
ESI SCENARIO 4 
OF WHICH 
INDUSTRY RESIDENTIAL & TERTIARY 
TWh 
2010 1987 1996 2000 
G23 SCENARIO 1 
V///. SCENARIO 3 
C3 SCENARIO 2 
UHU SCENARIO 4 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 3 
CD SCENARIO 2 
!;;;;! SCENARIO 4 
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Table 5.2.1 EUROPE 12 : TOTAL ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
including transmission losses and energy sector consumption 
Twh 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
1569.4 
1569.4 
1569.4 
1569.4 
56.5 
29.9 
393.2 
28.5 
124.1 
328.4 
11.7 
209.8 
3.9 
69.8 
22.3 
291.4 
1990 
1719.8 
1719.8 
1719.8 
1719.8 
61.8 
30.9 
427.6 
32.7 
134.3 
358.5 
13.1 
236.7 
4.8 
75.6 
26.7 
317.3 
1995 
1942.8 
2068.1 
2068.1 
1924.6 
71.2 
74.2 
74.2 
70.4 
34.6 
36.1 
36.1 
34.3 
462.6 
490.2 
490.2 
459.0 
39.0 
44.3 
44.3 
37.9 
154.6 
183.4 
183.4 
151.2 
414.1 
434.5 
434.5 
413.2 
15.7 
18.0 
18.0 
15.3 
274.5 
288.3 
288.3 
270.6 
5.3 
5.6 
5.6 
5.6 
85.2 
90.6 
90.6 
84.3 
33.4 
36.8 
36.8 
32.6 
352.6 
366.1 
366.1 
350.1 
2000 
2139.5 
2358.8 
2184.1 
1998.0 
81.4 
88.9 
79.2 
77.0 
38.1 
41.2 
37.9 
35.1 
480.5 
523.5 
504.8 
448.5 
48.1 
60.5 
51.0 
44.0 
175.2 
217.0 
210.3 
162.5 
472.5 
515.7 
457.7 
445.3 
17.7 
21.2 
20.6 
16.8 
309.1 
330.9 
304.8 
285.6 
5.9 
6.5 
6.0 
5.4 
91.0 
98.6 
93.3 
84.4 
38.0 
44.9 
42.7 
35.4 
382.0 
410.0 
376.0 
358.0 
2005 
2314.9 
2526.9 
2238.5 
1974.2 
89.7 
96.7 
81.5 
73.5 
41.4 
44.9 
37.4 
34.7 
498.7 
536.0 
496.8 
439.4 
57.8 
70.2 
55.8 
43.2 
194.7 
236.5 
225.6 
148.3 
520.9 
564.1 
475.0 
448.4 
20.2 
23.8 
21.9 
16.7 
337.1 
359.8 
315.1 
294.9 
6.4 
6.9 
6.0 
5.3 
100.3 
106.8 
95.2 
85.6 
44.5 
50.1 
46.3 
36.0 
403.1 
431.0 
381.8 
348.3 
2010 
2507.4 
2709.3 
2296.2 
1952.5 
98.9 
105.2 
84.0 
70.1 
45.1 
49.0 
37.0 
34.2 
517.6 
548.8 
489.0 
430.5 
69.6 
81.6 
61.0 
42.4 
216.3 
257.8 
242.1 
135.3 
574.2 
617.1 
493.0 
451.6 
23.0 
26.8 
23.4 
16.6 
367.7 
391.3 
325.9 
304.5 
6.9 
7.2 
6.0 
5.2 
110.6 
115.6 
97.1 
86.7 
52.2 
55.8 
50.3 
36.6 
425.3 
453.1 
387.7 
338.9 
Source: SOEC and DG XVIIA2 estimates 
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STRUCTURE OF ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION 
BY FUEL 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Twh 
I NUCLEAR □ SOLIDS ■ OIL H H GAS (ΠΠΠΙ OTHERS 
100% -Æ-
75% 
5 0 % ­
25% 
m 
à m m m: 
1987 S1 S2 S 3 S4 S1 S2 S 3 S4 
I NUCLEAR CH SOLIDS ■ OIL β GAS IMI OTHERS 
191 
Technical Annex 
Table 5.2.2 ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY FUEL - SCENARIO 1 
TWH 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
603.6 
675.1 
739.3 
949.4 
37.5 
37.5 
37.5 
52.7 
159.4 
159.5 
157.4 
183.5 
48.2 
48.2 
62.9 
91.1 
293.7 
359.6 
413.1 
503.6 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
25.5 
61.3 
67.2 
65.3 
93.0 
Solids 
621.7 
685.0 
822.4 
1030.0 
16.2 
17.2 
25.5 
30.0 
28.0 
29.6 
31.9 
35.5 
198.6 
204.4 
235.0 
258.7 
22.3 
25.9 
34.3 
54.7 
49.0 
64.6 
65.6 
79.4 
27.1 
23.1 
32.7 
65.1 
7.8 
7.7 
10.0 
19.4 
39.0 
63.9 
89.5 
161.4 
21.6 
29.6 
45.2 
47.5 
7.0 
10.6 
10.6 
28.4 
205.0 
208.4 
242.1 
249.9 
Oil 
176.7 
224.9 
192.8 
85.5 
5.5 
7.7 
6.7 
3.1 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.4 
22.4 
36.1 
11.9 
4.9 
6.8 
4.2 
3.4 
2.5 
6.1 
7.6 
10.1 
3.5 
1.5 
6.6 
13.2 
0.7 
1.7 
4.2 
4.2 
1.1 
94.1 
90.7 
79.6 
50.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
3.0 
8.1 
8.5 
2.6 
6.2 
7.6 
8.1 
2.3 
28.2 
50.7 
45.7 
12.7 
Gas 
115.3 
141.5 
161.2 
211.8 
3.4 
6.0 
8.3 
9.0 
0.5 
2.2 
2.9 
6.4 
22.7 
33.4 
45.6 
36.0 
2.1 
1.8 
1.3 
3.8 
1.9 
3.4 
7.0 
3.1 
3.9 
7.3 
13.3 
3.1 
3.2 
2.9 
1.9 
32.4 
44.1 
52.7 
67.2 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
38.4 
33.4 
21.3 
27.9 
0.1 
0.1 
1.4 
0.1 
7.3 
10.7 
13.1 
41.2 
Renew. 
199.6 
213.3 
223.8 
240.2 
1.6 
1.6 
2.2 
2.9 
0.5 
1.0 
1.6 
1.3 
21.4 
21.9 
23.4 
27.5 
3.4 
5.8 
7.4 
10.0 
33.6 
38.7 
39.8 
43.2 
69.7 
70.5 
70.8 
71.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.3 
48.9 
52.4 
56.1 
59.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.9 
1.4 
10.8 
12.1 
12.9 
14.4 
7.5 
6.8 
7.0 
7.2 
TOTAL 
1716.9 
1939.7 
2139.5 
2516.9 
64.2 
70.1 
80.3 
97.7 
30.4 
34.1 
37.6 
44.6 
424.5 
455.4 
473.2 
510.6 
32.5 
37.9 
47.0 
68.5 
140.6 
161.0 
181.7 
224.2 
395.0 
463.7 
537.1 
653.9 
13.6 
16.2 
18.2 
23.7 
214.5 
251.2 
277.8 
338.3 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
67.1 
74.7 
79.0 
104.9 
24.1 
30.4 
33.1 
45.3 
309.3 
343.7 
373.2 
404.0 
DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.3 ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY FUEL - SCENARIO 2 
TWH 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
603.6 
703.9 
790.9 
1005.8 
37.5 
37.5 
37.5 
52.7 
159.4 
159.5 
157.4 
183.5 
48.2 
48.2 
62.9 
91.1 
293.7 
388.5 
464.7 
560.0 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
25.5 
61.3 
67.2 
65.3 
93.0 
Solids 
621.7 
741.6 
935.4 
1122.2 
16.2 
18.7 
29.5 
32.6 
28.0 
31.1 
34.5 
38.9 
198.6 
221.8 
272.7 
283.7 
22.3 
28.6 
42.1 
61.8 
49.0 
85.8 
98.4 
112.0 
27.1 
26.1 
35.7 
68.1 
7.8 
7.7 
12.4 
22.1 
39.0 
66.3 
91.9 
163.8 
21.6 
29.6 
45.2 
47.5 
7.0 
12.9 
14.8 
28.4 
205.0 
213.0 
258.1 
263.3 
Oil 
176.7 
237.1 
204.5 
97.4 
5.5 
7.7 
6.7 
3.1 
1.3 
1.4 
1.4 
1.6 
22.4 
36.9 
13.1 
6.1 
6.8 
5.0 
3.8 
3.0 
6.1 
11.9 
13.1 
6.5 
1.5 
6.6 
13.2 
0.7 
1.7 
5.8 
4.2 
1.2 
94.1 
93.7 
85.0 
55.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
3.0 
8.2 
8.6 
2.8 
6.2 
7.6 
8.2 
2.4 
28.2 
52.2 
47.3 
14.4 
Gas 
115.3 
167.7 
199.0 
244.6 
3.4 
7.5 
11.2 
11.7 
0.5 
2.2 
3.2 
3.2 
22.7 
37.8 
46.8 
39.6 
3.0 
4.5 
3.8 
3.8 
4.0 
6.4 
10.0 
3.1 
6.4 
12.2 
17.1 
3.1 
4.0 
4.0 
3.0 
32.4 
49.0 
60.9 
75.0 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
38.4 
37.5 
26.8 
31.3 
0.1 
0.1 
1.4 
0.1 
7.3 
15.7 
21.1 
49.2 
Renew. 
199.6 
211.3 
228.6 
248.8 
1.6 
1.6 
2.2 
2.9 
0.5 
1.0 
1.6 
4.8 
21.4 
21.9 
23.4 
27.5 
3.4 
6.4 
8.6 
11.4 
33.6 
38.7 
41.6 
45.0 
69.7 
70.5 
70.8 
71.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.3 
48.9 
52.4 
56.0 
59.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.9 
1.4 
10.8 
9.6 
14.8 
16.2 
7.5 
6.8 
7.0 
7.2 
TOTAL 
1716.9 
2061.6 
2358.4 
2718.7 
64.2 
73.1 
87.2 
103.1 
30.4 
35.7 
40.6 
48.4 
424.5 
477.9 
513.3 
540.5 
32.5 
42.9 
58.9 
80.1 
140.6 
188.7 
222.3 
264.5 
395.0 
498.1 
596.6 
717.1 
13.6 
18.5 
21.7 
27.5 
214.5 
261.5 
293.9 
353.5 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
67.1 
78.9 
84.6 
108.5 
24.1 
30.2 
39.1 
47.2 
309.3 
354.9 
398.9 
427.2 
DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.4 ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY FUEL - SCENARIO 3 
TWH 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
603.6 
703.9 
745.8 
1013.1 
37.5 
37.5 
37.5 
52.7 
159.4 
159.5 
157.4 
198.2 
48.2 
48.2 
62.9 
112.6 
293.7 
388.5 
419.6 
483.8 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
33.3 
61.3 
67.2 
65.3 
132.6 
Solids 
621.7 
741.6 
818.6 
698.0 
16.2 
18.7 
21.0 
12.7 
28.0 
31.1 
31.4 
25.3 
198.6 
221.8 
252.7 
203.4 
22.3 
28.6 
33.4 
37.7 
49.0 
85.8 
92.6 
79.9 
27.1 
26.1 
26.6 
19.9 
7.8 
7.7 
11.8 
16.4 
39.0 
66.3 
69.9 
95.5 
21.6 
29.6 
40.3 
25.9 
7.0 
12.9 
13.2 
19.6 
205.0 
213.0 
225.8 
161.9 
Oil 
176.7 
237.1 
188.5 
76.8 
5.5 
7.7 
6.7 
2.5 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
22.4 
36.9 
12.9 
3.5 
6.8 
5.0 
3.6 
2.8 
6.1 
11.9 
12.4 
2.9 
1.5 
6.6 
6.7 
0.7 
1.7 
5.8 
4.2 
1.1 
94.1 
93.7 
78.9 
44.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
3.0 
8.2 
8.4 
2.6 
6.2 
7.6 
8.1 
1.3 
28.2 
52.2 
45.3 
14.3 
Gas 
115.3 
167.7 
211.6 
299.4 
3.4 
7.5 
11.2 
13.7 
0.5 
2.2 
3.2 
7.3 
22.7 
37.8 
50.1 
51.6 
3.0 
4.7 
8.8 
3.8 
4.0 
6.4 
10.0 
3.1 
6.4 
10.3 
14.6 
3.1 
4.0 
4.0 
5.3 
32.4 
49.0 
65.1 
97.7 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
38.4 
37.5 
28.6 
28.2 
0.1 
0.1 
1.4 
6.5 
7.3 
15.7 
26.1 
55.1 
Renew. 
199.6 
214.3 
227.5 
245.4 
1.6 
1.6 
2.2 
2.9 
0.5 
1.0 
1.6 
2.9 
21.4 
21.9 
23.4 
27.5 
3.4 
6.4 
8.1 
10.6 
33.6 
38.7 
41.4 
44.7 
69.7 
70.5 
70.8 
71.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.3 
48.9 
52.4 
56.1 
59.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.9 
1.4 
10.8 
12.6 
14.4 
15.9 
7.5 
6.8 
7.0 
7.3 
TOTAL 
1716.9 
2064.6 
2191.9 
2332.8 
64.2 
73.1 
78.6 
84.5 
30.4 
35.7 
37.4 
36.5 
424.5 
477.9 
496.4 
484.2 
32.5 
42.9 
49.7 
59.9 
140.6 
188.7 
215.5 
250.0 
395.0 
498.1 
534.0 
590.1 
13.6 
18.5 
21.1 
24.1 
214.5 
261.5 
270.0 
296.4 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
67.1 
78.9 
81.3 
91.3 
24.1 
33.2 
37.2 
43.4 
309.3 
354.9 
369.5 
371.0 
DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.5 ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY FUEL - SCENARIO 4 
TWH 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
603.6 
675.1 
722.4 
724.4 
37.5 
37.5 
37.5 
35.0 
159.4 
159.5 
157.4 
144.1 
48.2 
48.2 
55.5 
55.9 
293.7 
359.6 
403.6 
425.4 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
8.5 
61.3 
67.2 
65.3 
55.5 
Solids 
621.7 
690.4 
716.3 
692.6 
16.2 
15.8 
20.8 
15.0 
28.0 
29.4 
28.8 
23.3 
198.6 
221.8 
202.3 
199.7 
22.3 
24.8 
28.9 
24.9 
49.0 
59.1 
62.0 
38.8 
27.1 
23.1 
22.4 
21.4 
7.8 
7.7 
8.4 
10.7 
39.0 
61.0 
70.0 
106.6 
21.6 
29.6 
41.1 
40.5 
7.0 
9.8 
9.6 
10.8 
205.0 
208.4 
222.2 
200.9 
Oil 
176.7 
216.2 
170.1 
79.1 
5.5 
6.9 
5.1 
2.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.1 
22.4 
34.0 
11.9 
4.9 
6.8 
4.2 
3.4 
2.5 
6.1 
7.6 
7.1 
3.1 
1.5 
5.7 
5.9 
0.7 
1.7 
3.9 
4.2 
1.1 
94.1 
89.8 
77.1 
45.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
3.0 
7.1 
6.1 
2.6 
6.2 
7.6 
6.5 
2.3 
28.2 
48.2 
41.6 
12.7 
Gas 
115.3 
145.0 
164.9 
227.5 
3.4 
7.3 
10.1 
13.4 
0.5 
2.2 
3.1 
6.4 
22.7 
33.4 
45.6 
46.1 
2.1 
3.1 
4.5 
3.8 
4.0 
4.5 
4.7 
3.1 
3.9 
7.3 
12.6 
3.1 
3.2 
3.7 
4.1 
32.4 
44.1 
51.2 
63.8 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
38.4 
33.4 
21.3 
27.9 
0.1 
0.1 
1.4 
2.2 
7.3 
10.7 
13.1 
41.2 
Renew. 
199.6 
194.5 
224.8 
240.3 
1.6 
1.7 
2.4 
3.1 
0.5 
1.1 
1.6 
2.9 
21.4 
3.0 
24.1 
28.7 
3.4 
5.8 
7.4 
9.5 
33.6 
38.7 
39.9 
40.7 
69.7 
70.5 
70.8 
71.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.3 
48.9 
52.4 
56.1 
59.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.9 
1.4 
10.8 
12.2 
13.0 
14.4 
7.5 
6.8 
7.0 
7.3 
TOTAL 
1716.9 
1921.2 
1998.5 
1963.8 
64.2 
69.2 
75.9 
68.9 
30.4 
33.9 
34.7 
33.8 
424.5 
451.8 
441.3 
423.4 
32.5 
36.8 
42.9 
41.3 
140.6 
157.6 
169.0 
143.2 
395.0 
462.9 
510.0 
531.3 
13.6 
15.8 
17.3 
17.3 
214.5 
247.3 
254.3 
275.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
67.1 
73.8 
72.4 
81.0 
24.1 
29.7 
30.5 
29.7 
309.3 
341.2 
349.2 
317.6 
DG XVII A2 estimates 
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ELECTRICITY CAPACITIES 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Net maximum capacity by fuel 
GW 
700 
600-
500-
400 
300-
200-
100 
0 » * 
1990 SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 
NUCLEAR EZl FOSSIL ■ RENEW. 
Fossil share declines in scenario 3 & 4 
100% 
75% 
50% 
25% 
/ Λ ¿ A / Λ ¿ A 
1990 SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 
NUCLEAR EZl FOSSIL WM RENEW. 
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Table 5.2.6 ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 1 
GW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
; 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
105.3 
111.8 
119.2 
150.1 
5.50 
5.50 
5.50 
7.73 
22.90 
22.90 
22.55 
26.55 
7.45 
7.45 
9.72 
14.08 
55.53 
62.53 
68.46 
81.32 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
0.51 
0.45 
0.45 
3.90 
12.14 
11.69 
11.21 
15.29 
Solids 
141.4 
143.7 
170.8 
220.5 
4.03 
3.93 
5.73 
7.76 
6.62 
7.19 
7.45 
8.92 
44.21 
42.20 
49.90 
60.22 
4.39 
4.48 
6.09 
10.09 
9.89 
9.71 
10.41 
13.54 
15.44 
14.77 
15.98 
18.34 
1.29 
1.29 
1.57 
3.17 
9.74 
13.56 
18.03 
31.77 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
4.36 
4.51 
6.16 
9.28 
1.27 
1.81 
1.81 
4.96 
40.05 
40.07 
47.47 
52.27 
Oil 
49.9 
50.0 
46.6 
31.8 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
0.28 
7.76 
7.61 
7.48 
5.69 
1.03 
0.69 
0.47 
5.22 
4.62 
2.72 
0.54 
5.13 
5.13 
5.13 
4.55 
0.58 
0.58 
0.98 
0.78 
15.67 
16.87 
16.22 
12.27 
1.70 
1.70 
1.23 
• 1.23 
12.15 
12.12 
11.71 
6.51 
Gas 
18.0 
19.9 
23.1 
40.0 
0.06 
0.36 
0.93 
1.21 
0.15 
0.31 
0.45 
0.72 
11.83 
11.21 
11.00 
11.09 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.60 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.30 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.17 
0.37 
1.57 
3.97 
10.78 
5.14 
5.13 
4.42 
5.30 
0.50 
1.50 
9.47 
Oil + gas 
23.2 
22.0 
20.3 
13.4 
1.90 
1.67 
1.61 
0.97 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
3.01 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.74 
0.74 
0.74 
0.49 
11.11 
11.11 
10.27 
7.40 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
7.08 
6.03 
4.80 
0.51 
0.47 
0.47 
Peak 
14.3 
17.0 
20.3 
23.0 
0.90 
1.15 
1.66 
1.29 
0.27 
0.28 
0.31 
0.36 
4.82 
5.04 
5.76 
6.50 
0.91 
0.99 
1.17 
1.24 
0.85 
0.79 
3.25 
7.30 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
2.54 
2.51 
2.42 
2.29 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.34 
0.34 
0.54 
0.73 
0.33 
0.33 
0.46 
0.13 
2.98 
5.24 
4.38 
2.86 
Hydro 
78.7 
83.5 
86.7 
89.5 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
6.78 
6.85 
6.93 
7.09 
2.53 
3.19 
3.87 
4.95 
15.94 
18.41 
19.98 
20.85 
24.42 
24.47 
24.47 
24.47 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
18.76 
19.32 
19.71 
19.71 
1.12 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
3.10 
4.09 
4.54 
5.20 
4.21 
4.22 
4.24 
4.27 
Renew. 
2.1 
2.8 
4.3 
6.2 
0.15 
0.43 
0.12 
0.31 
0.44 
0.64 
0.97 
1.04 
1.24 
1.55 
0.01 
0.13 
0.19 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.24 
0.72 
1.03 
0.65 
0.88 
1.15 
1.27 
0.15 
0.24 
0.44 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
TOTAL 
433.0 
450.7 
491.2 
574.6 
13.83 
14.05 
16.99 
20.72 
7.97 
8.90 
9.46 
11.18 
99.25 
96.84 
104.84 
118.69 
8.86 
9.81 
12.12 
16.92 
40.40 
42.09 
44.72 
52.62 
102.09 
108.42 
118.50 
137.55 
3.73 
3.73 
4.41 
5.48 
60.10 
67.10 
73.04 
86.76 
1.31 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
17.57 
16.71 
16.80 
20.66 
6.41 
7.94 
8.51 
11.99 
71.52 
73.85 
80.52 
90.67 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and OG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.7 ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 2 
GW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
105.3 
114.7 
127.9 
158.8 
5.50 
5.50 
5.50 
7.73 
22.90 
22.90 
22.55 
26.55 
7.45 
7.45 
9.72 
14.08 
55.53 
65.43 
77.16 
90.02 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
0.51 
0.45 
0.45 
3.90 
12.14 
11.69 
11.21 
15.29 
Solids 
141.4 
155.3 
197.7 
244.7 
4.03 
4.23 
6.63 
8.36 
6.62 
7.59 
8.15 
9.82 
44.21 
46.10 
58.60 
67.02 
4.39 
4.89 
7.52 
11.51 
9.89 
13.31 
19.11 
22.44 
15.44 
15.37 
16.78 
18.94 
1.29 
1.29 
2.17 
3.77 
9.74 
14.16 
18.63 
32.37 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
4.36 
4.51 
6.16 
9.28 
1.27 
2.41 
2.71 
5.14 
40.05 
41.27 
51.07 
55.87 
Oil 
49.9 
51.0 
47.2 
32.4 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
0.28 
7.76 
7.61 
7.48 
5.69 
1.03 
0.69 
0.47 
5.22 
4.62 
2.72 
0.54 
5.13 
5.13 
5.13 
4.55 
0.58 
0.98 
0.98 
0.78 
15.67 
16.87 
16.22 
12.27 
1.70 
1.70 
1.23 
1.23 
12.15 
12.72 
12.31 
7.11 
Gas 
18.0 
22.7 
28.3 
44.6 
0.06 
0.66 
1.53 
1.81 
0.15 
0.31 
0.52 
0.79 
11.83 
11.21 
11.00 
11.09 
0.49 
0.84 
0.84 
0.30 
0.60 
1.20 
0.23 
0.53 
0.86 
0.90 
0.26 
0.41 
0.53 
0.44 
0.37 
1.87 
4.27 
11.08 
5.14 
5.43 
5.02 
5.40 
1.50 
3.10 
11.07 
Oil + gas 
23.2 
24.1 
23.9 
17.0 
1.90 
1.67 
1.61 
0.97 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
3.01 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.74 
0.74 
0.74 
0.49 
11.11 
12.61 
13.27 
10.40 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
7.08 
6.63 
5.40 
1.11 
0.47 
0.47 
Peak 
14.3 
18.8 
23.2 
25.5 
0.90 
1.15 
1.72 
1.35 
0.27 
0.28 
0.31 
0.36 
4.82 
5.54 
6.46 
6.86 
0.91 
1.02 
1.26 
1.39 
0.85 
1.39 
4.08 
7.66 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.38 
2.54 
2.91 
3.37 
3.46 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.34 
0.48 
0.68 
0.86 
0.33 
0.38 
0.50 
0.17 
2.98 
5.24 
4.48 
2.98 
Hydro 
78.7 
84.0 
88.5 
91.3 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
6.78 
6.85 
6.93 
7.09 
2.53 
3.49 
4.47 
5.56 
15.94 
18.41 
20.58 
21.45 
24.42 
24.47 
24.47 
24.47 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
18.76 
19.32 
19.71 
19.71 
1.12 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
3.10 
4.24 
5.14 
5.80 
4.21 
4.22 
4.24 
4.27 
Renew. 
2.2 
2.9 
4.4 
6.4 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.43 
0.12 
0.31 
0.44 
0.64 
0.97 
1.04 
1.24 
1.55 
0.01 
0.15 
0.26 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.24 
0.72 
1.03 
0.65 
0.88 
1.15 
1.27 
0.15 
0.24 
0.44 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
TOTAL 
433.0 
473.3 
541.0 
620.7 
13.83 
14.65 
18.56 
21.98 
7.97 
9.30 
10.23 
12.14 
99.25 
101.24 
114.24 
125.85 
8.86 
10.73 
14.81 
19.82 
40.40 
45.99 
54.62 
62.72 
102.09 
112.82 
129.46 
147.81 
3.73 
4.28 
5.28 
6.37 
60.10 
69.90 
77.89 
91.83 
1.31 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
17.57 
17.75 
18.14 
21.49 
6.41 
8.74 
10.06 
12.82 
71.52 
76.65 
86.41 
96.60 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.8 ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 3 
GW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
105.3 
114.7 
120.5 
165.8 
5.50 
5.50 
5.50 
7.73 
22.90 
22.90 
22.55 
28.95 
7.45 
7.45 
9.72 
18.16 
55.53 
65.43 
69.76 
82.62 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
0.51 
0.45 
0.45 
5.20 
12.14 
11.69 
11.21 
21.89 
Solids 
141.4 
155.3 
175.7 
162.8 
4.03 
4.23 
4.83 
3.78 
6.62 
7.59 
7.33 
6.42 
44.21 
46.10 
54.72 
51.67 
4.39 
4.89 
6.14 
6.62 
9.89 
13.31 
18.25 
16.04 
15.44 
15.37 
14.05 
8.61 
1.29 
1.29 
2.02 
2.90 
9.74 
14.16 
15.18 
20.89 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
4.36 
4.51 
6.01 
5.48 
1.27 
2.41 
2.41 
3.47 
40.05 
41.27 
44.58 
36.78 
Oil 
49.9 
51.0 
47.2 
32.4 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
0.28 
7.76 
7.61 
7.48 
5.69 
1.03 
0.69 
0.47 
5.22 
4.62 
2.72 
0.54 
5.13 
5.13 
5.13 
4.55 
0.58 
0.98 
0.98 
0.78 
15.67 
16.87 
16.22 
12.27 
1.70 
1.70 
1.23 
1.23 
12.15 
12.72 
12.31 
7.11 
Gas 
18.0 
22.7 
27.3 
45.6 
0.06 
0.66 
1.53 
2.28 
0.15 
0.31 
0.52 
1.24 
11.83 
11.21 
11.00 
10.77 
0.49 
0.64 
1.24 
0.30 
0.60 
1.20 
0.23 
0.53 
1.13 
1.50 
0.26 
0.41 
0.52 
0.53 
0.37 
1.87 
3.97 
11.07 
5.14 
5.43 
4.87 
5.45 
0.60 
1.50 
2.50 
9.74 
Oil + gas 
23.2 
24.1 
21.8 
13.5 
1.90 
1.67 
1.61 
0.97 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
1.61 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.74 
0.74 
0.74 
0.49 
11.11 
12.61 
11.77 
8.90 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
7.08 
6.63 
4.80 
0.51 
0.47 
0.47 
Peak 
14.3 
18.8 
20.0 
18.2 
0.90 
1.15 
1.50 
1.13 
0.27 
0.28 
0.31 
0.33 
4.82 
5.54 
6.26 
6.40 
0.91 
1.02 
1.21 
1.24 
0.85 
1.39 
1.97 
2.55 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
2.54 
2.91 
2.82 
2.39 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.34 
0.48 
0.68 
0.81 
0.33 
0.38 
0.48 
0.15 
2.98 
5.24 
4.38 
2.86 
Hydro 
78.7 
84.0 
88.0 
90.8 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
6.78 
6.85 
6.93 
7.09 
2.53 
3.49 
4.17 
5.26 
15.94 
18.41 
20.58 
21.45 
24.42 
24.47 
24.47 
24.47 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
18.76 
19.32 
19.71 
19.71 
1.12 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
3.10 
4.24 
4.96 
5.62 
4.21 
4.22 
4.24 
4.27 
Renew. 
2.2 
2.9 
4.4 
6.3 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.43 
0.12 
0.31 
0.44 
0.64 
0.97 
1.04 
1.24 
1.55 
0.01 
0.15 
0.25 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.24 
0.72 
1.03 
0.65 
0.88 
1.15 
1.27 
0.15 
0.24 
0.44 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
TOTAL 
433.0 
473.3 
504.8 
535.6 
13.83 
14.65 
16.54 
17.65 
7.97 
9.30 
9.41 
9.16 
99.25 
101.24 
110.16 
112.12 
8.86 
10.73 
12.87 
14.81 
40.40 
45.99 
53.77 
59.01 
102.09 
112.82 
117.49 
125.57 
3.73 
4.28 
5.12 
5.57 
60.10 
69.90 
72.09 
77.77 
1.31 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
17.57 
17.75 
17.24 
18.39 
6.41 
8.74 
9.55 
11.55 
71.52 
76.65 
79.23 
82.65 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimatet 
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Table 5.2.9 ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 4 
GW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Nuclear 
105.3 
111.8 
116.7 
117.1 
5.50 
5.50 
5.50 
5.13 
22.90 
22.90 
22.55 
23.25 
7.45 
7.45 
8.58 
8.64 
55.53 
62.53 
67.16 
68.03 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
1.27 
0.51 
0.45 
0.45 
1.30 
12.14 
11.69 
11.21 
9.52 
Solids 
141.4 
142.3 
148.1 
149.3 
4.03 
3.79 
4.69 
3.57 
6.62 
7.12 
6.69 
5.98 
44.21 
42.20 
43.93 
47.91 
4.39 
4.48 
5.19 
4.38 
9.89 
9.71 
10.37 
6.64 
15.44 
14.77 
12.95 
10.72 
1.29 
1.29 
1.21 
1.38 
9.74 
12.63 
13.08 
17.85 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
4.36 
4.51 
5.63 
7.77 
1.27 
1.57 
1.57 
1.55 
40.05 
40.07 
42.66 
41.42 
Oil 
49.9 
50.0 
46.6 
31.8 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
0.28 
7.76 
7.61 
7.48 
5.69 
1.03 
0.69 
0.47 
5.22 
4.62 
2.72 
0.54 
5.13 
5.13 
5.13 
4.55 
0.58 
0.58 
0.98 
0.78 
15.67 
16.87 
16.22 
12.27 
1.70 
1.70 
1.23 
1.23 
12.15 
12.12 
11.71 
6.51 
Gas 
18.0 
19.9 
23.1 
40.8 
0.06 
0.36 
1.23 
2.10 
0.15 
0.31 
0.48 
1.05 
11.83 
11.21 
11.00 
11.09 
0.34 
0.51 
0.81 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.60 
0.26 
0.26 
0.41 
0.62 
0.37 
1.57 
3.37 
9.79 
5.14 
5.13 
4.42 
5.30 
0.50 
1.50 
9.47 
Oil + gas 
23.2 
22.0 
20.3 
11.2 
1.90 
1.67 
1.61 
0.97 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
0.81 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.74 
0.74 
0.74 
0.49 
11.11 
11.11 
10.27 
7.40 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
7.08 
6.03 
4.80 
0.51 
0.47 
0.47 
Peak 
14.3 
16.4 
16.7 
16.6 
0.90 
1.12 
1.48 
1.11 
0.27 
0.28 
0.31 
0.29 
4.82 
4.74 
4.76 
4.77 
0.91 
0.99 
1.17 
1.17 
0.85 
0.79 
1.35 
3.50 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
2.54 
2.51 
2.42 
2.29 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.34 
0.34 
0.36 
0.38 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.13 
2.98 
4.98 
4.12 
2.60 
Hydro 
78.7 
83.5 
86.7 
88.4 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
6.78 
6.85 
6.93 
7.09 
2.53 
3.19 
3.87 
4.68 
15.94 
18.41 
19.98 
19.98 
24.42 
24.47 
24.47 
24.47 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
18.76 
19.32 
19.71 
19.71 
1.12 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
3.10 
4.09 
4.54 
5.20 
4.21 
4.22 
4.24 
4.27 
Renew. 
2.2 
2.8 
4.3 
6.2 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.43 
0.12 
0.31 
0.44 
0.64 
0.97 
1.04 
1.24 
1.55 
0.01 
0.13 
0.19 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.24 
0.72 
1.03 
0.65 
0.88 
1.15 
1.27 
0.15 
0.24 
0.44 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
TOTAL 
433.0 
448.8 
462.6 
461.4 
13.83 
13.88 
16.08 
14.64 
7.97 
8.83 
8.73 
8.49 
99.25 
96.54 
97.87 
101.34 
8.86 
9.81 
11.40 
11.35 
40.40 
42.09 
43.55 
36.60 
102.09 
108.42 
112.26 
113.13 
3.73 
3.73 
4.21 
4.14 
60.10 
66.17 
67.48 
71.84 
1.31 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
17.57 
16.71 
16.09 
16.20 
6.41 
7.69 
8.14 
8.58 
71.52 
73.59 
75.45 
73.79 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.10 INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 1 
M W 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
Nuclear 
7800 
11710 
50580 
70090 
3900 
3900 
5900 
5900 
2270 
5445 
7715 
7800 
8285 
25660 
41745 
3900 
3900 
1155 
5775 
6930 
Solids 
2949 
31137 
70550 
104636 
105 
1820 
2392 
4317 
325 
11029 
11940 
23294 
138 
1686 
5497 
7321 
42 
8103 
8145 
2556 
9237 
11793 
64 
184 
248 
600 
710 
4250 
5560 
546 
3387 
3933 
1235 
13230 
25560 
40025 
Polyval. 
with 
Coal 
5458 
7315 
34103 
46876 
140 
140 
1303 
1583 
1129 
698 
4448 
6275 
7720 
7720 
40 
29 
18 
87 
475 
1208 
1683 
352 
1605 
1957 
4027 
5042 
17553 
26622 
122 
579 
126 
827 
122 
122 
Polyval. 
without 
Coal 
676 
1329 
2204 
4209 
76 
76 
2204 
2204 
600 
1329 
1929 
Combin. 
Cycle 
2300 
5632 
21187 
29119 
300 
600 
311 
1211 
150 
150 
300 
600 
1184 
2318 
3502 
600 
600 
300 
300 
1200 
2398 
6993 
10591 
150 
300 
2393 
2843 
500 
1000 
7972 
9472 
Peak 
Devices 
4301 
6426 
7753 
18480 
251 
510 
761 
18 
34 
72 
124 
1500 
2826 
1384 
5710 
72 
186 
412 
670 
2370 
4225 
6595 
357 
357 
950 
950 
373 
353 
726 
127 
127 
2460 
2460 
Hydro 
4958 
3226 
2960 
11144 
76 
76 
300 
452 
663 
679 
1086 
2428 
2470 
1571 
875 
4916 
50 
50 
100 
694 
385 
1079 
5 
5 
988 
444 
666 
2098 
17 
17 
33 
67 
Renew. 
219 
888 
1908 
3015 
150 
280 
430 
12 
15 
80 
107 
65 
196 
803 
1064 
115 
60 
120 
295 
2 
267 
125 
394 
25 
200 
500 
725 
TOTAL 
28661 
67663 
191245 
287569 
796 
3220 
8186 
12202 
1385 
897 
4900 
7182 
1966 
15311 
30365 
47642 
1028 
2640 
7133 
10801 
2470 
3883 
17227 
23580 
7850 
13736 
40630 
62216 
416 
2146 
2562 
5923 
8092 
25621 
39636 
5 
5 
1497 
3491 
11522 
16510 
1534 
571 
4175 
6280 
4212 
15402 
39340 
58954 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.11 INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 2 
MW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
UNITED KINGDOM 1 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
Nuclear 
10700 
17510 
50580 
78790 
3900 
3900 
5900 
5900 
2270 
5445 
7715 
10700 
14085 
25660 
50445 
3900 
3900 
1155 
5775 
6930 
Solids 
10161 
43251 
68932 
122344 
405 
2420 
2092 
4917 
2025 
14529 
11540 
28094 
550 
2700 
5497 
8747 
3000 
4242 
8305 
15547 
2556 
9237 
11793 
64 
184 
248 
600 
710 
4250 
5560 
1146 
300 
2267 
3713 
2435 
15730 
25560 
43725 
Polyval. 
with 
Coal 
9858 
10415 
32803 
53076 
140 
140 
1303 
1583 
1529 
998 
4648 
7175 
2200 
1300 
6220 
9720 
40 
29 
18 
87 
600 
900 
1500 
600 
475 
1208 
2283 
952 
1605 
2557 
4627 
5042 
17553 
27222 
122 
579 
126 
827 
122 
122 
Polyval. 
without 
Coal 
3376 
3099 
2204 
8679 
76 
70 
146 
200 
200 
2204 
2204 
1500 
1500 
3000 
1200 
1329 
2529 
600 
600 
Combin. 
Cycle 
5100 
7702 
20687 
33489 
600 
900 
311 
1811 
150 
150 
300 
600 
1184 
2318 
3502 
150 
150 
300 
300 
300 
600 
1200 
300 
300 
300 
900 
150 
120 
270 
1500 
2398 
6993 
10891 
450 
600 
1893 
2943 
1500 
1600 
7972 
11072 
Peak 
Devices 
6010 
7712 
7185 
20907 
251 
570 
821 
18 
34 
72 
124 
2000 
3026 
1044 
6070 
97 
241 
479 
817 
600 
2700 
3655 
6955 
380 
380 
400 
550 
1170 
2120 
137 
373 
353 
863 
47 
127 
174 
2460 
91 
32 
2583 
Hydro 
5411 
4581 
2960 
12952 
76 
76 
300 
452 
966 
982 
1086 
3034 
2470 
2171 
875 
5516 
50 
50 
100 
694 
385 
1079 
5 
5 
1138 
896 
666 
2700 
17 
17 
33 
67 
Renew. 
239 
938 
2048 
3225 
150 
280 ' 
430 
12 
15 
80 
107 
65 
196 
803 
1064 
135 
110 
260 
505 
2 
267 
125 
394 
25 
200 
500 
725 
TOTAL 
50855 
95208 
187399 
333462 
1396 
4180 
7886 
13462 
1785 
1267 
5100 
8152 
6366 
20311 
28125 
54802 
1938 
4412 
7340 
13690 
6370 
9883 
17429 
33682 
12250 
20166 
40060 
72476 
150 
1136 
2169 
3455 
8723 
10142 
25841 
44706 
5 
5 
2534 
3791 
11022 
17347 
2331 
1323 
3055 
6709 
7012 
18593 
39372 
64977 
Source*: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.2.12 INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 3 
MW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
Nuclear 
10700 
10110 
64960 
85770 
3900 
3900 
8300 
8300 
2270 
9525 
11795 
10700 
6685 
25660 
43045 
5200 
5200 
1155 
12375 
13530 
Solids 
10161 
24790 
23967 
58918 
405 
620 
622 
1647 
2025 
10751 
5075 
17851 
550 
1170 
1829 
3549 
3000 
3386 
1963 
8349 
1637 
1637 
64 
184 
248 
600 
560 
600 
1760 
1146 
597 
1743 
2435 
8239 
11460 
22134 
Polyval. 
with 
Coal 
9858 
5418 
14761 
30037 
140 
140 
280 
1529 
176 
2076 
3781 
2200 
1200 
900 
4300 
40 
29 
18 
87 
600 
600 
1200 
600 
300 
1208 
2108 
802 
788 
1590 
4627 
1592 
9523 
15742 
122 
579 
126 
827 
122 
122 
Polyval. 
without 
Coal 
3376 
799 
954 
5129 
76 
70 
150 
296 
804 
804 
1500 
1500 
1200 
729 
1929 
600 
600 
Combin. 
Cycle 
5100 
8393 
25768 
39261 
600 
900 
780 
2280 
150 
150 
600 
900 
1184 
2320 
3504 
150 
300 
750 
1200 
300 
600 
1500 
2400 
300 
600 
600 
1500 
150 
111 
200 
461 
1500 
2098 
7283 
10881 
450 
450 
2093 
2993 
900 
900 
1500 
2000 
8742 
12242 
Peak 
Devices 
6010 
4466 
3161 
13637 
251 
348 
599 
18 
34 
40 
92 
2000 
2826 
784 
5610 
97 
186 
380 
663 
600 
594 
655 
1849 
357 
357 
400 
650 
1050 
137 
373 
295 
805 
47 
105 
152 
2460 
2460 
Hydro 
5411 
3995 
2960 
12366 
76 
76 
300 
452 
966 
679 
1086 
2731 
2470 
2071 
875 
5416 
50 
50 
100 
694 
385 
1079 
5 
5 
1138 
713 
666 
2517 
17 
17 
33 
67 
Renew. 
239 
928 
2008 
3175 
150 
280 
430 
12 
15 
80 
107 
65 
196 
803 
1064 
135 
100 
220 
455 
2 
267 
125 
394 
25 
200 
500 
725 
TOTAL 
50855 
58899 
138539 
248293 
1396 
2158 
5582 
9136 
1785 
445 
2946 
5176 
6366 
16233 
18482 
41081 
1938 
2464 
4283 
8685 
6370 
8927 
14667 
29964 
12250 
8229 
29760 
50239 
150 
977 
1529 
2656 
8723 
4342 
17581 
30646 
5 
5 
2534 
2891 
8814 
14239 
2331 
818 
2285 
5434 
7012 
11411 
32610 
51033 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
204 
Energy in Europe 
Table 5.2.13 INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITIES - SCENARIO 4 
MW 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
UNITED KINGDOM 1990-1995 
1995-2000 
2000-2010 
1990-2010 
Nuclear 
7800 
9275 
17405 
34480 
1300 
1300 
1135 
1135 
2270 
7800 
6985 
13670 
28455 
1300 
1300 
1155 
1155 
Solids 
2703 
15962 
39140 
57805 
105 
920 
545 
1570 
325 
5061 
8740 
14126 
138 
786 
701 
1625 
1245 
1245 
4644 
4644 
64 
184 
248 
600 
710 
3266 
4576 
300 
300 
600 
1235 
8421 
19515 
29171 
Polyval. 
with 
Coal 
4319 
1235 
16988 
22542 
140 
140 
1062 
2266 
3328 
4575 
4575 
40 
29 
18 
87 
1208 
1208 
166 
166 
3095 · 
1017 
8587 
12699 
122 
49 
126 
297 
42 
42 
Polyval. 
without 
Coal 
676 
1359 
2035 
76 
30 
106 
600 
1329 
1929 
Combin. 
Cycle 
2300 
5659 
21983 
29942 
300 
900 
900 
2100 
150 
150 
600 
900 
1184 
2318 
3502 
175 
300 
475 
600 
600 
150 
300 
450 
1200 
1800 
6600 
9600 
150 
300 
2393 
2843 
500 
1000 
7972 
9472 
Peak 
Devices 
3711 
3462 
4830 
12003 
221 
360 
581 
18 
34 
52 
1200 
2126 
624 
3950 
72 
186 
350 
608 
570 
2225 
2795 
357 
357 
950 
950 
186 
197 
383 
127 
127 
2200 
2200 
Hydro 
4958 
3226 
1814 
9998 
76 
76 
300 
452 
663 
679 
815 
2157 
2470 
1571 
4041 
50 
50 
100 
694 
385 
1079 
5 
5 
988 
444 
666 
2098 
17 
17 
33 
67 
Ftenew. 
219 
888 
1908 
3015 
150 . 
280 
430 
12 
15 
80 
107 
65 
196 
803 
1064 
115 
60 
120 
295 
2 
267 
125 
394 
25 
200 
500 
725 
TOTAL 
26686 
41066 
104068 
171820 
626 
2470 
3025 
6121 
1318 
229 
2946 
4493 
1666 
8643 
17360 
27669 
1028 
1915 
2304 
5247 
2470 
2706 
2380 
7556 
7850 
7605 
22347 
37802 
214 
1007 
1221 
4991 
3469 
16262 
24722 
5 
5 
1497 
2774 
7782 
12053 
1288 
444 
1135 
2867 
3952 
10593 
27520 
42065 
Sources: UNÍPEDE and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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AVERAGE INVESTMENT COSTS 
ECU 87 / KW 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
NUCLEAR 1870 
SOLIDS 1140 
POLYVALENT WITH COAL 1140 
POLYVALENT WITHOUT COAL 900 
COMBINED CYCLE 600 
PEAK DEVICES 450 
HYDRAULIC 1800 
RENEWABLES 2000 
INVESTMENT EXPENSES 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
By Fuel and by Period 
billion ECU 87 
250 
200 
150 
100 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 
NUCLEAR FOSSIL RENEW. 
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5.3 Oil Sector 
OIL SUPPLY 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Longer term oil supply similar in all scenarios 
Crude Oil Production 
MTOE 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 ι r 
■. 
1987 
I 200Ó I 
SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 
π τ 1 20 0 I SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 
V7 
iüil u.K. OTHERS EC 
Import needs similar, except in scenario 3 and 4 by 2010 
Call On Imports 
MTOE 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 ^  
100 
0 
α 
L I 
Β 
1987 1995 2 0 0 0 2010 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 3 
Œ 3 SCENARIO 2 
EHUD SCENARIO 4 
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Table 5.3.1 CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
150.91 
4.65 
4.78 
1.24 
1.86 
3.75 
4.03 
4.71 
125.89 
1990 
147.10 
5.50 
3.80 
0.50 
2.03 
3.43 
6.01 
5.08 
120.75 
1995 
125.18 
132.33 
132.33 
125.11 
6.60 
6.60 
6.60 
6.60 
3.41 
3.41 
3.41 
3.34 
2.03 
2.13 
2.13 
2.03 
3.23 
3.28 
3.28 
3.23 
4.36 
4.36 
4.36 
4.36 
5.80 
5.80 
5.80 
5.80 
99.75 
106.75 
106.75 
99.75 
2000 
111.93 
126.44 
122.64 
111.82 
5.40 
6.00 
5.70 
5.40 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
2.91 
2.03 
2.24 
2.24 
2.03 
2.83 
2.88 
2.83 
2.83 
4.20 
4.20 
4.20 
4.20 
5.20 
5.45 
5.40 
5.20 
89.25 
102.65 
99.25 
89.25 
2005 
107.46 
122.66 
117.78 
107.17 
4.93 
5.77 
5.34 
4.93 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
2.73 
2.03 
2.35 
2.22 
2.03 
2.23 
2.73 
2.51 
2.22 
3.83 
4.02 
3.83 
3.83 
4.84 
5.19 
5.04 
4.84 
86.59 
99.58 
95.82 
86.59 
2010 
103.30 
119.02 
113.15 
102.84 
4.50 
5.55 
5.00 
4.50 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
2.57 
2.03 
2.47 
2.20 
2.03 
1.75 
2.58 
2.23 
1.74 
3.50 
3.85 
3.50 
3.50 
4.50 
4.95 
4.70 
4.50 
84.00 
96.60 
92.50 
84.00 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.3.2 NET OIL IMPORTS 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
356.5 
22.2 
6.0 
110.5 
11.5 
41.5 
84.9 
4.5 
88.0 
1.3 
26.5 
8.8 
-49.1 
1990 
398.6 
23.5 
5.6 
123.7 
13.5 
42.4 
87.0 
4.6 
89.8 
1.4 
28.9 
10.4 
-32.0 
1995 
446.4 
479.1 
479.1 
429.9 
25.5 
26.3 
26.3 
24.2 
4.8 
5.2 
5.2 
4.5 
126.9 
132.6 
132.6 
124.0 
14.8 
16.9 
16.9 
14.2 
46.2 
53.4 
53.4 
44.9 
88.1 
95.6 
95.6 
84.2 
5.6 
6.6 
6.6 
5.3 
91.3 
98.1 
98.1 
89.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
1.3 
29.6 
31.0 
31.0 
28.7 
11.7 
12.6 
12.6 
11.3 
0.6 
-0.6 
■0.6 
-1.9 
2000 
447.5 
498.7 
451.3 
396.2 
24.0 
25.2 
24.8 
21.2 
5.7 
5.9 
5.4 
4.9 
116.5 
125.5 
117.1 
105.3 
15.9 
20.2 
17.2 
14.7 
48.7 
60.8 
53.2 
44.3 
90.0 
104.0 
90.8 
78.4 
5.7 
6.7 
6.2 
5.3 
85.7 
95.6 
89.9 
79.2 
1.5 
1.7 
1.5 
1.3 
31.1 
33.4 
30.8 
28.8 
12.0 
13.7 
12.8 
10.9 
10.8 
6.2 
1.8 
2.1 
2005 
433.8 
477.4 
351.6 
297.4 
22.5 
23.5 
20.7 
17.7 
6.4 
6.3 
4.0 
3.8 
111.3 
118.6 
94.1 
84.1 
16.3 
20.7 
16.0 
12.6 
49.7 
60.7 
46.2 
33.4 
86.4 
100.5 
72.2 
60.8 
5.5 
6.4 
5.2 
3.9 
81.7 
90.9 
71.4 
62.6 
1.4 
1.5 
1.2 
1.1 
30.7 
32.2 
26.4 
25.0 
11.8 
13.2 
10.7 
8.9 
10.1 
2.9 
-16.4 
-16.4 
2010 
421.0 
459.0 
270.8 
219.6 
21.2 
21.9 
17.2 
14.8 
7.2 
6.8 
3.0 
2.9 
106.3 
112.2 
75.6 
67.2 
16.7 
21.2 
14.8 
10.8 
50.6 
60.6 
40.2 
25.1 
83.0 
97.2 
57.4 
47.2 
5.4 
6.1 
4.3 
3.0 
77.8 
86.6 
56.7 
49.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.0 
0.9 
30.4 
31.0 
22.6 
21.8 
11.6 
12.7 
9.0 
7.2 
9.3 
1.4 
-31.0 
-30.7 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.3.3 OIL DEMAND BY PRODUCT - SCENARIO 1 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Refinery 
Gas 
16.9 
17.3 
17.8 
17.8 
0.46 
0.65 
0.66 
0.55 
0.32 
0.33 
0.32 
0.32 
2.95 
2.08 
1.84 
1.78 
0.29 
0.39 
0.45 
0.47 
1.24 
1.04 
1.01 
1.04 
2.11 
2.19 
2.28 
1.98 
0.03 
0.06 
0.10 
0.20 
2.40 
2.53 
2.91 
3.09 
2.82 
2.93 
3.00 
3.27 
0.13 
0.18 
0.18 
0.30 
4.15 
4.92 
5.06 
4.84 
LP.G. 
18.2 
17.8 
17.0 
16.5 
0.59 
0.62 
0.52 
0.43 
0.13 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
2.53 
2.53 
2.50 
2.52 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.23 
2.55 
2.74 
2.68 
2.60 
2.93 
3.01 
2.98 
2.81 
0.12 
0.11 
0.11 
0.19 
2.85 
2.65 
2.49 
2.36 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
3.39 
3.38 
3.32 
3.34 
0.58 
0.54 
0.47 
0.47 
2.24 
1.91 
1.62 
1.44 
Naphta 
31.0 
31.6 
32.5 
34.3 
1.48 
1.56 
1.61 
1.73 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
8.11 
8.13 
8.24 
8.41 
0.14 
0.14 
0.15 
0.19 
4.00 
3.88 
3.96 
4.34 
5.84 
6.08 
6.29 
6.80 
2.90 
3.07 
3.15 
3.37 
2.43 
2.45 
2.58 
2.72 
1.18 
1.27 
1.38 
1.38 
4.92 
5.01 
5.11 
5.35 
Gasoline 
112.2 
119.0 
121.9 
120.9 
3.20 
3.63 
3.72 
3.60 
1.70 
1.79 
1.83 
2.00 
28.88 
28.38 
26.65 
23.39 
2.43 
3.33 
4.16 
4.54 
7.56 
8.84 
9.70 
10.20 
21.24 
21.79 
22.56 
23.42 
1.04 
1.08 
1.17 
1.38 
13.59 
14.41 
15.48 
15.39 
0.37 
0.37 
0.38 
0.36 
4.48 
4.78 
4.94 
4.58 
1.50 
1.88 
1.93 
1.95 
26.18 
28.71 
29.33 
30.13 
Kerosene 
26.3 
27.2 
28.0 
29.8 
0.68 
0.70 
0.71 
0.71 
0.80 
0.83 
0.85 
0.98 
4.04 
4.20 
4.80 
5.48 
1.30 
1.40 
1.51 
1.43 
2.61 
2.80 
2.86 
2.74 
3.11 
3.10 
2.98 
3.25 
0.45 
0.45 
0.47 
0.48 
2.52 
2.65 
2.49 
2.55 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.16 
1.73 
1.81 
1.86 
1.98 
0.62 
0.67 
0.70 
0.80 
8.27 
8.45 
8.64 
9.22 
Gasoil & 
Diesel 
188.1 
191.8 
186.9 
179.5 
8.97 
9.21 
8.79 
7.61 
5.31 
5.36 
5.02 
5.04 
55.96 
55.74 
52.25 
47.00 
3.89 
4.02 
4.15 
4.48 
13.06 
14.49 
15.97 
18.54 
37.64 
36.19 
35.43 
31.46 
1.36 
1.45 
1.53 
1.69 
30.52 
31.63 
29.27 
29.14 
0.61 
0.59 
0.61 
0.55 
6.26 
5.95 
6.10 
5.96 
2.24 
2.47 
2.50 
2.79 
22.25 
24.72 
25.23 
25.23 
Residual 
Fuel oil 
90.5 
103.5 
91.5 
61.4 
4.00 
4.76 
3.53 
2.11 
1.76 
1.81 
1.75 
1.98 
13.93 
18.11 
12.08 
10.64 
3.68 
3.07 
2.78 
2.45 
7.43 
8.33 
8.37 
6.67 
8.70 
10.21 
11.54 
6.37 
1.32 
2.11 
1.99 
1.04 
31.16 
29.01 
24.24 
15.39 
0.26 
0.27 
0.28 
0.27 
2.27 
3.54 
3.77 
2.16 
3.14 
3.61 
3.80 
2.39 
12.82 
18.62 
17.41 
9.91 
Others 
30.0 
30.8 
31.1 
31.0 
1.01 
1.37 
1.39 
1.38 
0.56 
0.62 
0.67 
0.75 
8.03 
8.17 
8.11 
7.13 
0.48 
0.60 
0.74 
0.98 
2.46 
2.55 
2.70 
3.04 
5.32 
5.09 
4.95 
4.91 
0.17 
0.19 
0.21 
0.25 
5.05 
4.99 
5.03 
5.16 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
1.62 
1.60 
1.71 
1.95 
0.47 
0.54 
0.56 
0.80 
4.82 
4.99 
4.95 
4.55 
TOTAL 
513.1 
539.0 
526.6 
491.2 
20.39 
22.50 
20.93 
18.12 
10.62 
10.86 
10.55 
11.19 
124.43 
127.34 
116.47 
106.35 
12.43 
13.17 
14.16 
14.77 
40.91 
44.67 
47.25 
49.17 
86.89 
87.66 
89.01 
81.00 
4.49 
5.45 
5.58 
5.23 
90.99 
90.94 
85.06 
76.45 
1.42 
1.43 
1.48 
1.41 
25.00 
26.44 
27.28 
25.96 
9.86 
11.16 
11.52 
10.88 
85.65 
97.33 
97.35 
90.67 
Sources: SOEC and DG XV/II A2 estimates 
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Table 5.3.4 OIL DEMAND BY PRODUCT - SCENARIO 2 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Refinery 
Gas 
16.9 
19.8 
21.8 
21.6 
0.46 
0.82 
0.88 
0.67 
0.32 
0.33 
0.33 
0.32 
2.95 
3.69 
3.39 
3.27 
0.29 
0.35 
0.36 
0.37 
1.24 
1.53 
1.99 
1.84 
2.11 
2.40 
2.73 
2.53 
0.03 
0.10 
0.10 
0.22 
2.40 
2.81 
3.28 
3.64 
2.82 
2.92 
3.02 
3.39 
0.13 
0.20 
0.23 
0.31 
4.15 
4.63 
5.47 
4.99 
LP.G. 
18.2 
18.8 
18.7 
17.5 
0.59 
0.64 
0.54 
0.44 
0.13 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
2.53 
2.37 
2.34 
2.23 
0.22 
0.24 
0.24 
0.24 
2.55 
2.99 
3.29 
3.01 
2.93 
3.07 
3.04 
3.08 
0.12 
0.12 
0.13 
0.20 
2.85 
2.94 
2.85 
2.77 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
3.39 
3.55 
3.58 
3.42 
0.58 
0.58 
0.52 
0.48 
2.24 
2.21 
2.10 
1.54 
Naphta 
31.0 
33.0 
34.5 
34.9 
1.48 
1.63 
1.71 
1.75 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
8.11 
8.48 
8.76 
8.50 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.19 
4.00 
4.11 
4.21 
4.39 
5.84 
6.29 
6.63 
7.01 
2.90 
3.23 
3.37 
3.43 
2.43 
2.55 
2.74 
2.75 
1.18 
1.32 
1.46 
1.39 
4.92 
5.25 
5.46 
5.43 
Gasoline 
112.2 
131.4 
147.2 
147.9 
3.20 
3.85 
4.28 
3.91 
1.70 
1.91 
2.12 
2.40 
28.88 
30.54 
30.91 
28.96 
2.43 
4.06 
6.00 
6.64 
7.56 
10.49 
13.73 
14.56 
21.24 
25.02 
28.99 
29.21 
1.04 
1.24 
1.51 
1.60 
13.59 
15.77 
18.06 
18.53 
0.37 
0.40 
0.45 
0.41 
4.48 
5.11 
5.74 
5.19 
1.50 
2.29 
2.46 
2.63 
26.18 
30.68 
32.99 
33.90 
Kerosene 
26.3 
30.1 
33.5 
33.1 
0.68 
0.74 
0.81 
0.78 
0.80 
0.88 
0.98 
1.10 
4.04 
4.52 
5.56 
5.21 
1.30 
1.70 
2.17 
2.38 
2.61 
3.45 
3.99 
4.24 
3.11 
3.56 
3.83 
3.86 
0.45 
0.51 
0.60 
0.58 
2.52 
2.88 
2.89 
2.73 
0.12 
0.14 
0.17 
0.15 
1.73 
1.93 
2.14 
1.92 
0.62 
0.77 
0.87 
0.93 
8.27 
9.03 
9.51 
9.17 
Gasoil & 
Diesel 
188.1 
206.4 
208.6 
194.5 
8.97 
9.62 
9.26 
8.00 
5.31 
5.52 
5.27 
5.17 
55.96 
58.15 
54.34 
46.76 
3.89 
4.71 
5.35 
5.33 
13.06 
17.76 
21.19 
21.82 
37.64 
38.92 
40.60 
38.05 
1.36 
1.67 
1.88 
1.92 
30.52 
33.83 
32.77 
31.90 
0.61 
0.64 
0.70 
0.60 
6.26 
6.32 
6.86 
6.27 
2.24 
2.65 
2.95 
3.00 
22.25 
26.65 
27.47 
25.69 
Residual 
Fuel oil 
90.5 
107.7 
95.4 
65.1 
4.00 
4.64 
3.36 
2.08 
1.76 
1.84 
1.81 
1.94 
13.93 
16.77 
11.96 
9.82 
3.68 
3.39 
3.33 
3.15 
7.43 
9.04 
8.23 
6.64 
8.70 
9.90 
10.93 
6.79 
1.32 
2.65 
2.17 
1.16 
31.16 
31.34 
26.59 
17.45 
0.26 
0.29 
0.30 
0.27 
2.27 
3.45 
3.77 
2.39 
3.14 
3.81 
4.14 
2.77 
12.82 
20.59 
18.80 
10.66 
Others 
30.0 
31.1 
31.6 
29.5 
1.01 
1.32 
1.35 
1.18 
0.56 
0.65 
0.71 
0.76 
8.03 
8.44 
8.26 
7.44 
0.48 
0.64 
0.80 
0.93 
2.46 
2.55 
2.64 
2.94 
5.32 
5.95 
6.18 
5.28 
0.17 
0.20 
0.22 
0.25 
5.05 
4.98 
5.04 
5.11 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
1.62 
1.97 
2.00 
1.61 
0.47 
0.49 
0.51 
0.51 
4.82 
3.90 
3.84 
3.47 
TOTAL 
513.1 
578.4 
591.4 
544.1 
20.39 
23.26 
' 22.19 
18.81 
10.62 
11.25 
11.33 
11.80 
124.43 
132.96 
125.52 
112.19 
12.43 
15.24 
18.41 
19.23 
40.91 
51.92 
59.27 
59.44 
86.89 
95.11 
102.93 
95.81 
4.49 
6.49 
6.61 
5.93 
90.99 
97.78 
94.85 
85.56 
1.42 
1.54 
1.69 
1.50 
25.00 
27.80 
29.85 
26.94 
9.86 
12.11 
13.14 
12.02 
85.65 
102.94 
105.64 
94.85 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.3.5 OIL DEMAND BY PRODUCT - SCENARIO 3 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Refinery 
Gas 
16.9 
19.8 
20.4 
15.5 
0.46 
0.82 
0.81 
0.54 
0.32 
0.33 
0.30 
0.29 
2.95 
3.69 
3.21 
2.33 
0.29 
0.35 
0.33 
0.30 
1.24 
1.53 
1.77 
1.24 
2.11 
2.40 
2.52 
1.48 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.18 
2.40 
2.81 
3.13 
2.35 
2.82 
2.92 
2.95 
2.96 
0.13 
0.20 
0.23 
0.24 
4.15 
4.63 
4.99 
3.60 
LP.G. 
18.2 
18.8 
18.0 
13.5 
0.59 
0.64 
0.56 
0.38 
0.13 
0.09 
0.08 
0.06 
2.53 
2.37 
2.32 
1.73 
0.22 
0.24 
0.25 
0.20 
2.55 
2.99 
2.98 
2.69 
2.93 
3.07 
3.06 
2.29 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.15 
2.85 
2.94 
2.82 
1.99 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
3.39 
3.55 
3.25 
2.33 
0.58 
0.58 
0.53 
0.45 
2.24 
2.21 
1.97 
1.19 
Naphta 
31.0 
33.0 
31.4 
24.3 
1.48 
1.63 
1.56 
1.21 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
8.11 
8.48 
7.96 
5.90 
0.14 
0.15 
0.14 
0.13 
4.00 
4.11 
3.83 
3.04 
5.84 
6.29 
6.10 
4.92 
2.90 
3.23 
3.09 
2.42 
2.43 
2.55 
2.49 
1.91 
1.18 
1.32 
1.22 
0.97 
4.92 
5.25 
4.97 
3.77 
Gasoline 
112.2 
131.4 
126.2 
78.1 
3.20 
3.85 
3.72 
2.18 
1.70 
1.91 
1.81 
1.16 
28.88 
30.54 
26.57 
15.43 
2.43 
4.06 
4.47 
4.01 
7.56 
10.49 
11.28 
8.40 
21.24 
25.02 
23.91 
14.30 
1.04 
1.24 
1.28 
1.01 
13.59 
15.77 
15.97 
9.31 
0.37 
0.40 
0.36 
0.24 
4.48 
5.11 
5.01 
3.04 
1.50 
2.29 
2.22 
1.67 
26.18 
30.68 
29.61 
17.36 
Kerosene 
26.3 
30.1 
29.2 
18.5 
0.68 
0.74 
0.72 
0.46 
0.80 
0.88 
0.84 
0.53 
4.04 
4.52 
4.79 
2.79 
1.30 
1.70 
1.62 
1.44 
2.61 
3.45 
3.28 
2.44 
3.11 
3.56 
3.16 
1.89 
0.45 
0.51 
0.51 
0.38 
2.52 
2.88 
2.60 
1.37 
0.12 
0.14 
0.13 
0.09 
1.73 
1.93 
1.88 
1.16 
0.62 
0.77 
0.78 
0.59 
8.27 
9.03 
8.84 
5.32 
Gasoil & 
Diesel 
188.1 
206.4 
195.4 
130.3 
8.97 
9.62 
9.23 
6.48 
5.31 
5.52 
5.10 
3.50 
55.96 
58.15 
53.10 
35.57 
3.89 
4.71 
4.66 
3.66 
13.06 
17.76 
17.96 
14.22 
37.64 
38.92 
37.06 
22.73 
1.36 
1.67 
1.68 
1.38 
30.52 
33.83 
31.22 
19.73 
0.61 
0.64 
0.61 
0.42 
6.26 
6.32 
6.11 
4.04 
2.24 
2.65 
2.75 
2.08 
22.25 
26.65 
25.96 
16.50 
Residual 
Fuel oil 
90.5 
107.7 
91.7 
50.8 
4.00 
4.64 
3.78 
2.09 
1.76 
1.84 
1.77 
1.44 
13.93 
16.77 
12.11 
6.89 
3.68 
3.39 
3.21 
2.66 
7.43 
9.04 
8.38 
4.94 
8.70 
9.90 
8.41 
4.48 
1.32 
2.65 
2.16 
0.97 
31.16 
31.34 
25.89 
14.90 
0.26 
0.29 
0.28 
0.21 
2.27 
3.45 
3.56 
1.75 
3.14 
3.81 
4.06 
2.08 
12.82 
20.59 
18.06 
8.34 
Others 
30.0 
31.1 
28.3 
20.7 
1.01 
1.32 
1.33 
0.83 
0.56 
0.65 
0.65 
0.53 
8.03 
8.44 
7.09 
5.04 
0.48 
0.64 
0.55 
0.50 
2.46 
2.55 
2.48 
2.13 
5.32 
5.95 
5.58 
3.99 
0.17 
0.20 
0.20 
0.18 
5.05 
4.98 
4.48 
3.44 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1.62 
1.97 
1.87 
1.17 
0.47 
0.49 
0.46 
0.37 
4.82 
3.90 
3.52 
2.51 
TOTAL 
513.1 
578.4 
540.5 
351.6 
20.39 
23.26 
21.71 
14.17 
10.62 
11.25 
10.58 
7.54 
124.43 
132.96 
117.15 
75.68 
12.43 
15.24 
15.23 
12.90 
40.91 
51.92 
51.96 
39.10 
86.89 
95.11 
89.80 
56.08 
4.49 
6.49 
6.08 
4.25 
90.99 
97.78 
89.20 
55.51 
1.42 
1.54 
1.45 
1.01 
25.00 
27.80 
27.12 
18.36 
9.86 
12.11 
12.25 
8.45 
85.65 
102.94 
97.92 
58.59 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.3.6 OIL DEMAND BY PRODUCT - SCENARIO 4 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Refinery 
Gas 
16.9 
16.3 
16.5 
12.0 
0.46 
0.62 
0.59 
0.49 
0.32 
0.32 
0.31 
0.26 
2.95 
2.03 
1.80 
1.41 
0.29 
0.35 
0.36 
0.26 
1.24 
1.04 
1.05 
0.76 
2.11 
2.15 
2.11 
1.39 
0.03 
0.06 
0.08 
0.07 
2.40 
2.48 
2.63 
1.85 
2.82 
2.73 
2.63 
2.37 
0.13 
0.18 
0.17 
0.11 
4.15 
4.36 
4.77 
3.07 
LP.G. 
18.2 
17.4 
16.0 
10.9 
0.59 
0.58 
0.45 
0.30 
0.13 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
2.53 
2.45 
2.27 
1.73 
0.22 
0.21 
0.20 
0.13 
2.55 
2.68 
2.48 
1.44 
2.93 
2.87 
2.66 
1.88 
0.12 
0.10 
0.10 
0.11 
2.85 
2.56 
2.24 
1.50 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
3.39 
3.30 
3.15 
2.23 
0.58 
0.52 
0.44 
0.33 
2.24 
2.04 
1.86 
1.20 
Naphta 
31.0 
31.6 
32.3 
23.4 
1.48 
1.56 
1.61 
1.24 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
8.11 
8.13 
8.23 
6.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.15 
0.11 
4.00 
3.95 
3.96 
2.23 
5.84 
6.00 
6.15 
4.83 
2.90 
3.06 
3.13 
2.41 
2.43 
2.45 
2.58 
1.96 
1.18 
1.27 
1.38 
0.87 
4.92 
5.01 
5.11 
3.56 
Gasoline 
112.2 
114.9 
107.8 
58.7 
3.20 
3.46 
3.21 
1.86 
1.70 
1.75 
1.65 
1.02 
28.88 
27.84 
23.97 
12.94 
2.43 
3.13 
3.65 
2.63 
7.56 
8.20 
8.74 
4.72 
21.24 
20.82 
19.16 
10.35 
1.04 
1.05 
1.05 
0.59 
13.59 
14.02 
13.70 
7.12 
0.37 
0.35 
0.33 
0.21 
4.48 
4.66 
4.47 
2.55 
1.50 
1.92 
1.76 
1.12 
26.18 
27.72 
26.13 
13.59 
Kerosene 
26.3 
26.4 
24.8 
13.7 
0.68 
0.66 
0.61 
0.36 
0.80 
0.81 
0.77 
0.47 
4.04 
4.12 
4.32 
2.34 
1.30 
1.32 
1.33 
0.95 
2.61 
2.70 
2.54 
1.37 
3.11 
2.96 
2.53 
1.37 
0.45 
0.44 
0.42 
0.22 
2.52 
2.58 
2.21 
1.05 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.08 
1.73 
1.75 
1.67 
0.97 
0.62 
0.65 
0.62 
0.40 
8.27 
8.25 
7.65 
4.12 
Gasoil & 
Diesel 
188.1 
186.4 
164.2 
99.7 
8.97 
8.50 
7.25 
4.79 
5.31 
5.18 
4.57 
3.09 
55.96 
54.78 
45.14 
29.21 
3.89 
3.85 
3.77 
2.43 
13.06 
14.36 
14.19 
7.70 
37.64 
34.45 
30.76 
17.44 
1.36 
1.38 
1.36 
0.91 
30.52 
30.93 
26.52 
15.89 
0.61 
0.54 
0.50 
0.33 
6.26 
5.73 
5.52 
3.50 
2.24 
2.28 
2.20 
1.43 
22.25 
24.45 
22.46 
13.01 
Residual 
Fuel oil 
90.5 
99.6 
84.3 
51.5 
4.00 
4.40 
3.15 
1.56 
1.76 
1.75 
1.64 
1.42 
13.93 
17.16 
11.87 
8.10 
3.68 
2.98 
2.68 
1.82 
7.43 
8.15 
7.43 
4.42 
8.70 
9.55 
9.37 
4.78 
1.32 
1.95 
1.93 
0.80 
31.16 
28.45 
23.42 
14.78 
0.26 
0.25 
0.26 
0.19 
2.27 
3.39 
3.39 
2.48 
3.14 
3.48 
3.24 
1.85 
12.82 
18.05 
15.92 
9.26 
Others 
30.0 
30.0 
29.8 
21.1 
1.01 
1.37 
1.34 
1.11 
0.56 
0.62 
0.67 
0.54 
8.03 
7.78 
7.58 
4.98 
0.48 
0.56 
0.69 
0.66 
2.46 
2.33 
2.47 
1.46 
5.32 
5.06 
4.87 
3.55 
0.17 
0.19 
0.21 
0.15 
5.05 
4.93 
4.93 
3.79 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1.62 
1.59 
1.66 
1.35 
0.47 
0.54 
0.56 
0.63 
4.82 
4.99 
4.75 
2.83 
TOTAL 
513.1 
522.6 
475.7 
291.0 
20.39 
21.15 
18.21 
11.71 
10.62 
10.54 
9.71 
6.88 
124.43 
124.29 
105.18 
66.85 
12.43 
12.54 
12.83 
8.99 
40.91 
43.41 
42.86 
24.10 
86.89 
83.86 
77.61 
45.59 
4.49 
5.17 
5.15 
2.85 
90.99 
89.01 
78.78 
48.39 
1.42 
1.33 
1.28 
0.86 
25.00 
25.60 
25.07 
17.41 
9.86 
10.84 
10.37 
6.74 
85.65 
94.87 
88.65 
50.64 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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GLOBAL REFINERY PROSPECTS 
Total Refinery Inputs 
MTOE 
1995 
2000 
2010 
Scenario 1 
552 
550 
519 
Scenario 2 
591 
613 
568 
Scenario 3 
591 
564 
389 
Scenario 4 
540 
505 
335 
SCENARIO 1 
»Until 1995: 
*1995-2000: 
»2000-2010 : 
SCENARIO 2 
*1990-2010: 
SCENARIO 3 
»Until 1995 : 
*1995-2000 : 
*2000-2010 : 
SCENARIO 4 
»Until 1995 : 
»1995-2000 : 
»2000-2010: 
ALL SCENARIOS: 
Saturation of existing équipement + some needs of 
conversion units. 
Required investment both in distillation and conversion 
units including some deep conversion. 
Uncreased requirement in conversion units towards 
deep conversion. 
Amplification of investment, both for distillation and 
conversion units. More oriented to deep conversion. 
Similar to scenario 2. 
Stabilisation of équipement. 
Required restucturation. 
Similar to scenario 1. 
Overcapacities emerging. 
In depth restructuration required. 
Increasing demand In upgrading units to assure 
lead free gasoline production. 
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5.4 Coal Sector 
SOLID FUELS DEMAND 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
150 Mtoe range in demand by 2010 
Total Demand 
MTOE 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 -\ 
150 
100 i 
50 
"f 
\m ï: 
1987 1995 2000 2010 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 3 
C D SCENARIO 2 
ΕΠΠΕ SCENARIO 4 
The power generation dominates 
Demand by Sector 
MTOE 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 ¡dì 
mm^ 
bzzzi' 
m \¿M I ï w 
1987 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 
POWER GENERATION 
Π3 INDUSTRY 
C D ENERGY BRANCH 
Β DOMEST.-TERT. 
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COAL SUPPLY 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Hard coa l p roduc t ion fa l l s , l ign i te remains c o n s t a n t . 
Production 
1987 2010 
COAL 
81%, 
COAL 
69%, 
LIGNITE 
18% 
168.8 MTOE 
LIGNITE 
30% 
105.3 MTOE 
W i d e range on coa l impor ts by 2 0 1 0 . 
Net Imports 
2 0 0 -
1 5 0 -
5 0 -
Mtoe 
Sc 2 M 
Sc 1 ^ - ^ 
I I I I 
S ^ - .Sc 3.1 
<s¡-^ ^ . Se 4 .-
Se 3.4 - - . 
I I I I I I I I I I [ ] 
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Table 5.4.1 SOLIDS FUELS PRODUCTION 
Total Production By Products For All Scenarios (*) 
COAL MTOE 
BELGIUM 
GERMANY 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
EUROPE 12 
1987 
2.97 
54.36 
9.21 
8.83 
0.10 
60.86 
136.33 
1990 
2.10 
49.98 
11.13 
6.50 
0.10 
55.00 
124.81 
1995 
43.40 
10.13 
5.25 
0.10 
50.75 
109.63 
2000 
35.00 
8.13 
4.00 
0.10 
44.00 
91.23 
2010 
28.00 
7.13 
0.04 
0.10 
37.00 
72.27 
PEAT MTOE 
IRELAND 
1987 
1.68 
1990 
1.37 
1995 
1.35 
2000 
1.35 
2010 
1.20 
COAL + PEAT MTOE 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
GREECE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLAND 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
EUROPE 12 
1987 
2.97 
75.40 
12.04 
9.64 
5.97 
1.68 
0.28 
0.10 
60.86 
168.94 
1990 
2.10 
72.36 
13.60 
7.00 
6.50 
1.37 
0.30 
0.10 
55.00 
158.33 
1995 
65.35 
12.60 
5.65 
7.25 
1.35 
0.31 
0.10 
50.75 
143.36 
2000 
54.00 
10.60 
4.30 
8.0C 
1.35 
0.10 
44.00 
122.35 
2010 
47.00 
9.60 
0.19 
10.25 
1.20 
0.10 
37.00 
105.34 
* Same levels of production for each scenario, except the production of lignite in Greece; 
which is link to electricity production (see below). 
Table 5.4.2 LIGNITE PRODUCTION IN GREECE 
LIGNITE MTOE 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
5.97 
5.97 
5.97 
5.97 
1990 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
1995 
7.25 
7.25 
7.25 
7.25 
2000 
8.00 
9.20 
8.79 
8.00 
2010 
10.25 
12.75 
9.91 
6.85 
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Table 5.4.3 NET SOLID FUEL IMPORT 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
59.6 
5.4 
7.4 
0.9 
1.1 
5.4 
8.9 
1.9 
13.3 
1.1 
7.1 
1.5 
5.5 
1990 
76.8 
7.9 
7.7 
1.8 
1.1 
5.0 
12.1 
2.5 
15.5 
1.2 
7.8 
2.2 
12.0 
1995 
102.8 
116.6 
116.6 
89.8 
10.2 
10.7 
10.7 
9.1 
8.2 
8.6 
8.6 
8.0 
8.5 
14.4 
14.4 
5.5 
1.4 
1.6 
1.6 
0.9 
9.3 
12.3 
12.3 
7.2 
12.0 
12.9 
12.9 
10.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.7 
2.0 
21.2 
21.9 
21.9 
19.9 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
9.4 
9.6 
9.6 
9.2 
3.2 
3.7 
3.7 
2.8 
15.8 
17.0 
17.0 
13.7 
2000 
152.2 
181.7 
146.4 
112.6 
11.9 
13.1 
10.6 
9.7 
8.6 
9.3 
8.5 
7.7 
24.6 
35.2 
28.0 
13.4 
2.9 
3.8 
2.0 
1.3 
11.4 
19.2 
17.0 
9.5 
16.0 
17.2 
13.7 
10.8 
3.0 
3.9 
3.5 
1.5 
27.0 
27.9 
21.9 
21.9 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.0 
12.9 
13.2 
11.8 
11.7 
3.2 
4.3 
3.8 
2.8 
29.5 
33.6 
24.4 
21.3 
2005 
180.8 
204.1 
128.2 
111.2 
12.5 
13.4 
9.1 
8.5 
9.1 
9.8 
7.7 
6.9 
29.7 
39.3 
22.3 
13.9 
4.2 
4.6 
2.0 
1.3 
13.2 
20.9 
14.6 
5.2 
21.5 
22.5 
13.1 
11.0 
4.0 
4.8 
3.8 
1.7 
34.2 
35.0 
23.6 
27.7 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
0.9 
13.0 
13.3 
9.7 
11.1 
4.9 
5.7 
4.5 
2.9 
33.3 
33.6 
16.8 
20.1 
2010 
216.94 
239.24 
114.97 
106.23 
13.06 
13.77 
7.72 
7.35 
9.52 
10.34 
6.88 
6.17 
36.00 
43.82 
17.73 
14.45 
6.27 
5.59 
2.11 
1.24 
15.22 
22.89 
12.58 
2.89 
28.90 
29.32 
12.61 
11.25 
5.22 
6.07 
4.11 
1.91 
43.17 
43.93 
25.55 
1.91 
1.15 
1.09 
0.98 
0.86 
13.24 
13.44 
7.90 
10.61 
7.68 
7.75 
5.25 
2.91 
37.51 
41.23 
11.55 
18.88 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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5.5 Gas Sector 
GAS DEMAND 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Total Demand 
MTOE 
1987 1995 2000 2010 
SCENARIO 1 
SCENARIO 3 
C D SCENARIO 2 
Q U SCENARIO 4 
Domestic and tert iary sectors remain the most 
important despite growth in power sector. 
Demand by Sector (*) 
MTOE 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
β DOMEST.-TERT. C D INDUSTRY H i NON ENERGY USES 
C D ENERGY BRANCH ESS) POWER GENERATION 
(·) NATURAL GAS ONLY 
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GAS SUPPLY 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
D e p l e t i o n leads to dec l in ing product ion a f ter 2 0 0 0 
Production 
145 
140 
135 
130 
125 
Mtoe 
120-
115 
1987 1990 
τ — ι — ι — ι — ι — ι — ι — ι — ι — Γ 
1995 2000 
Wide range of u n c e r t a i n t y by 2 0 1 0 
Net Imports 
310 
270 
230 
190 
Mtoe 
Sc 2 
ι—ι 1 1—ι—Γ 
2005 2010 
Sc 3.3 -' 
Sc 3.2, 
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Table 5.5.1 NATURAL GAS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12\ 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
129.0 
0.0 
2.1 
12.8 
0.1 
0.6 
3.3 
1.3 
13.2 
56.1 
39.3 
1990 
131.2 
2.7 
11.6 
0.1 
0.9 
2.4 
1.7 
14.0 
55.3 
42.5 
1995 
136.8 
140.5 
140.5 
136.8 
3.5 
3.6 
3.6 
3.5 
12.3 
12.3 
12.3 
12.3 
1.2 
1.5 
1.5 
1.2 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
15.3 
16.0 
16.0 
15.3 
53.0 
54.4 
54.4 
53.0 
48.3 
49.5 
49.5 
48.3 
2000 
135.3 
140.6 
139.8 
135.1 
4.0 
4.3 
4.2 
3.9 
11.9 
11.9 
11.9 
11.9 
1.5 
1.9 
1.8 
1.5 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
16.5 
17.3 
17.3 
16.5 
48.8 
50.0 
50.0 
48.8 
50.0 
52.5 
52.0 
50.0 
2005 
126.2 
135.5 
132.0 
126.2 
4.2 
4.6 
4.3 
4.2 
11.6 
11.6 
11.6 
11.6 
1.7 
2.1 
1.9 
1.7 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
16.4 
17.4 
17.1 
16.4 
44.0 
45.7 
45.1 
44.0 
47.4 
53.2 
51.0 
47.4 
2010 
119.36 
132.55 
126.46 
119.36 
4.40 
4.84 
4.55 
4.40 
11.31 
11.31 
11.31 
11.31 
1.90 
2.40 
2.10 
1.90 
0.75 
0.75 
0.75 
0.75 
16.25 
17.50 
17.00 
16.25 
39.75 
41.75 
40.75 
39.75 
45.00 
54.00 
50.00 
45.00 
Sources: SOEC and OG XVII A2 estimates 
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Table 5.5.2 NET GAS IMPORT 
MTOE 
EUROPE 12 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
1987 
71.4 
7.5 
-0.8 
33.1 
2.2 
22.6 
19.2 
0.4 
-22.5 
10.0 
1990 
81.4 
8.7 
-0.9 
33.7 
2.8 
26.1 
21.0 
0.4 
-20.8 
10.5 
1995 
95.9 
112.0 
112.0 
88.8 
9.3 
10.3 
10.3 
9.2 
-1.0 
-0.9 
-0.9 
-1.0 
36.8 
40.9 
40.9 
35.1 
1.6 
2.2 
2.2 
1.5 
3.1 
3.7 
3.7 
3.4 
30.0 
31.9 
31.9 
29.1 
0.3 
0.3 
25.8 
27.9 
27.9 
24.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
-18.3 
-17.2 
-17.2 
-19.7 
0.0 
0.0 
8.2 
12.4 
12.4 
6.6 
2000 
114.1 
139.0 
138.7 
100.2 
11.1 
12.8 
11.6 
10.8 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-0.8 
-1.0 
41.8 
45.4 
47.8 
38.4 
2.0 
3.9 
3.5 
2.2 
4.2 
5.6 
5.6 
4.1 
32.7 
36.1 
36.3 
30.5 
0.6 
1.1 
0.9 
0.7 
28.7 
32.6 
31.9 
26.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
0.5 
-15.9 
-14.1 
-14.2 
-17.5 
1.3 
1.7 
1.5 
1.2 
8.0 
14.4 
14.0 
3.8 
2005 
135.6 
157.6 
157.9 
114.5 
11.5 
13.3 
12.0 
11.2 
-0.7 
-0.9 
-0.1 
-0.6 
42.3 
46.8 
50.2 
41.4 
2.2 
4.2 
4.1 
2.3 
4.9 
6.4 
6.7 
3.6 
35.6 
38.5 
38.5 
32.1 
1.2 
1.9 
1.6 
1.2 
31.5 
35.1 
35.3 
28.0 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
-8.0 
-7.4 
-9.4 
-12.0 
1.6 
2.1 
2.2 
1.4 
12.8 
17.0 
16.2 
5.5 
2010 
157.30 
174.82 
177.24 
128.81 
12.05 
13.88 
12.39 
11.72 
-0.48 
-0.91 
-0.02 
-0.43 
42.73 
48.26 
52.73 
44.58 
2.53 
4.62 
4.90 
2.44 
5.69 
7.31 
8.08 
3.12 
38.82 
41.11 
40.81 
33.81 
2.30 
3.25 
2.97 
2.12 
34.51 
37.80 
39.17 
29.50 
0.65 
0.70 
0.63 
0.55 
-4.03 
-3.90 
-6.20 
-8.27 
2.00 
2.60 
3.14 
1.67 
20.53 
20.10 
18.64 
8.00 
Sources: SOEC and DG XVII A2 estimates 
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5.6 Atmospheric Pollutants 
Scenario Comparisons 
( EUROPE 12 ) 
Emiss ions up in scenar ios 1 and 2, down in scenar ios 3 and 4 
C02 
M Tonn·· 
4000 
1 
m Iiiii ..; 
1 Sc 1 CD Sc 2 VM Sc 3 UHI Sc 4 
Emiss ions down in al l scenar ios 
NOx 
M Tonnes 
12 
10 
Β 
β 
!Æ i ! 
• 
mm 
1006 
ESS3 sc 1 CD sc 2 ^ 8c s ΕΠΕ sc 4 
Emissions down in al l scenar ios 
S02 
14 
1 2 ­
10-
8 
β 
2 
0 m 
¡si il 
1890 1095 2000 
I 80 1 CD 8c 2 ZM 8c 3 UUSI 8c 4 
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Table 5.6.1 EUR12 S02 Emissions ( Mtons ] 
Greatest scope for reductions in the power generation sector. 
Conventional Wisdom 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential /Tertiary 
1986 
13.40 
8.61 
0.82 
3.97 
2.12 
0.56 
1.30 
1990 
12.23 
7.65 
0.67 
3.90 
2.12 
0.68 
1.10 
1995 
12.02 
7.39 
0.71 
3.93 
2.17 
0.73 
1.02 
2000 
10.26 
5.90 
0.62 
3.74 
2.05 
0.76 
0.93 
2010 
6.56 
2.39 
0.51 
3.66 
2.07 
0.79 
0.79 
Driving 
1986 
13.40 
8.61 
0.82 
3.97 
2.12 
0.56 
1.30 
Into Tensions 
1990 
12.23 
7.65 
0.67 
3.90 
2.12 
0.68 
1.10 
1995 
12.83 
7.85 
0.80 
4.17 
2.29 
0.83 
1.05 
2000 
11.33 
6.63 
0.68 
4.03 
2.16 
0.94 
0.92 
2010 
6.85 
2.52 
0.53 
3.80 
2.08 
0.96 
0.75 
Sustaining High Economic 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential/Tertiary 
Growth 
1986 
13.40 
8.61 
0.82 
3.97 
2.12 
0.56 
1.30 
1990 
12.23 
7.65 
0.67 
3.90 
2.12 
0.68 
1.10 
1995 
12.83 
7.85 
0.80 
4.17 
2.29 
0.83 
1.05 
2000 
10.39 
5.98 
0.60 
3.82 
2.10 
0.80 
0.91 
2010 
4.81 
1.84 
0.37 
2.61 
1.51 
0.51 
0.58 
High Prices 
1986 
13.40 
8.61 
0.82 
3.97 
2.12 
0.56 
1.30 
1990 
12.23 
7.65 
0.67 
3.90 
2.12 
0.68 
1.10 
1995 
11.47 
7.22 
0.75 
3.50 
1.88 
0.71 
0.91 
2000 
9.07 
5.33 
0.69 
3.04 
1.69 
0.68 
0.68 
2010 
4.32 
1.76 
0.69 
1.88 
1.11 
0.37 
0.40 
Source: DG XVII A2 estimates 
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S02 EMISSIONS PER CAPITA 
1986 
Kø/es pita 
Conventional Wisdom 
Kg/capita 
Sustaining High Economic Growth 
Kg/capita 
40 
30 
20 
10 
2010 
ï 
111 \¿£ I 
EUR12 
Β DK D GR E F IRL 
Country 
I DO X V I I Λ2 » a t i n a i · · ) 
L NL Ρ UK 
Driving Into Tensions 
Kg/capita 
High Prices 
Kg/capita 
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Table 5.6.2 EUR12 NOx Emissions ( Mtons) 
Conventional Wisdom 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential/Tertiary 
1986 
9.56 
2.40 
0.21 
6.95 
0.72 
5.62 
0.61 
1990 
10.38 
2.25 
0.23 
7.90 
0.75 
6.53 
0.62 
1995 
9.50 
2.20 
0.25 
7.06 
0.77 
5.67 
0.62 
2000 
7.88 
1.76 
0.25 
5.87 
0.77 
4.51 
0.59 
2010 
7.85 
1.61 
0.23 
6.01 
0.80 
4.64 
0.57 
Driving 
1986 
9.56 
2.40 
0.21 
6.95 
0.72 
5.62 
0.61 
Into Tensions 
1990 
10.38 
2.25 
0.23 
7.90 
0.75 
6.53 
0.62 
1995 
10.38 
2.37 
0.25 
7.76 
0.80 
6.31 
0.65 
2000 
9.24 
2.07 
0.25 
6.92 
0.80 
5.50 
0.63 
2010 
8.98 
1.79 
0.24 
6.96 
0.82 
5.55 
0.59 
Behaviour change in the transport sector required to significantly reduce NOx emission 
(scenarios 3 and 4) 
Sustaining High Economic Growth 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential/Tertiary 
1986 
9.56 
2.40 
0.21 
6.95 
0.72 
5.62 
0.61 
1990 
10.38 
2.25 
0.23 
7.90 
0.75 
6.53 
0.62 
1995 
10.38 
2.37 
0.25 
7.76 
0.80 
6.31 
0.65 
2000 
8.20 
1.86 
0.22 
6.11 
0.77 
4.71 
0.63 
2010 
5.55 
1.24 
0.17 
4.14 
0.65 
2.97 
0.52 
High Prices 
1986 
9.56 
2.40 
0.21 
6.95 
0.72 
5.62 
0.61 
1990 
10.38 
2.25 
0.23 
7.90 
0.75 
6.53 
0.62 
1995 
9.17 
2.15 
0.25 
6.77 
0.68 
5.51 
0.59 
2000 
7.03 
1.61 
0.25 
5.18 
0.65 
4.02 
0.51 
2010 
4.53 
1.20 
0.21 
3.13 
0.52 
2.20 
0.40 
Source: DG XVII A2 estimates 
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NOX EMISSIONS PER CAPITA 
1986 
Kg/ospita 
80 
eo-
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E " " * 
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Country 
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Table 5.6.3 EUR12 C02 Emissions Mtons) 
Conventional Wisdom 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential/Tertiary 
1986 
2560.46 
786.41 
93.32 
1680.72 
496.48 
577.53 
606.72 
1990 
2764.98 
857.46 
103.29 
1804.24 
513.27 
672.91 
618.06 
1995 
2930.10 
965.93 
111.03 
1853.14 
517.90 
716.76 
618.49 
2000 
3025.79 
1046.37 
110.41 
1869.02 
521.68 
743.42 
603.92 
2010 
3143.25 
1190.51 
105.72 
1847.03 
518.53 
759.26 
569.23 
Driving Into 
1986 
2560.46 
786.41 
93.32 
1680.72 
496.48 
577.53 
606.72 
Tensions 
1990 
2764.98 
857.46 
103.29 
1804.24 
513.27 
672.91 
618.06 
1995 
3135.91 
1034.80 
114.96 
1986.15 
538.85 
797.69 
649.62 
2000 
3405.35 
1218.29 
115.68 
2071.39 
540.03 
898.28 
633.08 
2010 
3481.70 
1334.18 
105.07 
2042.45 
541.48 
907.16 
593.81 
Major behavioural changes are required to reduce C02 emissions levels by 2010. 
(scenarios 3 and 4) 
Sustaining High Economic 
Emissions by sector 
TOTAL 
Power Generation 
Energy sector 
Final Sector 
Industry 
Transports 
Residential/Tertiary 
Growth 
1986 
2560.46 
786.41 
93.32 
1680.72 
496.48 
577.53 
606.72 
1990 
2764.98 
857.46 
103.29 
1804.24 
513.27 
672.91 
618.06 
1995 
3135.91 
1034.80 
114.96 
1986.15 
538.85 
797.69 
649.62 
2000 
3120.83 
1099.88 
101.88 
1919.07 
516.90 
769.32 
632.86 
2010 
2426.25 
912.30 
77.78 
1436.17 
424.57 
480.22 
531.39 
High Prices 
1986 
2560.46 
786.41 
93.32 
1680.72 
496.48 
577.53 
606.72 
1990 
2764.98 
857.46 
103.29 
1804.24 
513.27 
672.91 
618.06 
1995 
2812.98 
947.15 
111.44 
1754.39 
471.94 
695.72 
586.73 
2000 
2701.52 
961.79 
110.20 
1629.53 
455.93 
656.07 
517.53 
2010 
2098.37 
880.51 
96.14 
1121.73 
353.29 
357.32 
411.12 
Source: DG XVII A2 estimates 
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON SCENARIO 3 
6.1 Electricity Generating Capacities 
Europe 12 
Scenario 3.1 
GW 
1990 1995 2000 2010 
H Ü Nuclear I I Solids 
CD OH * Gas M Peak 
Oil 
Hydro 
Gas 
Other renewable 
Large capacity differences by 2010 
GW 
100 
50 
■50 
1 0 0 ­
­150 
3.2 3.3 3.4 
Nuclear I I Solids Gas Other renewable 
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Table 6.1.1 EVOLUTION OF NET MAXIMUM CAPACITIES : SUSTAINING HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SCENARIO 3.1 : REFERENCE 
EUROPE 12 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
433.04 
105.29 
78.70 
246.90 
141.45 
49.88 
18.04 
0.00 
23.24 
14.30 
2.15 
0.03 
0.42 
1.46 
0.00 
0.24 
1995 
473.35 
114.69 
83.98 
271.82 
155.32 
50.97 
17.61 
5.10 
24.07 
18.75 
2.86 
0.16 
0.53 
1.93 
0.00 
0.24 
2000 
504.78 
120.46 
88.02 
291.91 
175.69 
47.17 
15.23 
12.04 
21.81 
19.96 
4.38 
0.76 
0.85 
2.52 
0.00 
0.24 
2010 
535.56 
165.82 
90.84 
272.57 
162.85 
32.44 
11.48 
34.14 
13.46 
18.21 
6.34 
2.54 
1.07 
2.48 
0.00 
0.24 
EUROPE 12 
Shares 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
100.0% 
24.3% 
18.2% 
57.0% 
32.7% 
11.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
5.4% 
3.3% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1995 
100.0% 
24.2% 
17.7% 
57.4% 
32.8% 
10.8% 
3.7% 
1.1% 
5.1% 
4.0% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
2000 
100.0% 
23.9% 
17.4% 
57.8% 
34.8% 
9.3% 
3.0% 
2.4% 
4.3% 
4.0% 
0.9% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
2010 
100.0% 
31.0% 
17.0% 
50.9% 
30.4% 
6.1% 
2.1% 
6.4% 
2.5% 
3.4% 
1.2% 
0.5% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
Table 6.1.2 EVOLUTION OF NET MAXIMUM CAPACITIES : SUSTAINING HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SCENARIO 3.2 : Nuclear Stable After 2000 With Medium Renewables 
EUROPE 12 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
433.04 
105.29 
78.70 
246.90 
141.45 
49.88 
18.04 
0.00 
23.24 
14.30 
2.15 
0.03 
0.42 
1.46 
0.00 
0.24 
1995 
473.35 
114.69 
83.98 
271.82 
155.32 
50.97 
17.61 
5.10 
24.07 
18.75 
2.86 
0.16 
0.53 
1.93 
0.00 
0.24 
2000 
504.94 
120.46 
88.02 
289.75 
175.69 
47.17 
15.23 
9.88 
21.81 
19.96 
6.71 
1.26 
0.85 
4.36 
0.00 
0.24 
2010 
535.88 
120.46 
90.84 
313.04 
162.85 
32.44 
11.48 
74.61 
13.46 
18.21 
11.54 
3.50 
1.07 
6.72 
0.00 
0.24 
EUROPE 12 
Shares 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
100.0% 
24.3% 
18.2% 
57.0% 
32.7% 
11.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
5.4% 
3.3% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1995 
100.0% 
24.2% 
17.7% 
57.4% 
32.8% 
10.8% 
3.7% 
1.1% 
5.1% 
4.0% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
2000 
100.0% 
23.9% 
17.4% 
57.4% 
34.8% 
9.3% 
3.0% 
2.0% 
4.3% 
4.0% 
1.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.9% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
2010 
100.0% 
22.5% 
17.0% 
58.4% 
30.4% 
6.1% 
2.1% 
13.9% 
2.5% 
3.4% 
2.2% 
0.7% 
0.2% 
1.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
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Table 6.1.3 EVOLUTION OF NET MAXIMUM CAPACITIES : SUSTAINING HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SCENARIO 3.3 : Nuclear Moratorium With Maximum Renewables 
EUROPE 12 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
433.04 
105.29 
78.70 
246.90 
141.45 
49.88 
18.04 
0.00 
23.24 
14.30 
2.15 
0.03 
0.42 
1.46 
0.00 
0.24 
1995 
473.35 
114.69 
83.98 
271.82 
155.32 
50.97 
17.61 
5.10 
24.07 
18.75 
2.86 
0.16 
0.53 
1.93 
0.00 
0.24 
2000 
505.01 
106.16 
88.02 
302.01 
175.69 
47.17 
15.23 
22.14 
21.81 
19.96 
8.83 
1.47 
0.85 
6.27 
0.00 
0.24 
2010 
536.29 
60.87 
90.84 
367.60 
162.85 
32.44 
11.48 
129.17 
13.46 
18.21 
16.98 
4.19 
1.07 
11.47 
0.00 
0.24 
EUROPE 12 
Shares 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
100.0% 
24.3% 
18.2% 
57.0% 
32.7% 
11.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
5.4% 
3.3% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1995 
100.0% 
24.2% 
17.7% 
57.4% 
32.8% 
10.8% 
3.7% 
1.1% 
5.1% 
4.0% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
2000 
100.0% 
21.0% 
17.4% 
59.8% 
34.8% 
9.3% 
3.0% 
4.4% 
4.3% 
4.0% 
1.7% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
2010 
100.0% 
11.4% 
16.9% 
68.5% 
30.4% 
6.0% 
2.1% 
24.1% 
2.5% 
3.4% 
3.2% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
2.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
Table 6.1.4 EVOLUTION OF NET MAXIMUM CAPACITIES : SUSTAINING HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SCENARIO 3.4 : Nuclear Stable After 2000 With Maximum Gas And Maximum Renewables 
EUROPE 12 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil + gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
433.04 
105.29 
78.70 
246.90 
141.45 
49.88 
18.04 
0.00 
23.24 
14.30 
2.15 
0.03 
0.42 
1.46 
0.00 
0.24 
1995 
473.35 
114.69 
83.98 
271.82 
155.32 
50.97 
17.61 
5.10 
24.07 
18.75 
2.86 
0.16 
0.53 
1.93 
0.00 
0.24 
2000 
505.01 
120.46 
88.02 
287.70 
153.64 
47.17 
15.23 
29.89 
21.81 
19.96 
8.83 
1.47 
0.85 
6.27 
0.00 
0.24 
2010 
536.29 
120.46 
90.84 
308.01 
104.85 
32.44 
11.48 
127.58 
13.46 
18.21 
16.98 
4.19 
1.07 
11.47 
0.00 
0.24 
EUROPE 12 
Shares 
TOTAL 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
THERMAL 
solids 
oil 
conv. gas 
com. c. gas 
oil+gas 
peak 
RENEW 
wind 
geoth 
bio-mass 
solar 
tydal 
1990 
100.0% 
24.3% 
18.2% 
57.0% 
32.7% 
11.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
5.4% 
3.3% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1995 
100.0% 
24.2% 
17.7% 
57.4% 
32.8% 
10.8% 
3.7% 
1.1% 
5.1% 
4.0% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
2000 
100.0% 
23.9% 
17.4% 
57.0% 
30,4% 
9.3% 
3.0% 
5.9% 
4.3% 
4.0% 
1.7% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
2010 
100.0% 
22.5% 
16.9% 
57.4% 
19.6% 
6.0% 
2.1% 
23.8% 
2.5% 
3.4% 
3.2% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
2.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
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6.2 Comparison of C02 Emissions and Imports 
Table 6.2.1 Comparative Summary 
Main Findings in 2000 
C02 Output (Mtonnnes) 
Power Generation ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) 
Solids ( 1 ) 
Gas(2) 
TOTAL EMISSIONS 
Variations in % of base case 
Sc 3.1 
533.0 
473.0 
60.0 
3120.8 
Sc 3.2 
529.6 
473.0 
56.7 
3117.5 
-0.1 
Sc 3.3 
548.6 
473.0 
75.6 
3136.5 
0.5 
Sc 3.4 
503.7 
416.1 
87.6 
3091.5 
-0.9 
Net Imports ( M toe ) 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
TOTAL 
Sc 3.1 
146.4 
138.7 
737.6 
Sc 3.2 
146.4 
135.9 
734.8 
Sc 3.3 
146.4 
151.8 
750.7 
Sc 3.4 
122.1 
161.8 
736.4 
Call On Import ( % ) 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
TOTAL 
Sc 3.1 
54.3 
49.8 
55.9 
Sc 3.2 
54.3 
49.3 
55.8 
Sc 3.3 
54.3 
52.1 
56.8 
Sc 3.4 
49.8 
53.7 
55.9 
Main Findings in 2010 
C02 Output ( M tonnes ) 
Power Generation ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) 
Solids ( 1 ) 
Gas(2) 
TOTAL EMISSIONS 
Variations in % of base case 
Sc 3.1 
475.8 
395.2 
80.6 
2426.2 
Sc 3.2 
538.5 
395.2 
143.2 
2488.9 
2.6 
Sc 3.3 
622.9 
395.2 
227.7 
2573.4 
6.1 
Sc 3.4 
470.8 
245.6 
225.2 
2421.3 
-0.2 
Net Imports (Mtoe) Sc 3.1 Sc 3.2 Sc 3.3 Sc 3.4 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
TOTAL 
115.0 
177.3 
562.1 
115.0 
229.8 
614.6 
115.0 
300.5 
685.3 
51.0 
298.5 
619.3 
Call On Import ( % ) Sc 3.1 Sc 3.2 Sc 3.3 Sc 3.4 
Hard coal 
Natural gas 
TOTAL 
52.3 
58.4 
47.7 
52.3 
64.5 
52.8 
52.3 
70.4 
59.4 
32.7 
70.3 
52.5 
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7. GLOSSARY 
Factors Name Symbol 
1.E+03 
1.E + 06 
1.E + 09 
1.E+12 
1.E+15 
UNITS 
Volume 
barrel 
US gallon 
cubic foot 
kilo 
mega 
giga 
tera 
peta 
Symbol 
bbl 
ftE3 
Kg 
M 
G 
Τ 
Ρ 
Equivalence 
158.98 litres 
3.785 litres 
28.32 litres 
HEAT 
Kcal 
joule 
BTU 
Kwh 
Kcal 
1 
4186 
3.969 
1.160E-03 
joule 
2.389E-04 
1 
9.480E-04 
2.780E-07 
BTU 
2.520E-01 
1054.8 
1 
2.930E-04 
Kwh 
860 
3.60E + 06 
3413 
1 
Example : 1 BTU - 1054.8 joules 
1 toe = 1.0E + 7 Kcal 
1 tee = 7.0E + 6 Kcal 
ABBREVIATIONS 
bpd barrel per day 
CHP Combined production of Heat and Power 
CIF Cost, Insurance, Freight 
CPEs Centrally Planned Economies 
DC Developing Countries 
DH District Heating 
FOB Free On Board 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
LDCs Less Developed Countries 
LNG Liquified Natural Gas 
LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas 
mbd million barrels day 
NGL Natural Gas Liquids 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
SOEC Statistical Office of European Community 
UNÍPEDE International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy 
WEC World Energy Conference 
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